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1 Introduction to the Topic 
1.1 Introduction 
Life is full of decisions and choices. While some of them are difficult to make, others are 
ordinary and intuitive. Yet, in both cases individuals are facing various different ways and 
options to express and to articulate them. For instance, decisions and choices can be expressed 
orally by talking to another person. Direct interpersonal communication is the cornerstone of 
human interaction and particularly important for business collaborations (Homburg/Stock 
2004; Scarino 2009). From business-to-business relations to ordinary grocery shopping, there 
are virtually infinite occasions in which individuals can opt to express their preferences, 
decisions, and choices in a face-to-face conversation (Cox/Cox/Anderson 2005; 
Homburg/Bornemann/Kretzer 2014). Of course, oral choice expression can also be asserted 
without the necessity of a face-to-face interaction. For instance, one can call another person to 
disclose a decision or one can order a pizza via phone. However, there are also many 
situations in which individuals usually do not express their preferences, decisions, and choices 
orally by speaking, but rather manually by some form of action. For example, in supermarkets 
and other stores offering self-service, it is possible to choose items by simply taking them 
from the shelves. Further, if individuals intend to get an item from a vending machine they 
only have to push buttons or to turn slots to express their choice and receive what they desire. 
Eventually, the internet allows individuals to express their decisions and choices via a simple 
mouse click.  
Despite the indubitable fact that a large number of different modalities of decision and choice 
expression exists, so far research as well as practitioners seem to neglect the potential impact 
of different modalities of decision and choice expression on decision making and choice. This 
is particularly surprising as ample studies repeatedly highlight that the process of decision 
making and the eventual choice is significantly affected by, or even entirely depending on 
various internal and external factors. For instance, there is evidence that factors such as the 
context-specific decision situation (e.g., Ratner/Kahn 2002), the valence of individual mood 
and affect (Garbarino/Edell 1997; Kahn/Isen 1993), the presentation and formation of a 
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choice set (e.g., Diehl/Zauberman 2005; Kahn/Wansink 2004; Mogilner/Shiv/Iyengar 2013), 
as well as the contextual induction of perceptions and metaphorical mindsets (e.g., 
Gu/Botti/Faro 2013; Shiv/Fedorikhin 1999) have an essential influence on the process of 
decision making and eventually steer the expression of choice. However, whether the 
modality in which preferences, decisions, and choices are expressed also constitutes a 
decision making and choice affecting factor and what potential practical recommendations 
could be drawn from the connection between expression modality and choice, constitute 
unanswered questions. 
In fact, to the best knowledge so far there is only one single initial attempt to explicitly 
investigate the effect of different modalities of preference expression on choice. In that study, 
Klesse/Levav/Goukens (2015) imply that the likelihood of making an indulging choice is 
indeed partly dependent on the modality in which a preference is expressed. This initial work 
is very insightful as it indicates that a difference in the modality of expressing one’s 
preferences impacts decision making and eventually choice. Yet, as many questions remain 
unanswered so far this study only constitutes the beginning of a series of research in an 
entirely new and promising research avenue investigating the impact of the modality of 
choice expression within the context of consumer behavior. 
1.2 Goal and Structure of the Present Dissertation 
As many potentially interesting questions still remain unanswered and other important 
questions are not even raised, this dissertation is intended to further elaborate on the potential 
impact of different modalities of decision and choice expression.  
With regard to the scarcity of relevant studies in this new field of research, this dissertation 
pursues the goal to gain more insights into the potential impact of different modalities of 
choice expression on decision and choice making as well as on the underlying mechanisms 
for this potential effect. That is, the present dissertation intends to reach and to fulfill two 
goals. In their initial study, Klesse/Levav/Goukens (2015) propose that different modes of 
preference expression might impact how impulsive choices are asserted. More specifically, 
the authors differentiate between manual and oral preference expression and assume that in 
contrast to manual preference expression, oral preference expression elicits impulsivity. By 
studying choice situations comprising a self-control dilemma (e.g., choosing between a tasty, 
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but unhealthy and a less palatable, but healthy snack) the authors observe that individuals 
expressing their preferences orally are more likely to choose an indulging over a healthy 
choice option than are individuals expressing their preferences manually. Although these 
findings are in line with the presumption that different expression modalities yield different 
levels of impulsivity, the underlying mechanisms have not been explicitly investigated or 
proven, yet. Accordingly, the first goal of this dissertation is to investigate and quantify the 
underlying mechanisms for why a difference in the modality of expressing one’s choice 
affects and shapes choice.  
Secondly, as mentioned before the study of Klesse /Levav/Goukens (2015) constitutes merely 
the first attempt of investigation in the research field of expression modality. Accordingly, 
very few insights have been obtained and many questions are not addressed, yet. Particularly, 
so far very little is known about the potential impact of expression modalities on subjective 
measures of choice quality. More precisely, Klesse/Levav/Goukens (2015) show that 
expression modalities influence the likelihood of making indulgent choices and also influence 
the likelihood of making choices that are in line with affective preferences. However, the 
consequences of different expression modalities on subjective perceptions, such as the 
perceived satisfaction with an expressed choice, remain unobserved. This is particularly 
interesting as research implies that subjective perceptions related to choice, such as 
satisfaction, are not necessarily mirrored by the objective quality or rightness of an expressed 
choice (Iyengar/Wells/Schwartz 2006; Schwartz et al. 2002). Accordingly, the second goal of 
the present dissertation is to investigate the influence of choice expression modalities on 
choice related subjective perceptions. 
Based on these research goals, the present dissertation is subdivided into five chapters and is 
structured as followed: In Chapter 1 the general relevance of the investigation of choice 
expression modalities for research in consumer behavior is established (section 1.1) and the 
research goals of this dissertation are presented (section 1.2).  
The subsequent Chapter 2 is intended to provide the conceptual basis on which the present 
dissertation is grounded. To this end the relevant terms ‘choice expression modality’, ‘choice 
rationality’ and ‘choice satisfaction’ are introduced and explained (section 2.1). Hereafter, the 
dual processing theory as general theoretic foundation is introduced and elaborated (section 
2.2). Section 2.3 and section 2.4 consecutively give a brief literature overview regarding 
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important insights into choice expression modalities and dual processing in the context of 
choice rationality (section 2.4.1) and choice satisfaction (section 2.4.2). Finally, section 2.5 is 
intended to summarize the insights from the literature and to develop the main research 
questions of the present dissertation.  
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 represent the core of the present dissertation. Chapter 3 is organized 
as scientific working paper and constitutes an empirical study (Study 1) intended to address 
the first research goal. As such Chapter 3 investigates the effect of manual and oral choice 
expression modalities on the induction of different types of mental processing, which could 
explain the underlying mechanism for why different choice expression modalities affect 
choices in different ways. This first study (Study 1) comprises three experiments, which all 
feature an individual method, results and discussion part. After a brief introduction (section 
3.1) and description of the conceptual foundation (section 3.2) a testable hypothesis stating 
that manual choice expression is more likely to yield an objectively rational choice compared 
to oral choice expression is developed (section 3.3). Thereafter, a general overview and 
explanation of the applied methods in the present experiments is provided (section 3.4). The 
following three sections comprise the three empirical experiments. Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2 (a, b) in section 3.5 and 3.6 respectively, are intended to reveal whether 
manually expressed choices are more likely to yield an objectively rational choice compared 
to orally expressed choices. Besides providing additional robustness of the initial findings, 
Experiment 3 in section 3.7 is intended to feature an important boundary condition. More 
precisely, it is investigated whether orally expressed choices are still less likely to yield an 
objectively rational choice if cognition is externally triggered. Subsequently, Chapter 3 closes 
with a general discussion of the obtained findings (section 3.8) including an argumentation 
about theoretical and practical implications.  
While Study 1 in Chapter 3 addresses the potential underlying mechanism for why different 
choice expression modalities might affect choice differently (i.e., induction of different types 
of mental processing), the second study (Study 2) in Chapter 4 is intended to investigate the 
impact of oral and manual expression modalities on the subjective measure choice satisfaction. 
As such Chapter 4 focuses on the second research question and hence, whether choice 
expression modalities also affect subjective perceptions related to choice. For this purpose, 
Study 2 comprises four empirical experiments, which all feature an individual method, results 
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and discussion part. More specifically, after a brief introduction (section 4.1) and presentation 
of relevant concepts (section 4.2), three hypotheses are developed (section 4.3). Particularly, 
it is proposed that oral choice expression yields higher levels of choice satisfaction than does 
manual choice expression (H1), that this effect disappears once cognition is externally 
triggered (H2) and eventually that this effect is mediated by the level of intuition when 
cognition is not externally triggered (H3). After a general description of the experimental 
procedure (section 4.4), the subsequent sections feature the four experiments. While 
Experiment 1 (a, b) (section 4.5) and Experiment 2 (section 4.6) are intended to address the 
main effect (H1), Experiment 3 (section 4.7) and Experiment 4 (section 4.8) are intended to 
replicate the main effect and additionally to address an important boundary condition (H2). 
Eventually, Experiment 4 (section 4.8) supports the assumption that the main effect of oral 
choice expression on choice satisfaction is mediated by the level of intuition when cognition 
is not externally triggered (H3). In a subsequent general discussion part (section 4.9), the 
obtained results are summarized and practical as well as theoretical implications are provided. 
In addition, section 4.9 addresses a major concern about the practical generalizability of the 
obtained results by the conduction of the post-hoc Experiment 5.  
The final Chapter 5 summarizes and discusses the insights and implications from Study 1 
(Chapter 3) and Study 2 (Chapter 4) with reference to the research questions of this 
dissertation.  
Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the general structure of the present dissertation.  
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2 Conceptual Background 
The second chapter of this dissertation is intended to define important terms and to provide a 
detailed overview of concepts and theories, which are relevant for the present dissertation. To 
this end, section 2.1 defines the terms choice expression modality, choice rationality, and 
choice satisfaction. Section 2.2 introduces the dual processing theory as theoretical 
foundation. The sections 2.3 and 2.4 provide a literature review regarding choice expression 
modality and dual processing in the context of rational choice and choice satisfaction. Finally, 
in section 2.5 the research questions for the present dissertation are developed. 
2.1 Definition and Explanation of Important Terms 
2.1.1 Discussion and Definition of the Term Choice Expression Modality 
This paragraph is intended to develop a comprehensive definition to describe the phenomenon 
of different ways or modes to express decisions and choices. As indicated in the introduction 
of this dissertation (Chapter 1.1), the only study attempting to define different ways of 
expressing a preference was recently conducted by Klesse/Levav/Goukens (2015). There the 
authors define different ways to express one’s choice as ‘preference expression modality’. 
However, because preferences and choices do not necessarily need to be congruent 
(Markus/Schwartz 2010) the term preference expression modality might be improper to 
define different ways of choice expression. More specifically, as the term preference might be 
defined as value assessment that involves a tradeoff of liking different options (Amir/Levav 
2008, Hausman 2011), the expression of choice (i.e., choosing) merely constitutes an 
observable, problem solving behavior (e.g., Amir/Levav 2008; Schall 2005; Simon 1957).  
Despite the fact that preference and choice represent different constructs, normative choice 
theory assumes that preferences are perfectly reflected by choice behavior 
(Bettman/Luce/Payne 1998). That is, economic theory proposes that individuals have 
preexisting preferences for attributes of a choice set (e.g., preference for free time and 
preference for money), from which specific preferences for different choice options (i.e., a 
bundle of attributes: spending free time to earn more money and vice versa) are revealed 
during the decision and choice process (e.g., Fischhoff 1991, Kron/Milovanovic 1975; Slovic 
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1975, 1995). Eventually, individuals are ought to choose an option that dominates the 
remaining options within the given choice set (e.g., Restle 1961; Slovic 1975). According to 
this ‘preference construction view’, the investigation of choice would be sufficient to make 
inferences about the underlying preferences as the expression of choice would always reflect 
the expression of preferences.  
However, empirical research implies that choices do not always perfectly mirror preferences. 
As the construction of preference requires some deliberation effort, individuals tend to avoid 
preference construction involving difficult and subjective value estimation. This is especially 
the case for rather unimportant choices, such as ordinary and habitual grocery shopping (e.g., 
Chaiken/Maheswaran 1994). In addition to that, individuals often express choices without 
being consciously aware of their own preferences (Amir/Levav 2008; Christenfeld 1995; 
Eliaz/Ok 2006).  
Further, although there are situations in which preferences do influence choices (Sharot/De 
Martino/Dolan 2009), there is also evidence that in certain situations choices influence 
preferences. Dissonance theory constitutes a prominent example for this change of causality 
(Sharot/Velasquez/Dolan 2010). In this context, studies have repeatedly demonstrated that the 
subjective preference for a chosen option is significantly augmented and the preference for the 
non-chosen options is significantly attenuated once a choice is expressed (e.g., Brehm 1956; 
Egan/Santos/ Bloom 2007; Festinger 1957; Gu/Botti/Faro 2013).  
Additionally, although the constructs ‘choice’ and ‘preference’ are both likely to deliver 
valuable insights and are worth to be studied, the investigation of choice seems to offer the 
opportunity for more rigorous research as it can be assessed very accurately (Border 1992; 
Samuelson 1938). In contrast, the assessment of preferences is rather difficult and involves a 
fair amount of uncertainty (Eliaz/Ok 2006). Following this argumentation, it appears that the 
term ‘choice expression modality’ might be more comprehensive than the term ‘preference 
expression modality’. 
As addendum, it is noteworthy to mention that in every day’s language the verbs ‘to decide’ 
and ‘to choose’ as well as the related nouns ‘decision’ and ‘choice’ are often used and 
perceived as being synonyms (e.g., Evans 1955; Schall 2005). Despite their similarities, there 
is a minor, but important difference between these terms. While ‘to choose’ is defined as an 
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action to express a selection based on preferences, ‘to decide’ is generally defined as 
determination of a question (Nowell-Smith 1958). However, because in a choice situation the 
question of determination is defined as the consideration of which option to choose, it is 
possible to argue that decision is a precursor of choice and that ‘to choose’ is eventually 
simply the overt action corresponding to ‘to decide’ (Schall 2005). Therefore, a strict 
differentiation between these terms might not be selective. However, because in contrast to a 
decision only the actual choice is objectively observable, in this dissertation the terminology 
‘choice expression modality’ is utilized to define different ways and options of expressing a 
decision for or  a choice of  a certain option. 
2.1.2 Rationality of Choice: A Matter of Objective or Subjective Outcome 
Research implies that decision and choice situations can be classified into two general 
categories according to the outcome of choice (Giblin/Morewedge/Norton 2013; 
Inbar/Cone/Gilovich 2010; Morewedge/Giblin/Norton 2014). On the one hand, there are 
decision situations and choice problems in which the outcome of a given decision or choice 
can be objectively assessed. Put differently, in these situations individuals are given sufficient 
information about the choice options and can sequentially deduce the best or optimal option 
after comparing and weighting the characteristics of a given choice set 
(Payne/Bettman/Johnson 1988). For example, the government’s decision where to locate a 
toxic waste dump or a student’s decision which college to choose, constitute decision or 
choice situations that are objectively assessable (Inbar/Cone/Gilovich 2010). On the other 
hand, there are decision situations and choice problems in which the outcome of a given 
decision or choice is entirely subjective. Put differently, these situations do not feature a 
generally ‘wrong’ or ‘right’ or a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ option as the decision or choice outcome is 
idiosyncratic. For instance, whether one chooses pudding or ice cream for dessert is a result of 
personal or even situational preferences and it is futile to declare a general superiority of one 
of the options. 
It is important to note that only the availability of sufficient information, but not the 
importance of a decision itself determines whether the outcome of a certain choice is a 
subjective or an objective matter. This can be exemplified by considering a person in a 
restaurant. If she can only choose between two deserts and knows that only one of them 
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contains peanuts, to which she is allergic to, the decision to choose the dessert without 
peanuts can be interpreted as being objectively rational, although generally the choice of a 
dessert is rather unimportant. However, the decision with whom one wants to spend one’s life 
together with is highly subjective and idiosyncratic, although this decision is very important 
and momentous. 
In addition to that, if in a specific decision or choice situation no or only insufficient 
information about the choice options is available, decisions and choices have to be expressed 
randomly, and accordingly the outcome of a choice in such a situation is subjective regardless 
of the actual importance of the decision (Christenfeld 1995; Payne/Bettman/Johnson 1988). 
Consider for instance a toss of a fair coin (i.e., a binary choice). Even if an individual might 
win a large amount of money by correctly predicting the outcome of the toss, the mere 
information that both sides show with equal probability is insufficient to determine an optimal 
choice. Thus, the prediction of the toss can only be made randomly. Accordingly, it is 
reasonable to argue that the outcome of a choice in choice situations featuring insufficient or 
little information can be defined as a subjective matter as it is not intelligible to define a 
superior choice. 
In summary, one can differentiate between choice situations in which the outcome of a certain 
decision or choice is an objective matter or a subjective matter. If a given choice set features 
an option that can be objectively determined as ‘the correct choice’, ‘superior to the remaining 
options’ or simply as ‘ the best choice’, the outcome of the underlying decision or choice is 
defined as objective matter and the superior option is defined as ‘objective rational choice’ 
(ORC). Only if an ORC exists, it is actually possible to express a rational choice. However, if 
a choice set does not include an ORC or if it features only insufficient information to 
determine the ORC, the outcome of the underlying decision or choice is defined as ‘subjective 
matter’, and rational choice making is by definition impossible in this situation 
(Giblin/Morewedge/Norton 2013; Inbar/Cone/Gilovich 2010, Morewedge/Giblin/Norton 
2014).  
2.1.3 Definition of Choice Satisfaction 
In a world of fierce market competition, enterprises have to find and adjust opportunities to 
maintain and to enhance their market performance (Netemeyer/Maxham/Lichtenstein 2010). 
Conceptual Background  11 
 
In this context various studies have repeatedly shown that customer satisfaction may 
constitute a key determinant to build and to shape important beneficial factors, such as 
customer loyalty (Yi/La 2004), repurchase behavior (Olsen 2002), and customers’ willingness 
to pay (Homburg/Koschate/Hoyer 2005). Eventually, because all of these factors tend to 
enhance profitability and the cash flow of the company (Luo/Homburg/Wieseke 2010), 
customer satisfaction can be considered an important corporate goal (Cooil et al. 2007; 
Fecikova 2004).  
In this context, customer satisfaction can be considered as multidimensional construct (e.g., 
Athanassopoulos 2000; Czepiel/Rosenberg 1977) of which choice satisfaction constitutes an 
important aspect of overall customer satisfaction (Anderson/Fornell/Lehmann 1994; 
Fitzsimmons 2000; Heitmann/Lehmann/Herrmann 2007). Choice satisfaction can be defined 
as the individual level of satisfaction with a given choice, without taking into account the 
consumption or usage of the chosen object (e.g., Fassnacht/Schmidt/Pannek 2015; 
Krishen/Hu 2014). In comparison to consumption satisfaction or overall satisfaction, the 
concept of choice satisfaction describes a more abstract and perception based level of 
satisfaction, which is mostly independent from pre-existing preferences and the actual product 
experience. The distinction between choice satisfaction, consumption satisfaction and overall 
satisfaction becomes more evident when considering a simple example of an individual 
participating in a tasting study. Suppose that this individual is offered three different options, 
is only allowed to try one of them, and has to indicate her level of satisfaction. The 
assessment of overall satisfaction includes the consideration of satisfaction with context 
specific aspects, such as the taste, the texture, and the consumption enjoyment. However, in 
addition overall satisfaction also comprises the assessment of satisfaction with context and 
consumption unspecific aspects, such as pre-existing preferences about the offered options. 
Overall satisfaction is eventually the mental average of the satisfaction with all relevant 
aspects (Gilbert/Veloutsou 2006). In contrast, the assessment of consumption satisfaction 
excludes consumption unspecific aspects. Consumption satisfaction can therefore be defined 
as the assessment of pre-consumption standards and actual consumption experience 
(Heitmann/Lehmann/Herrmann 2007; Oliver 1989). Eventually, choice satisfaction would be 
the individual’s satisfaction for choosing one particular option and not another one before 
trying any option. In other words, choice satisfaction defines the perception that an expressed 
choice was good and felt satisfying. 
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Because choice satisfaction is thus less affected by external influences (i.e., pre-existing 
preferences or pre-consumption standards), one can conjecture that choice satisfaction 
constitutes a more rigorous and less biased measure compared to the assessment of 
consumption or overall satisfaction. As the usage of very rigorous measures is particularly 
essential for the investigation of new research avenues, the focus of this dissertation is set on 
choice satisfaction (Calder/Phillips/Tybout 1982; Klesse/Levav/Goukens 2015; Peter 1981; 
Swets 1988).  
2.2 Theoretical Foundation 
2.2.1 Intuitive and Reflective Choices: The Dual Processing Theory 
The idea that decisions and eventually choices are elicited on the basis of two distinct mental 
processes, one that is intuitive and one that is more analytic has a long tradition in social 
psychology and marketing research (Alter et al. 2007; Inbar/Cone/Gilovich. 2010). Already at 
the end of the nineteenth century, James (1890, 1950) differentiated between an experience-
based associative type of thinking and a reason-based analytic type of thinking. Since then a 
tremendous body of research has evolved whereby the terms utilized to define the theory, the 
underlying models and even the general concepts have been repeatedly revisited and adjusted 
(e.g., ‘heuristic and systematic information processing’ by Chaiken 1980; ‘system one and 
system two processing’ by Stanovich/West 2000; ‘associative and rule-based processing 
mode’ by Smith/DeCoster 2000; ‘reflection and reflexion’ by Liebermann et al. 2002; 
‘reflective-impulsive model’ by Strack/Deutsch 2004). Additionally, evidence from the field 
of neuroscience further supports the existence of the duality of mental processing (e.g., Qiu et 
al. 2007).  
However, the fact that still many different concepts, models, and definitions of dual 
processing theory co-exist and that researchers in this field do not reach consensus on 
important aspects has caused a discussion about whether the dual processing theory might be 
generally questioned (Keren 2013; Keren/Schul 2009; Kruglanski/Gigerenzer 2011). 
Although this discussion is to some extent still in progress, it has already prompted many 
authors to review the overall concepts and to attempt to establish a more general and 
comprehensive theory (e.g., Evans/Stanovich 2013a; Evans/Stanovich 2013b; 
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Reyna/Brainered 2011). For instance, Evans/Stanovich (2013a) revisited the terms that 
diverse studies have assigned to the different styles of processing and concluded that defining 
rapid and intuitive processing as ‘Type 1’ and higher order reflective reasoning as ‘Type 2 
processing’ constitute the most indisputable terms. They argue that unlike the often applied 
term ‘System’ (e.g., Kahneman 2003), the term ‘Type’ correctly implies that two forms of 
processing exist, but that these types might be based on more than two cognitive systems. 
Further, there is now much consensus on what Evans (2007) calls ‘default-interventionist 
theory’. This theory assumes that individuals process information or sensations and response 
to them intuitively by default (i.e., Type 1) and that subsequent reflective processing (i.e., 
Type 2) only intervenes in case something unexpected happens or if individuals are highly 
motivated and committed (see also Strack/Deutsch 2004). In other words, individuals are 
assumed to process and response according to Type 1 processing until Type 2 processing is 
triggered by internal or external cues or antecedents (Evans/Stanovich 2013b). 
2.2.2 Antecedents of Type 2 Processing 
Despite the large number of scientific essays and empirical insights into the field of dual 
processing theory, research investigating which factors might potentially trigger individuals to 
engage in Type 2 processing and express choices and decisions accordingly is still limited 
(Alter et al. 2007; Evans 2008; Inbar/Cone/Gilovich 2010). The following section is intended 
to give a comprehensive overview of existing theories and discriminates between internal and 
external antecedents that trigger or induce Type 2 processing. Internal antecedents subsume 
all factors that are germane to subjective characteristics of an individual. Particularly, this 
includes the personal ability and motivation to engage in Type 2 processing (De 
Mello/MacInnis/Stewart 2007). On the contrary, external antecedents subsume all contextual 
factors that foster reflective thinking and Type 2 processing independent from internal 
antecedents.  
  Internal Antecedents 2.2.2.1
The idea that internal factors induce reflective thinking and that the engagement in Type 2 
processing is highly dependent on personal variables is commonly accepted. An early 
example of this concept is embedded in ‘the contingency model’ developed by 
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Beach/Mitchell (1978). The basic assumption of this model is that decisions and eventually 
choices can be made according to three general decision strategies, which are called ‘aided 
analytic’, ‘unaided analytic’ and ‘nonanalytic’ strategies. The first two strategies comprise 
rational decision processes (e.g., Type 2 processing) and only differ to the extent of 
expressing the underlying decision rules explicitly (i.e., aided analytic) or just mentally (i.e., 
unaided analytic). In contrast, a nonanalytic strategy is merely an intuitive rule of thumb (e.g., 
Type 1 processing). Because these decision strategies require different amounts of cognitive 
effort, Beach/Mitchell (1978) argue that the decision maker first mentally assesses the 
importance of the decision at hand and then decides for an appropriate decision strategy 
accordingly. More specifically, the authors assume that if a decision is perceived as being 
important, it is more likely that decision makers apply an analytic strategy, while if the 
decision is unimportant or its consequences are negligible, decision makers are more likely to 
apply a ‘rule of thumb like’ nonanalytic strategy. This supposition is also in line with what 
Payne/Bettman/Johnson (1993) call ‘the adaptive decision maker framework’. Payne and his 
colleagues (1993) argue very similarly to the assumptions of ‘the contingency model’ that a 
decision maker assesses the characteristics of the choice context (e.g., importance of the 
choice or required effort to align the presented information) before adjusting the decision 
strategy and decision precision correspondingly. Hence, both theories implicitly assume that 
Type 2 processing is to a large extent internally triggered, as the decision maker willingly opts 
to apply a certain decision strategy after assessing the subjective importance of a decision.  
In the same vein of thoughts, Chaiken (1980) shows that the likelihood of reflective 
processing is increased by the importance and the personal relevance of particular information. 
Although the original ‘heuristic-systematic model’ by Chaiken (1980) focuses on how 
individuals process information rather than on how they make decisions or choices, the 
model’s results can also be transferred to decision or choice situations (e.g. Suri/Monroe 
2003). The research of Chaiken (1980) implies that the perception of personal relevance and 
importance of a message augments the likelihood that individuals process and respond to it in 
a systematic manner compared to when the message is perceived as being irrelevant and 
unimportant (see also Chaiken/Maheswaran 1994). The idea that motivation and personal 
relevance is an essential internal antecedent of Type 2 processing is also the foundation of the 
‘elaboration likelihood model’ by Petty/Cacioppo (1986). Here the authors argue very similar 
to the ‘heuristic-systematic model’ (Chaiken 1980) that individuals only process information 
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in-depth if their motivation to do so is high. Additionally, Petty/Cacioppo (1986) assume that 
the idiosyncratic ability to process information systematically is another key antecedent of 
Type 2 processing. In other words, if individuals do not possess the cognitive ability or if the 
situation suppresses the ability of systematic information elaboration (e.g., time pressure), 
motivation is not sufficient for Type 2 processing to occur. In summary, the authors conclude 
that if individuals possess the ability to process information or a decision scenario 
systematically and if the information or the decision itself is personally relevant, individuals 
are likely to engage in Type 2 processing. This argumentation implies that Type 2 processing 
can also be externally triggered, for instance by increasing the personal relevance of a 
decision or choice. 
  External Antecedents 2.2.2.2
The ‘cognitive continuum theory’ by Hammond et al. (1987) is one of the first theories that 
explicitly states that the decision context can induce Type 2 processing and that this induction 
is at least to some extent independent from individual relevance of the decision context and 
ability to engage in Type 2 processing. Additionally, this theory postulates that characteristics 
of the decision context might trigger a certain response mode. For instance, in situations in 
which the application of an analytic decision approach is difficult or even impossible, 
individuals are likely to rely on intuition to make a choice. However, if the decision context 
provides clear and objective information, individuals seem to be more likely to engage in 
Type 2 processing. Although the cognitive continuum theory is one of the first attempts to 
describe the contextual and thus external cues potentially induce Type 2 processing and is 
thus very interesting, the theory does not explicitly explain why and how the decision context 
triggers Type 2 processing (see Inbar/Cone/Gilovich 2010 for a critical discussion on the 
cognitive continuum theory).  
The work by Inbar/Cone/Gilovich (2010) was intended to close this theoretical gap and to 
explain the antecedents of context induced Type 2 processing by defining ‘the task cueing 
hypothesis’. That is, in their studies the authors observe that if a certain task involves 
characteristics representative for Type 2 processing, individuals are eventually more likely to 
use Type 2 processing to solve this task. For instance, the authors show that increasing the 
complexity of a choice set augments the likelihood that choices are elicited based on Type 2 
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processing. Noteworthy is the fact that this finding remains significant even after controlling 
for perceived importance of the choice at hand. In other words, the external factor 
‘complexity’ triggers Type 2 processing independent from the internal factor ‘perceived 
importance of an item’. Very similar to ‘the task cueing hypothesis’, Alter et al. (2007) 
investigate the direct impact of external cues on Type 2 processing and find that task 
difficulty and perceived disfluency can trigger Type 2 processing independent from any other 
internal or external factor.  
In summary, the likelihood that individuals engage in Type 2 processing or remain default 
Type 1 processing when making a decision and expressing a choice is influenced by internal 
and external factors. Because the modality in which a choice is expressed does not constitute 
an internal but rather an external antecedent, the focus of the present dissertation is to shed 
light on choice expression modalities as potential external antecedents of Type 2 processing.  
2.3 Literature Overview on Choice Expression Modalities 
As the investigation of the impact of different choice expression modalities constitutes a very 
new field of research, so far only very few insights are obtained. Consequently, a thorough 
review of existing literature is only conditionally possible. The structure of chapter 2.3 is 
therefore diverging from the traditional standards of a literature review as the aim of this 
chapter is two folded. First, by reviewing literature implicitly investigating the impact of 
channels and choice situations on decision making and choice, the initial assumption by 
Klesse/Levav/Goukens (2015) that the majority of choices are either expressed orally or 
manually shall be revised. To this end, three very common choice situations are introduced 
(i.e., choice in stores, choice in the internet, and choice at vending machines) and a discussion 
about choice modalities, specific to the choice situation is provided. Second, by reviewing 
findings in the field of neuroscience, it is indented to build a theoretical foundation for the so 
far implicit assumption that manual choice expression is more likely to yield reflective 
choices (i.e., based on Type 2 processing) and that oral choice expression is more likely to 
yield intuitive choices (i.e., based on Type 1 processing). 
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2.3.1 Choice Expression Modalities in Different Choice Situations 
  Choice Expression in Stores 2.3.1.1
Despite the existence of various different opportunities and situations to express choice, the 
majority of consumer choices are still expressed in the channel of traditional brick and mortar 
stores (e.g., Avery et al. 2012; Cox/Cox/Anderson 2005; Pauwels/Neslin 2015; 
Thomas/Sullivan 2005; U.S. Census Bureau 2015). Although the generic term ‘bring and 
mortar store’ comprises an almost infinite number of different retailing or service providing 
facilities, it is reasonable to generally categorize bring and mortar stores according to whether 
the involved choice expression includes the necessity to interact with other individuals or not.  
Stores including the necessity to interact with other individuals encompass pharmacies, 
restaurants, banks, butchers, traditional bakeries, corner-shops, and premium stores (e.g., wine 
house, jeweler). Although this list is to no end exhaustive and might be extended by other 
examples, the similarity among these stores should become evident: In all choice situations 
the customer has to express her choice orally by speaking to a service-assistant, clerk, or 
waiter. 
Even though most stores offer at least the additional opportunity to interact with the selling 
staff (e.g., asking an employee), it is reasonable to assume that customers will only interact 
with the selling staff if it is actually necessary (Cox/Cos/Anderson 2005; Falk/Campbell 
1997). More precisely, in supermarkets, clothes outlets and any other stores offering self-
service (e.g., a buffet in a restaurant) customers normally express their choice by merely 
taking the item they want without engaging in any form of interaction, such as verbal 
communication with other individuals. 
Following this argumentation that most daily choices are still expressed in brick and mortar 
stores and the differentiation between stores that do or do not include the necessity to interact 
with another individual to express one’s choice, it is reasonable to argue that most daily 
choices in stores are asserted by either oral or manual choice expression modalities. 
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  Choice Expression Online 2.3.1.2
Despite the diverse insights into online choice behavior and about the differences and 
similarities between online and offline shopping behavior (e.g., Chu et al. 2010; 
Chu/Chintagunata/Cebollada 2008), so far no scientific effort has been made to investigate 
the modality through which choices are expressed online. More precisely, there are no 
insights into whether the choice expression modality enabled by the internet has any indirect 
or direct effect on choice. 
Obviously, online choices are expressed by ‘clicking’ and it is reasonable to argue that the 
online choice situation of choosing an item by clicking and dropping it into a virtual shopping 
basket is comparable with the choice situation in an offline store that does not include the 
necessity to interact with another individual (e.g., Pitta/Franzak/Fowler 2006). In both 
situations choices are expressed by a manual action (e.g., clicking on an item or taking an 
item) and as online shopping constitutes a private experience (e.g., Kukar-Kinney/Grewal 
2007), both situations do not include the necessity to verbally interact with another person. 
Accordingly, it can be conjectured that although there are important differences between 
online and offline choice situations, the modality of choice expression is comparable. 
Therefore, it is argued that online choice expression constitutes another form of manual 
choice expression.  
  Choice Expression at Vending Machines 2.3.1.3
Another very common situation of choice expression involves the usage of vending machines. 
Although vending machines usually contain snacks or beverages and thus mainly serve 
consumer products (Anupindi/Dada/Gupta 1998; Desai/Hoyer 2000), there is virtually no 
product category that cannot be chosen through a vending machine (Cross 2002; 
Dahl/Manchanda/Argo 2001). Despite the fact that choice expression at vending machines 
constitutes a rather common choice situation (French et al. 2001), little is known about the 
potential impact of the vending machine specific choice expression modality on choice. In 
order to express a choice at a vending machine an individual has to push buttons or has to turn 
slots (Brehm/Cole 1966). Thus, because choices are expressed by a manual action that does 
not require any form of verbal interpersonal interaction (Rayport/Jaworski, 2004), it is 
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reasonable to argue that the choice expression at vending machines is yet another form of the 
modality of manual choice expression. 
In summary, chapter 2.3.1 indicates that most daily consumer choices are either expressed 
orally by talking to another person or manually by any form of physical action (e.g., by taking 
an item or by clicking or pushing). Although, it is reasonable to argue that brick and mortar 
stores, the internet, and vending machines capture the majority of daily choice situations, this 
list of potential choice situations is to no end exhaustive. However, despite the maybe infinite 
number of different choice situations, it is claimed that it is generally intelligible to conjecture 
that probably all choice situations involve either a form of personal and verbal interaction, or 
a form of physical action to express choice. Following this argumentation, it is reasonable and 
comprehensive to differentiate between choice situations featuring oral choice expression 
modalities and choice situations featuring manual choice expression modalities. 
The following chapter 2.3.2 is intended to provide an argumentation for the assumption that 
orally and manually expressed choices might yield different choices, due to different mental 
processing types (e.g., Bock 1996; Klesse/Levav/Goukens 2015).  
2.3.2 The Impact of Choice Expression Modalities on Brain Activity and Type 2 Processing 
Although research on functional brain connectivity is to no extend conclusive and 
unequivocal (e.g., Damoiseaux/Greicius 2009; Ramsey et al. 2010; Sharma/Baron/Rowe 
2009), various studies repeatedly imply that the level of brain activity and the location of the 
activity within the brain is likely to be different for the execution of intended motoric action 
(e.g., manual response) compared to the execution of oral verbalization (e.g., speaking) (Frith 
et al. 1991; Wilson et al. 2004). Particularly, it seems likely that the specific areas triggered 
by simple manual actions are involved in higher cognitive processing. For instance, Kuo et al. 
(2009) find in an functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study that individuals 
solving tasks that require cognitive deliberation effort (e.g., dominance games) show 
increased activity close to the motor cortex (i.e., in the frontal lobe) and in the precuneus, a 
brain area responsible for motor control and motor coordination (Cavanna/Trimble 2006; 
Luo/Ding/Luo 2004). Further, Paus et al. (1993) found in a positron emission tomography 
(PET) study that manual actions (e.g., key-pressing of the right hand) trigger activity in the 
dorsal/caudal part of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which is considered to be strongly 
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involved in higher cognition and in the execution of demanding cognitive tasks and inferential 
reasoning (Bush/Luu/Posner 2000; Qiu et al. 2007).  
Accordingly, because motoric actions (e.g., manual choice expression modality) seem to 
trigger activity in brain areas likely related to higher cognition, it is conjectured that 
expressing a choice manually will likely trigger Type 2 processing. 
Although speech production also involves motoric actions (e.g., facial muscles and tongue 
movement), it seems likely that particularly the left insula is responsible for the motor control 
of speech (Ackermann/Riecker 2004; Dronkers 1996). This is particularly important to note 
as Bush/Luu/Posner (2000) find that the insula is active for automatic actions and Kuo et al. 
(2009) observe that the insula shows increased activity for intuitive tasks (e.g., coordination 
game). In addition, Paus et al. (1993) show that the verbal utterance of a pronoun causes 
activation in the rostral/ventral part of the ACC, which is often considered as the affective 
division of the ACC (Bush/Luu/Posner 2000). Therefore, it is assumed that in contrast to 
manual choice expression, oral choice expression does not trigger Type 2 processing. A 
graphical summary of the argumentation in this section 2.3.2 is given in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Conjectured relation of choice expression modalities and processing Types within the ACC 
Source:    Figure 2 is based on the work of Bush/Luu/Posner (2000)  
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2.4 Literature Overview on Dual Processing in the Context of Decision Making 
The following section is intended to provide a comprehensive literature overview on findings 
regarding the impact of reflective (i.e., Type 2 processing) or intuitive (i.e., Type 1 processing) 
in the context of choice rationality and choice satisfaction. 
2.4.1 Rational Choices and Dual Processing Theory 
Research has repeatedly shown that if a decision or choice situation features determinable 
‘good’ or ‘bad’ options and thus holds the opportunity to make an ORC, Type 2 processing 
augments the probability of making an optimal final choice (Alter et al. 2007; Chaiken 1980; 
Hamilton/Hong/Chernev 2007; Stanovich/West 2000). This finding is in line with traditional 
economic theories, implying that decisions involving deliberation and rational thought always 
yield superior outcomes compared to decisions based on intuitive gut feeling (Denno 2003; 
Simon 1955; Von Neumann/Morgenstern 2007). To investigate the likelihood of individuals 
expressing an ORC as proxy for Type 2 processing, various methods and procedures have 
been established. Based on the comprehensive work of Toplak/West/Stanovich (2011), Table 
1 summarizes the most frequently applied methods to assess the likelihood of individuals 
making an ORC or rational decision over an intuitively appealing, but irrational choice or 
decision option. Table 1 is ordered alphabetically and comprises the most frequently applied 
methods accompanied by a brief description of the underlying reasoning.  
  
22  Conceptual Background 
 
Method Example/Definition Relevant sources 
Bayesian reasoning Assessment of the probability of an event, given a 
conditional probability. 
Beyth-Marom/Fischhoff 1983; 
Stanovich/West 1998b 
Causal base rate Choosing the option recommended by Consumer 
Reports over the option recommended by a friend is 
the ORC. 
Fong/Krantz/Nisbett 1986 
Cognitive reflection 
test 
Choosing a correct over an intuitively appealing 
option is an ORC. 
Alter et al. 2007; Campitel-
li/Labollita 2010; Frederick 2005 
Conjunction problem Assessing that the conjunction of two independent 
events cannot be more likely than any of the single 
events constitutes an ORC. 
Tversky/Kahneman 1983 
Framing problem 
 
A problem is once framed positively and then 
negatively. Not changing initial choice is a proxy 
for ORC. 
Tversky/Kahneman 1981 
Methodological 
reasoning 
Assessing the ability to reason methodologically 
correctly is an ORC. 
Lehman/Lempert/Nisbett 1988 
Monty Hall’s three 
doors game 
Switching an initial choice after new information 
shape winning probabilities is an ORC. 
Friedman 1998; Gilo-
vich/Medvec/Chen 1995; 
Granberg/Brown 1995 
Outcome bias Evaluating events according to their relative odds, 
not absolute outcome. 
Baron/Hershey 1988 
Probabilistic 
matching/ Gamblers 
fallacy 
Consistency of strategy in games of independent 
events is rational behavior. 
West/Stanovich 2003; Gal/Baron 
1996 
Probabilistic 
reasoning/ Ratio 
bias/ Covariation 
detection 
Choosing an option that appears relatively more 
frequently over an option that appears absolutely 
more frequently is an ORC. 
Denes-Raj/Epstein 1994; 
Kirkpatrick/Epstein 1992 
Sample size bias/ 
Regression to the 
mean 
Intuitively every sample is likely to match the 
universal average, but a larger sample is more 
likely to represent the universal average. 
Tversky/Kahneman 1974; 
Kahneman/Tversky 1982; 
Lehman/Lempert/Nisbett 1988 
Sunk costs bias Choice consistency independent from initial 
investments is ORC. 
Frisch 1993; Stanovich/West 
1998a 
Syllogism Assessing the valence of a conclusion based on two 
(or more) premises correctly is an ORC. 
De Neyes 2006; 
Khemlani/Johnson-Laird 2012 
Table 1:  Overview of methods to assess ORC as proxy for Type 2 processing, alphabetic order 
Source:   Table 1 is based on the work of Toplak/West/Stanovich (2011). Note, this list is not  
   conclusive as other methods might exist or are still to be developed. 
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Although the assertion that Type 2 processing always increases the probability of making an 
ORC is reasonable and intuitively appealing, other studies indicate that depending on the 
choice situation Type 2 processing does not necessarily augment choice quality 
(Epstein/Denes-Raj/Pacini 1995; Giblin/Morewedge/Norton 2013; Novak/Hoffman 2009). 
For instance, in their classic study, Wilson/Schooler (1991) observed that students made 
course choices more in line with experts’ opinions when they decided intuitively compared to 
when they were ask to give reason for their choice or evaluate all attributes of the courses 
offered in depth. The rationale behind this argumentation is based on the assertion that 
especially important choices are accompanied by complex and an often tremendous amount of 
information. Although sufficient information is a necessary precursor to make an ORC, too 
much information is likely to impede the decision process and thus to decrease the likelihood 
of making an ORC (Dijksterhuis/van Olden 2006; Heitmann/Lehamnn/Hermann 2007; 
Nordgren/Dijksterhuis 2008; Wilson/Schooler 1991). Moreover, it is important to note that a 
decision based on reflective Type 2 processing does not increase the likelihood of making an 
optimal choice when the choice outcome is a subjective matter and thus the choice situation 
does not feature an ORC. For instance, whether an individual prefers one poster over another 
cannot be objectively evaluated as the final choice cannot be considered as being ‘good’ or 
‘bad’ per se (Giblin/Morewedge/Norton 2013; Inbar/Cone/Gilovich 2010).  
In summary, if a choice situation features sufficient information or comprises an ORC and if 
there is no or little choice uncertainty (i.e., choice outcome is an objective matter), decisions 
based on Type 2 processing augment the likelihood of making an optimal choice and are thus 
superior compared to choices based on Type 1 processing. However, if the choice situation 
features too much or too little information, and an ORC is not available (i.e., choice outcome 
is a subjective matter), decisions based on Type 2 processing do not necessarily yield superior 
choices. 
2.4.2 Choice Satisfaction and Dual Processing Theory 
Previous studies in the field of social psychology and marketing have repeatedly shown that 
external factors impact how satisfied individuals are with their choice. There is for instance 
empirical evidence that implies that factors, such as the size of an assortment (Iyengar/Lepper 
2000), the fact as to whether presentation of options appears simultaneously or sequentially 
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(Mogilner/Shiv/Iyengar 2013), and even the underlying process of decision making 
(Zhang/Fitzsimons 1999) have a strong influence on choice satisfaction. There is however, 
little knowledge about whether the type of cognitive processing during decision making has 
an impact on the level of perceived satisfaction with an expressed choice. 
Although intuitive decisions and ‘impulsive buying’ represent fairly common consumer 
behaviors (e.g., Rook/Fisher 1995; Steenkamp/Maydeu-Olivares 2015), lay-people and 
experts often consider intuitive decisions based on ‘gut-feeling’ as inferior compared to 
rational decisions (Shafir/Simonson/Tversky 1993; Simonson 1989; Strack/Werth/Deutsch 
2006). More specific, it is commonly proclaimed that thorough deliberation about decisions 
augments the decision quality (e.g., Chaiken 1980), which should eventually increase 
satisfaction with an elicited choice (e.g., Raiffa 1968; Tordesillas/Chaiken 1999). This 
conjecture is mainly based on the traditional economic view, which implies that rational 
decisions are generally more acceptable and maintainable (Simon 1955) and the assumption 
that individuals are more satisfied with their decisions and choices if they can justify them to 
others (e.g., Heitmann/Lehmann/Herrmann 2007; Slovic 1975). This view implies that choice 
satisfaction would be strongly related to choice rationality, and choice satisfaction should be 
positively affected by a reflective decision style (i.e., Type 2 processing). 
However, there is evidence which implies that intuitive decisions cannot be considered as 
being generally inferior and as less satisfying (Novak/Hoffman 2009). In contrary, depending 
on the context, intuitive decision making might even result in greater choice satisfaction 
compared to reason based decision making (Dijksterhuis et al. 2006; Kahneman 2003). 
Particularly, if a choice situation comprises little information and a high amount of choice 
uncertainty, individuals might benefit from a more intuitive decision style (e.g., Type 1 
processing). Although an intuitive decision style cannot systematically increase the likelihood 
of making an ORC by definition (since making an ORC always involves the deliberation and 
weighting of different options), it might be that an intuitive decision style augments 
satisfaction. For example, Wilson et al. (1993) found that satisfaction with a self-chosen 
poster as compensation for participating in an experiment was lower among participants that 
were asked to give reason for their poster choice and thus made an objective decision 
compared to participants that were not asked to give any reason for their poster choice and 
thus made an intuitive decision. Further, the study of Dijksterhuis et al. (2006) even indicates 
Conceptual Background  25 
 
that particularly for complex decisions (e.g., buying a new car) choice satisfaction can be 
increased when choices are based on unconscious deliberation rather than on rational thought. 
Particularly interesting is the observation that for choices with a subjective outcome an ORC 
does not necessarily result in higher levels of satisfaction (Schwartz et al. 2002). For instance, 
Iyengar/Wells/Schwartz (2006) find that the individual assessment of satisfaction with one’s 
career is independent from job status and objective job fit. In other words, even if individuals 
might have chosen their optimal career, they might not be satisfied with it. In contrast to that, 
although individuals might have chosen a career which does not have a high status and does 
not match their talents, they might still perceive their choice as comparably satisfying. 
Although the authors do not mention the career choice process of their participants, one could 
conjecture that because a career choice is highly subjective that those individuals who 
intuitively chose a career path were more satisfied with their jobs than those individuals who 
planned every part of their career in detail. 
In summary, when objective decisions rules are not applicable due to context specific 
constraints (i.e., too complex, limited, or no information is available) or because the choice 
outcome is a subjective matter, intuitively expressed decisions might outperform deliberation 
based and reflectively expressed decisions. That is, based on the literature one can deduce that 
if a choice situation is defined by little information, choice uncertainty and the absence of an 
ORC (i.e., a subjective matter) choices expressed based on an intuitive decision style (i.e., 
Type 1 processing) are likely to yield higher levels of choice satisfaction compared to choices 
expressed based on a reflective decision style (i.e., Type 2 processing).  
2.4.3 Final Thoughts about the Assessment of Dual Processing 
In the previous section of this dissertation, different research ventures and studies 
investigating dual processing and its consequences for choice rationality and choice 
satisfaction were briefly introduced. However, it is noteworthy to mention that in all studies 
the occurrence of Type 2 processing was not directly assessed but rather implicitly deduced. 
That is, although the different authors were able to observe that participants acted and 
behaved in ideal and predicted manner according to theoretical assumptions about Type 2 
processing, so far no study exists that explicitly and directly measures the occurrence of Type 
2 processing. For instance, Alter et al. (2007) conjecture that disfluency should induce Type 2 
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processing and accordingly find that participants facing disfluent information performed 
better on tasks requiring attention and deliberation compared to participants who faced the 
exact same information, but in a fluent manner. Although the authors’ argumentation is 
convincing and an alternative explanation is not obvious, they do not prove that disfluency 
triggers Type 2 processing, but that disfluency increases the performance in attention and 
deliberation demanding tasks. The assumption that performance in these tasks holds as a 
proxy for the occurrence of Type 2 processing is reasonable, but so far the concrete direction 
and causality of this relation is not explicitly proven in an empirical endeavor. In future 
studies, this explicit evidence might come from research in neuroscience, but then the settings 
and methods currently applied in this field, might create a fairly artificial situation which 
could potentially impact the results (see for instance Kuo et al. 2009).  
However, because current findings in neuroscientific research generally support the 
assumptions of the dual processing theory by implying that reflective and intuitive solving 
strategies can be attributed to different levels of activity in different brain areas (Kuo et al. 
2009; Qiu et al. 2007) and because currently a direct assessment of the mental processing 
styles seems to be difficult and virtually impossible in a realistic setting, the assessment of the 
probability of making an ORC in a specific choice situation appears to be the best proxy for 
the assessment of Type 2 processing (see Toplak/West/Stanovich 2011; West/Stanovich 
2003). Accordingly, in this dissertation it is assumed that if individuals behave in line with 
predictions about Type 2 processing, it can be deduced that they engage in Type 2 processing. 
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2.5 Summary of Literature Overview and Development of Research Questions 
As the investigation of choice expression modalities constitutes a new research avenue within 
the field of marketing, consumer behavior, and social psychology, very few insights exist so 
far. Although there are still many unanswered questions, the previous literature review 
(section 2.3) indicates that the differentiation between manual and oral choice expression 
modalities is a reasonable classification (e.g., Klesse/Levav/Goukens 2015). The present 
dissertation will therefore adapt this recommended classification of choice expression 
modalities.  
With reference to findings in the field of neuroscience, there is implicit support for the 
assumption that different modalities of choice expression might yield different types of 
mental processing. More specifically, it appears that manual actions trigger activity in brain 
areas involved in higher cognition, while oral utterance does not trigger activity in these areas 
(Bush/Luu/Posner 2000; Paus et al. 1993). In other words, these findings indicate that manual 
choice expression triggers individuals to engage in Type 2 processing, while oral choice 
expression does not trigger Type 2 processing and consequently individuals retain Type 1 
processing. However, so far no study has tried to empirically proof this conjecture. 
Consequently the following research question might be formulated: 
In contrast to oral choice expression, does manual choice expression trigger Type 2 
processing? 
However, because the direct assessment of Type 2 processing in a realistic setting is virtually 
impossible, as outlined in section 2.4.3, in the present dissertation indirect methods to assess 
the likelihood of engaging in Type 2 processing are applied. Therefore, the assessment of the 
probability of making an ORC will be applied as proxy for Type 2 processing 
(Toplak/West/Stanovich 2011). 
Accordingly, the literature overview in chapter 2.4 illustrated the insights into the relation 
between dual processing and choice rationality and making an ORC in particular. It was 
argued that neither a reflective nor an intuitive style of decision making and choice expression 
can be generally considered as being superior or inferior. Instead it seems that if the situation 
provides sufficient and relevant information to make an ORC, individuals benefit from a more 
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deliberative reflective style of decision making (i.e., Type 2 processing). Therefore, the 
initially stated first research question will be adjusted, so that a more unequivocal answer 
becomes feasible: 
First research question: What is the impact of manual and oral choice expression modalities 
on the likelihood of making an ORC as proxy for Type 2 processing? 
This research question is intended to be answered in Chapter 3 by Study 1. 
Further, it appears that if a choice situation does not comprise an ORC, little (or too much) 
information is available and the choice outcome is subjective, a reflective decision style is 
unlikely to augment the objective quality of choice. On the contrary, there is evidence that in 
particularly these choice situations an intuitive decision style might increase the subjective 
perception of choice satisfaction. Accordingly, the second research question is stated: 
Second research question: What is the impact of manual and oral choice expression 
modalities on subjective choice satisfaction in a choice situation with subjective outcome? 
As Type 1 processing constitutes the default mode of mental processing by definition (Evans 
2007), the implicit assessment of Type 1 processing appears to be difficult. However, a 
considerably high level of intuition in decision making might be a proxy to prove the 
existence of Type 1 processing (Alter et al. 2007). Accordingly, in line with the assumption 
that Type 1 processing has a positive impact on choice satisfaction, if the choice outcome is a 
subjective matter, the following research question is formulated: 
Third research question: Is the impact of manual and oral choice expression modalities on 
choice satisfaction in a choice situation with subjective outcome mediated by the level of 
intuition in decision making? 
The second and third research questions are intended to be answered in Chapter 4 of the 
present dissertation by Study 2. 
Study 1: The Effect of Manual and Oral Choice Expression Modalities on Choice Rationality 29 
 
3 Study 1: The Effect of Manual and Oral Choice Expression Modalities 
on Choice Rationality 
The following Chapter 3 is presented in form of a scientific working paper. In this chapter, 
the effect of manual (i.e., taking and button pressing) and oral (i.e., speaking) choice 
expression modalities on choice rationality is investigated. Based on the dual processing 
theory and research in neuroscience, it is conjectured that manual choice expression induces 
cognitive, Type 2 processing. Consequently, it is predicted that a manual modality of choice 
expression is more likely to yield an ORC than an oral modality of choice expression. In line 
with this conjecture, three laboratory experiments are conducted. Accordingly, the obtained 
results indicate that manually expressed choices are more likely to yield an ORC compared to 
orally expressed choices (Experiment 1, Experiment 2 (a, b)). However, if Type 2 processing 
is externally triggered prior to choice expression, no difference in the likelihood of making an 
ORC is observed (Experiment 3).  
3.1 Introduction 
‘We define ourselves by the choices we have made. We are in fact the sum total of our 
choices’ is part of the final quote of the fictive character Professor Louis Levy in the 1989 
Woody Allen movie ‘Crimes and Misdemeanors’ (Allen 1989). Of course nobody would 
doubt that important life choices such as getting married or choosing a career have a huge 
impact on our future and define who we are. But even smaller and rather ordinary choices, 
such as picking an item from the lower and not from the upper part of a shelf, ordering a salad 
and not pasta at a restaurant, or buying one brand while refusing to buy another at a grocery 
store have an impact on our mood, behavior, and well-being (e.g., see Patall/Cooper/Robinson 
2008 for an overview). In many situations we have various ways or modalities to express our 
choices (e.g., we can say what we want or simply take what we want) and the choices we 
make are often based on either intuition or on rational deliberation and differ to their extent of 
being objectively rational (De Neyes 2006; Evans 2011; Giblin/Morewegde/Norton 2013). 
Although the fact that different modalities for choice expression can be applied and the fact 
that the level of the objective rationality of an expressed choice might differ seem to be very 
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salient, no research has so far investigated whether a direct link between the modality of 
choice expression and the objective choice rationality exists. 
This study is intended to close this research gap and to investigate whether the way in which a 
choice decision is expressed (i.e., choice expression modality) influences the objective 
rationality of a choice (i.e., choice rationality). In three laboratory experiments, it is revealed 
that in contrast to orally expressed choices, manually expressed choices are more likely to 
yield an ORC. Implications for theory and practice are provided and discussed. This study 
starts with a brief explanation of the conceptual context and a brief introduction of the 
underlying theories. 
3.2 Conceptual Context 
3.2.1 Choice Expression Modalities and Dual Processing Theory 
Nowadays individuals are offered various different ways, options, and modalities to express 
their decisions and choices in the market. Although research repeatedly indicates that 
decisions and choices are highly dependent and strongly influenced by contextual factors (see 
Gu/Botti/Faro 2013 for an overview), and the fact that different choice expression modalities 
exist is indubitable, so far few is known about the potential impact of different choice 
expression modalities on decisions and choices. One exception constitutes the work of 
Klesse/Levav/Goukens (2015). The authors conjecture that the modality in which a choice or 
preference is expressed affects preference consistency. By observing choice situations that 
involve self-control dilemmas, the authors find that individuals who express preferences 
orally are more likely to choose an indulging over a healthy choice option than are individuals 
who express preferences manually. Klesse/Levav/Goukens (2015) explain this finding by 
speculating that the oral expression of choice might be more automatic and is therefore more 
consistent with genuine desires compared to manual expression of choice that involves more 
executive function and might therefore induce cognitive deliberation.  
The assumption that decisions and choices can be either expressed intuitively or after some 
deliberation effort is in line with the dual processing theory (Evans/Stanovich 2013a; 
Evans/Stanovich 2013b; Reyna/Brainered 2011; Wason/Evans 1975). In a nutshell, the dual 
processing theory implies that individuals can process information, elicit decisions, and 
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express choices based on one of two distinct mental processes. They can either express an 
intuitive, ‘gut-felling’ Type 1 or a reflective, ’analytic’ Type 2 decision or choice (Alter et al. 
2007; Inbar/Cone/Gilovich 2010). Although the tendency of processing according to Type 1 
or Type 2 is strongly affected by internal factors, such as personal ability and motivation to 
deliberate or to rely on intuition (Chaiken 1980; Chaiken/Maheswaran 1994; Petty/Cacioppo 
1986), the ‘default-interventionist theory’ (see Evans 2007) implies that individuals process 
information and elicit decisions according to Type 1 processing by default. However, if Type 
2 processing is induced by external triggers that interrupt and impede the fluency of 
processing or induce cognition, individuals process information thoroughly and elicit 
decisions and choices according to Type 2 (Evans/Stanovich 2013b). By connecting the 
speculation of Klesse/Levav/Goukens (2015) that manually expressed choices are elicited less 
automatically than orally expressed choices and insights from dual processing theory, it is 
reasonable to assume that the modality of manual choice expression constitutes an external 
antecedent of Type 2 processing. More specific, in this study it is conjectured that while oral 
choices are made automatically in line with default Type 1 processing, manual choices are 
likely to induce rational Type 2 processing.  
3.2.2 Manual Choice Expression as External Antecedent of Type 2 Processing 
In the field of neuroscience ample studies indicate that motoric movement and the utterance 
of words induce activity in different regions of the human brain (Ackermann/Riecker 2004; 
Frith et al. 1991; Wilson et al. 2004). Interestingly, it appears that besides a spatial difference, 
these regions also seem to differ to the extent to which they are involved in the execution of 
higher cognitive processing (Cavanna/Trimble 2006; Kuo et al. 2009; Luo/Ding/Luo 2004). 
More specific, it seems likely that intended motoric actions trigger activity in the 
dorsal/caudal part of the ACC, while the verbal expression seems to cause activation in the 
rostral/ventral part of the ACC (Paus et al. 1993). Because the dorsal/caudal part is assumed 
to be involved in higher cognitive processing and deliberation, and because the rostral/ventral 
part of the ACC is widely regarded as the affective part of the ACC (Bush et al. 2000; Qiu et 
al. 2007), it can be conjectured that motoric action induces cognition. In line with the default 
interventionist theory, which implies that individuals only engage in cognitive Type 2 
processing if it is internally or externally triggered, it is therefore reasonable to assume that 
manual expression of choice (e.g., a motoric action) constitutes an external trigger of Type 2 
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processing. Consequently, as oral choice expression does not trigger activity in brain areas 
involved in higher cognition, it is reasonable to assume that Type 2 processing is not triggered 
and thus Type 1 processing is retained. 
3.2.3 Rationality of Choice and Dual Processing 
Decisions and choices can differ to the extent whether their outcome can be considered as 
being an objective or subjective matter (Inbar/Cone/Gilovich 2010). In this paper an ORC is 
defined as choosing the ‘best’ option, which asymmetrically dominates all remaining options 
in a given choice set (Bettman/Luce/Payne1998; Mikels et al. 2011).  
As the direct assessment of Type 2 processing would require advanced imaging techniques 
(Qiu et al. 2007), assessing Type 2 processing indirectly constitutes the most commonly 
applied method in the field of social psychology and the research of consumer behavior 
(Toplak/West/Stanovich 2011). In other words, the presence of Type 2 processing is deduced 
if participants act and decide as if they would be processing according to Type 2 in line with 
preassigned experimental manipulations (Alter et al. 2007; Inbar/Cone/Gilovich 2010). 
Accordingly, in this study it is assumed that the appearance of an ORC can be considered to 
be a proxy for Type 2 processing.  
3.3 Hypothesis Development 
Summarizing the argumentation given above, it is conjectured that manual choice expression 
induces cognitive deliberation and therefore constitutes an external trigger for Type 2 
processing. Further, because research implies that oral choice expression does not induce 
deliberation and seems to be elicited automatically (e.g., Bock 1996), it is reasonable to 
assume the modality of oral choice expression does not trigger Type 2 processing. As 
research implies that Type 2 processing increases the likelihood of making an ORC 
(Toplak/West/Stanovich 2011), the following testable hypothesis is formulated: 
 
H1:  Individuals expressing their choice manually are more likely to make an ORC than are 
individuals expressing their choice orally. 
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To test this hypothesis three laboratory experiments were designed in which participants were 
confronted with different choice tasks that were ought to assess the likelihood of making an 
ORC and thus engaging in Type 2 processing. That is, although the design and content of the 
choice tasks differed, they all shared two common factors: First, unknown to the participants, 
it was manipulated whether choices had to be expressed manually or orally. Second, as the 
direct assessment of Type 2 processing is difficult as outlined before, all experiments 
comprised choice tasks to indirectly assess Type 2 processing, that involved one objectively 
rational and (at least) one incorrect, but intuitively appealing option.  
3.4 Current Research: Methods to Assess Types of Mental Processing 
Over the last decades ample studies attempted to develop reliable and empirically applicable 
methods to assess the likelihood that individuals process information or fulfill experimental 
tasks according to Type 1 or Type 2 processing. As the direct assessment of the mental 
processing types is virtually impossible, the assessment of the probability of making an ORC 
has become an often applied proxy to indirectly assess Type 2 processing 
(Toplak/West/Stanovich 2011). Because the present research is interested in the impact of 
different choice expression modalities on the likelihood of making an ORC, the experimental 
designs and choice tasks were chosen and adjusted accordingly. For this purpose, the ‘Monty 
Hall Three Doors Game’ (Experiment 1), the ‘Critical Reasoning Task’ (Experiment 2a) 
‘Syllogism Reasoning’ (Experiment 2b) and the ‘Ration-Bias Paradigm’ in form of a ‘Marble 
Choice Experiment’ (Experiment 3) were applied. These tasks constitute very common 
methods for this kind of investigation (Evans/Over 2013; Toplak/West/Stanovich 2011) and 
offered the opportunity for oral and manual choice expression. 
3.4.1 Monty Hall’s Three Doors Game 
In the original ‘Monty Hall’s Three Doors Game’ (hereafter simply ‘Monty Hall Game’) 
known from the US TV quiz-show ‘Let’s make a deal’ contestants are shown three closed 
doors and are told that behind one door would be a prize, while behind the other two doors 
would be losses (‘goats’). After contestants make an initial decision and choose one of the 
doors, the show master (i.e., Monty Hall) opens one of the remaining doors featuring a loss. 
Hereafter, he asks the contestants whether they would like to stay with their initially chosen 
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still unopened door or whether they now would rather like to switch and choose the other, still 
unopened door. It seems intuitively appealing that all doors have the same fixed likelihood of 
winning (i.e., one third). Therefore, it appears irrelevant whether one sticks to one’s initial 
choice or whether one switches and chooses the other still closed door. In fact, if this was 
true, it would even be more rational to stick with one’s initially chosen door compared to 
switching it, because individuals tend to perceive losses as less severe when they originate 
from passive rather than active actions (Gilovich/Medvec/Chen 1995).  
However, the fact that one ‘non-winning’ door is opened affects the winning probability of 
the remaining doors. The rationale behind this phenomenon might be counter-intuitive at first 
glance, but becomes obvious after some deliberation. The initially chosen door of the constant 
wins with a probability of one-third (e.g., the prize is behind the chosen door) and loses with a 
probability of two-third (e.g., the prize is behind one of the non-chosen doors). This implies 
that the show master’s doors win with a probability of two-thirds and lose with a probability 
of one-third. These a-priori odds are unaffected by the fact that the show master opens one of 
‘his doors’. Because the show master knows behind which door the great prize is hidden and 
he always opens a door featuring a loss (i.e., rule of the game), the contestant can double her 
odds of winning by switching her initially chosen door (Gillman 1992; Nalebuff 1987). 
Switching one’s initial choice after one loss is revealed can therefore be considered as ORC 
(Fox/Levav 2004; Friedman 1998). 
3.4.2 Cognitive Reflection Test 
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) was initially created by Frederick (2005) to assess 
whether individuals process tasks or information with a rather reflective and cognitive (e.g., 
Type 2) or with a rather reflexive and intuitive (e.g., Type 1) mindset. The original CRT 
comprises three open-end questions, each possessing one incorrect, but intuitively appealing 
and one correct answer that requires some deliberation effort. The underlying idea of the CRT 
is that overriding the urge to give the intuitive, but incorrect answer requires reflective 
deliberation and that consequently the number of correct answers (i.e., ORC) can be seen as 
proxy for Type 2 processing. For instance consider the first question of the CRT: 
A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than the ball. How 
much does the ball cost? 
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The reflexive answer is 10 cents, as one intuitively subtracts the values 1.10$ and 1$ given by 
the question. However, the correct answer is 5 cents, which becomes salient once the result is 
reconsidered. 
Existing research has shown that the context but also the manner in which the CRT is 
presented influences the performance on the CRT (see for an overview Evans 2011). 
Particularly, Alter et al. (2007) show that the performance on the CRT can be enhanced if 
Type 2 processing is externally triggered by the experimental design. By altering the font and 
size of the text of the CRT into a ‘hard-to-read’ design, the authors decreased the processing 
fluency and thereby activated Type 2 processing (Stanovich/West 2000). As a result, 
participants who read this ‘disfluent’ version of the CRT gave significantly more correct 
answers than did participants who faced the CRT in a fluent, ‘easy-to-read’ font. This finding 
implies that the CRT is a suitable method to assess Type 2 processing. 
3.4.3 Syllogism Reasoning 
Syllogism reasoning (hereafter simply ‘syllogism’) is a very commonly applied method to 
investigate Type 2 processing (Evans/Over 2013; Qiu et al. 2007). Although various variants 
of syllogism exist, the basic structure is often very similar. The general pattern behind this 
logical argument is whether one can deductively arrive at a conclusion based on two or more 
premises that are assumed to be true. One very common and repeatedly empirically used 
variant of a syllogism comprises two premises and asks whether a final conclusion is true or 
false based on the premises (see Khemlani/Johnson-Laird 2012 for an overview). Even 
though all syllogisms require some deliberative effort, the level of difficulty to derive the 
correct answer can vary tremendously (Stanovich/West 2000). Particularly, research indicates 
that when the conclusion is true (false) based on the premises, but false (true) based on 
common knowledge, choosing the correct answer requires reflective thinking and thus Type 2 
processing (Campitelli/Gerrans 2014; De Neyes 2006; Sa/West/Stanovich 1999). Syllogisms 
of that structure are therefore applied in the present study. 
3.4.4 Ratio-Bias Phenomenon 
The ‘Ratio-Bias Phenomenon’ (RBP) (Denes-Raj/Epstein 1994; Inbar/Cone/Gilovich 2010) is 
based on the observation that individuals perceive the probability of a certain incident as more 
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likely when it is presented in large rather than in small numbers (Miller/Turnbull/McFarland 
1989). For instance, research shows that individuals perceive an event as less likely to occur 
when it appears once in ten times compared to when it appears ten in hundred times. Even 
though the absolute ratios are identical, individuals seem to prefer options with more 
‘absolute winners’ (Kirkpatrick/Epstein 1992). Further, Inbar/Cone/Gilovich (2010) and 
Denes-Raj/Epstein (1994) found that this preference could even cause irrational decisions. 
They observed that participants preferred choosing from a bowl with more absolute winners 
over choosing from a bowl that contains less absolute winners, even if the bowl with less 
absolute winners possess a higher relative ratio of winning tokens. Interestingly, 
Inbar/Cone/Gilovich (2010) found that participants are less likely to make this objectively 
irrational choice in this decision situation if cognition had been externally triggered (i.e., Type 
2 processing is activated). In other words, the RBP is a suitable method to compare the effect 
of internal cues on mental processing by simultaneously controlling the impact of external 
processing cues. In this dissertation the RBP is applied in form of a ‘Marble Choice 
Experiment’ comparable to the set-up of the study by Inbar/Cole/Gilovich (2010). Table 2 
summarizes the three choice tasks applied in this study, their main purposes and the most 
relevant sources. 
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Table 2:  Overview of Experiments, Study 1 
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3.5 Experiment 1 ‘Monty Hall Game’ 
To test the hypothesis that manual choice expression is more likely to yield an ORC than oral 
choice expression, the ‘Monty Hall Game’ was applied in a laboratory experiment 
(Gilovich/Medvec/Chen 1995). In this choice task the proxy for Type 2 processing is the 
likelihood of switching one’s initial choice, which is considered to be the ORC. 
As outlined in Chapter 3.4.1, this game features three choice options among which only one 
contains a prize. In total the game comprises three game stages. After expressing an initial 
choice for one of the three options (i.e., phase 1), participants are informed that one of the 
non-chosen options does definitely not feature the prize (i.e., phase 2) and are subsequently 
asked whether they want to stay with their initial choice or want to switch (i.e., phase 3). A 
schematic overview of the game phases is provided in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3:  Game phases of the Monty Hall Game, Experiment 1, Study 1 
Because switching one’s initial choice is the ORC in this situation and because it is 
conjectured that only manual choice expression induces Type 2 processing, it is predicted in 
line with H1 that participants expressing their initial envelope choice by taking it (i.e., manual 
choice condition) are more likely to change the initial envelope choice after one ‘non-
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winning’ envelope is revealed than are participants expressing their choice by saying which 
envelope they want to initially choose (i.e., oral choice condition). 
3.5.1 Method 
Ninety-nine undergraduate students (55.6% Males, MAge = 21.06 years, SDAge = 8.54) 
participated in this experiment in exchange for partial course credit. The laboratory 
experiment was a single-factor between-subjects (manual vs. oral choice condition) design 
and was conducted on three consecutive days (Wednesday to Friday, approximately 9:00 am 
to 3:00 pm). Participants were seated in individual computer cubicles and were informed 
about the ‘Monty Hall Game’ and the overall procedure via a computer screen. They were 
told that they would be escorted to a separate room where they would be asked to choose one 
out of three envelopes lying next to each other on a table in the order ‘left’, ‘middle’, ‘right’ 
and that each envelope would contain a card featuring a different letter (see picture 1, General 
Appendix I). Participants were informed that they could only choose one of the three 
envelopes and that in case their envelope would contain the card with the ‘winning-letter’ 
they would have the opportunity to participate in a lottery to win a Samsung galaxy tablet pc. 
A lottery was applied to ensure a sufficient incentive for participants to be committed to the 
game, but at the same time to keep the experimental costs reasonable (e.g. 
Inbar/Cone/Gilovich 2010). As experimental manipulation approximately half the participants 
were instructed to express their envelope choice manually by taking one envelope without 
talking to the attending research assistant (i.e., manual choice condition, N = 51), while the 
other half was instructed to express their envelope choice orally by saying the position of the 
envelope they would like to choose to the research assistant (i.e., oral choice condition, N = 
48).  
After reading the instructions, participants were led to the separate room where the three 
envelopes were positioned on a table and the research assistant was standing behind it. The 
position of each envelope on the table was clearly marked by signs featuring the position 
(‘left’, ‘middle’, ‘right’). Participants made their envelope choice as instructed and to exclude 
potential effects due to ‘mere touch’ (Gilovich/Medvec/Chen 1995; Peck/Shu 2009), 
participants in the oral choice condition were handed their chosen envelope. Eventually, 
participants were asked to return to their cubicle with their chosen envelope in their hands and 
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to continue with a computer based questionnaire. They were instructed to keep their envelope 
closed until they would be explicitly instructed to open it.  
In line with the original ‘Monty Hall Game’, participants were then informed by the computer 
that one of the remaining two not-chosen envelopes would not include the card with the 
‘winning-letter’ (e.g., ‘non-winning’ envelope). With this knowledge, they were asked 
whether they would like to keep their initially chosen envelope (i.e., stay) or whether they 
would like to switch and choose the other still unopened envelope (i.e., switch). Noteworthy, 
this decision was entered into the computer-based questionnaire and took place in private (i.e., 
in the cubical without the attendance of a research assistant or any other person). In case 
participants decided to switch their envelope, they were informed by the computer that this 
decision would be remembered for the lottery. However, participants were not physically 
handed the other envelope. After participants indicated their choice to ‘stay’ or to ‘switch’, 
they continued with questions about their knowledge about the game and their demographics. 
After that, they were thanked and dismissed. 
As research implies that internal factors, such as the subjective preference and situational 
motivation to process and act according to Type 2 processing might influence the likelihood 
of making an ORC, control variables were included (e.g., Chaiken 1980; 
Chaiken/Maheswaran 1994). More specific, to control subjective preferences to process and 
act according to Type 2, the short version of the rational experiential inventory (REI) scale 
was included (consisting of the subscales ‘need for cognition’ (NFC) and ‘faith in intuition’ 
(FI), see Epstein et al. 1996).
1
 To assess the motivation and commitment of participants to the 
game they were asked to estimate the price of the prize (e.g., the tablet) and additionally how 
much money they demand to withdraw the potential opportunity to participate in the lottery 
(see Inbar/Cone/Gilovich 2010 for a comparable approach). As a proxy for motivation an 
‘uninvolved-score’ was calculated by subtracting the amount to withdraw the chance of 
joining the lottery from the estimated price. A higher ‘uninvolved-score’ thus implies lower 
motivation to participate in the game. Further, because the general knowledge of the ‘Monty 
Hall Game’ might influence the likelihood of switching one’s initial choice, participants were 
asked whether they ‘knew the game before’ on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
                                                 
1
 Cacioppo et al. (1996) showed a positive correlation between high NFC scores and the likelihood of making an 
ORC. However, because NFC is a self-reported measure, it is only considered as proxy for personal preference 
and not as actual ability to engage in Type 2 processing.. 
Study 1: The Effect of Manual and Oral Choice Expression Modalities on Choice Rationality 41 
 
3.5.2 Results 
To assess whether manual choice expression modalities increase the likelihood of making an 
ORC in line with H1, switching behavior was investigated. As expected, among participants 
in the manual choice condition 35.3 % indicated a willingness to switch their initially chosen 
envelope, while among participants in the oral choice condition only 16.7 % decided to switch 
after one ‘non-winning’ envelope was uncovered. This difference reached the threshold of 
being statistically significant χ2 (1, N = 99) = 4.43, p = .035 and is in line with H1. Figure 4 
provides a visual representation of this result. 
 
 
Figure 4:  Switching intention per experimental group, Experiment 1, Study 1 
Next the control variables were considered. First, it was assessed whether the general 
knowledge of the ‘Monty Hall Game’ differed among participants, as a difference between 
conditions might impact the ORC (i.e., switching choice). However, the results reveal that 
knowledge of the game was not significantly different between conditions (MManual = 1.71, 
SDManual = .46 vs. MOral = 1.75, SDOral = .44, F(1, 97) = .24, p = .63). Further, a one sample t-
test shows that the overall sample mean (MTotal = 1.73, SDTotal = .45) was significantly smaller 
than the center of the scale (MScale_center = 4.00, p < .0005). This indicates that in general 
participants were unaware of the Monty Hall Game. 
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In order to rule out the possibility that participants differed in the preference to engage in 
Type 2 processing, the NFC (α = .6) and FI (α = .82) sub-scales of the REI were created 
(Epstein et al. 1996). The results reveal that participants in the manual choice condition did 
not indicate a higher need for cognition (NFC) (MManual = 3.65, SDManual = .68) than did 
participants in the oral choice condition (MOral = 3.64, SDOral = .55, F(1, 97) = .01, p = .91). 
Similarly, faith in intuition (FI) was not significantly different between conditions (MManual = 
3.68, SDManual = .75 vs. MOral = 3.79, SDOral = .68, F(1, 97) = .62, p = .43). Thus, the overall 
preference to engage in Type 2 processing was similar between conditions. 
Next, the ‘uninvolved-score’ was calculated by forming the difference between the value 
participants indicated to be willing to withdraw their lottery participation opportunity and the 
estimated price of the prize. Although the ‘uninvolved-score’ was slightly higher for 
participants in the manual choice condition (MManual = 179.23, SDManual = 134.18) than for 
participants in the oral choice condition (MOral = 156.4, SDOral = 108.33), this difference was 
not statistically significant (F(1, 97) = .86, p = .36). This result implies that the general 
motivation to play the game was similar across conditions and generally fairly high (MTotal = 
168.16, SDTotal = 122.25). 
Finally, binary regressions with ‘switching’ as dependent variable and condition as 
categorical independent variable further indicates that the observed main effect remains 
significant even after controlling for knowledge of the game (p = .044), NFC (p = .04), FI (p 
= .047), and the ‘uninvolved-score’ (p = .043), while none of the control variables reached 
statistical significance in any regression model.  
3.5.3 Discussion Experiment 1 
Switching one’s initial choice after one loser is revealed is the ORC in the Monty Hall Game. 
In line with the assumption that manual choice expression triggers Type 2 processing, and 
that Type 2 processing increases the likelihood of making an ORC, the results of Experiment 
1 show that participants expressing their initial envelope choice manually were more likely to 
switch their choice after one ‘non-winning’ envelope was revealed compared to participants 
in the oral choice condition. Thus, Experiment 1 supports the main hypothesis (H1) and 
indicates that manual choice expression is an external antecedent of Type 2 processing. 
Further, other alternative explanations for the present results could be rejected by the obtained 
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data. That is, research implies that situational motivation can be an internal antecedent of 
Type 2 processing which could increase the chances of making an ORC (e.g., Petty/Cacioppo 
1986). However, the assessment of the ‘uninvolved-score’ as proxy for motivation to play the 
game did not yield a significant difference between conditions. Further, it could be 
demonstrated that the main effect of manual choice expression on the ORC (i.e., switching 
behavior) remains significant after controlling for motivation. Therefore, it is unlikely that the 
observed effect occurs due to different levels of motivation to play the game among 
participants. In addition, research implies that the personal preference to cognitively process 
information might impact the likelihood of Type 2 processing. This issue was addressed by 
assessing the NFC and FI. The results indicate no significant difference between conditions 
for these measures and imply that the main effect of manual choice expression on switching 
behavior remains significant after controlling for NFC and FI. This implies that the observed 
effect on making an ORC cannot be explained by internal antecedents (e.g., motivation and 
preference for Type 2 processing), but only by a difference in the modality of choice 
expression (i.e., external antecedent). 
Although Experiment 1 provides initial support for H1 and ruled out some alternative 
explanations for the observed effect, there are still some potential constraints that need to be 
discussed. For instance, even though the controls imply that participants in both experimental 
conditions were equally aware of the ‘Monty Hall Game’ and possessed similar levels of 
subjective processing preference and motivation, one cannot explicitly exclude the alternative 
explanation that switching participants were generally more capable to process the underlying 
probabilities correctly. Thus, participants might have made the ORC due to cognitive ability 
regardless of the experimental manipulation and knowledge of the game (e.g., Stanovich 
2011). Moreover, in total only a small fraction of 26.3 % of the participants indicated a will to 
switch. This indicates that making the ORC and overcoming the intuitive assumption that 
staying and switching yield the same probability to win appears to be fairly difficult. 
Therefore, one could argue that some participants were engaging Type 2 processing, but due 
to a general lack of mental ability they were still not able to make the ORC. In other words, 
the ORC might be a rather conservative proxy for assessing Type 2 processing in this specific 
case. 
Further, the choice participants made (i.e., stay or switch) was a binary and singular choice. 
Although binominal tests reveal that for both conditions the odds of staying or switching do 
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significantly deviate from chance (e.g., manual choice condition: p = .049; oral choice 
condition: p < .0005), one cannot entirely rule out the possibility that these odds might 
approach chance if the game was repeatedly played (see for instance Friedman 1998 for a 
discussion on repeated Monty Hall Games). Experiment 2 is intended to address these issues 
by utilizing different methods and proxies to assess the likelihood of making an ORC. 
3.6 Experiment 2 ‘CRT (a) and Syllogism (b)’ 
Experiment 2 was intended to replicate the main effect in an again different context and to 
concomitantly address the potential issues raised by Experiment 1. Therefore, a lab 
experiment was conducted in which the probably most common methods for assessing the 
likelihood of making an ORC were applied: Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) and syllogism 
reasoning (Evans 2011; Frederick 2005). Although research implies that for both methods the 
assessment of the likelihood of making an ORC (i.e., reveal Type 2 processing) is 
independent from the general cognitive ability of individuals (Toplak/West/Stanovich 2011), 
it is reasonable to oppose that the CRT and syllogism differ in their level of difficulty and 
skill requirement. While CRT requires at least some mathematical ability, syllogisms demand 
a certain feeling for argumentation structure logic and language to make the ORC 
(Campitelli/Gerrans 2013). Therefore, both tasks were included in one experiment with two 
subparts (i.e., a and b) to control the impact of general ability.
2
 Moreover, since the CRT is a 
non-binary decision problem and both methods constitute repeated decisions, Experiment 2 
(a, b) addresses the problem of a binary singular choice raised in the discussion part of 
Experiment 1. 
To assess whether the choice expression modality (i.e., manual versus oral) influences the 
likelihood of making an ORC (i.e., giving correct answers as proxy for Type 2 processing), 
the choice tasks had to be adjusted so that it was feasible to answer the CRT and the syllogism 
in an experimentally pre-assigned choice expression modality. 
                                                 
2
 Reasoning: minor and individual forms of dyscalculia and dyslexia can influence the CRT and syllogism 
performance independent from the actual processing style. 
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3.6.1 Design CRT  
For the CRT the three original questions were applied (Frederick 2005). However, instead of 
the original open-ended version a paper-based multiple-choice variant was developed. This 
adjustment was necessary, because answering the test manually requires a design with a finite 
number of answers so that participants could physically ‘take’ an answer. Further, by 
providing answer options participants were obligated to ‘choose one answer option’, so that it 
was actually possible to make an ORC. 
Hence, the CRT was printed on a standard DIN A4 sheet featuring the three CRT questions. 
For each question six answer options were provided. These answer options were printed in 
parallel directly below a CRT question and were sequentially, alphabetically labeled (A-F). 
The answer options always included the correct answer, the intuitive answer and four 
reasonable filler answers. The filler answers were designed in a form that the position of the 
intuitive and the correct answer within the six answer options differed among the three 
questions to impede the possibility that participants would answer the questions correctly by 
applying any kind of heuristic order rule (see Table 3 for an overview). The final CRT sheet 
including all answer options can be found in the General Appendix III.
3
 
 
CRT Question Correct answer Intuitive Answer 
 
Q1 
 
B 
 
C 
Q2 A E 
Q3 F D 
Table 3:  Answer positions CRT, Experiment 2 (a), Study 1 
To test the main hypothesis and to investigate whether choice expression modality impacts 
the likelihood of making an ORC, participants were manipulated to either answer the CRT 
orally or manually. In the oral choice condition, participants were instructed to say the letter 
of the answer, which they thought was correct. This letter was then marked by a research 
assistant. In the manual choice condition, participants were instructed to ‘take’ the letter of the 
                                                 
3
 Note: the word ‘widget’ in the second CRT Question was replaced by the more common and comprehensive 
word ‘machine’. 
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answer they thought was correct by removing a small piece of paper featuring the letter that 
was loosely attached to the CRT sheet. To ensure that the mere presence of the research 
assistant in the oral choice condition would not influence the results, he was also attendant for 
participants in the manual choice condition. 
Although research indicates that the total number of correct answers (i.e., ORC) in the CRT is 
a proxy for Type 2 processing independent from general ability and preference to engage in 
Type 2 processing, it is likely that CRT solving ability requires at least some mathematical 
capacity. Further, some studies imply that although overall intelligence and cognitive capacity 
is not a perfect predictor for CRT performance, these measures are still highly correlated 
(Toplak/West/Stanovich 2011). Experiment 2 therefore also included a syllogism reasoning 
task (Alter et al. 2007; De Neys 2006) which is fairly unaffected by mathematical capacity. 
3.6.2 Design Syllogism  
For the syllogism task, four individual syllogisms were designed. Each syllogism consisted of 
two premises and one conclusion, which was definitely true or definitely false based on the 
two premises. To vary the level of difficulty among syllogisms, the empirical 
recommendations of Khemlani/Johnson-Laird (2012) were closely followed (see Table 4).
4
  
 
 
Conclusion True based  
on the premises 
Conclusion False based  
on the premises 
 
Conclusion True based on 
common knowledge 
 
 
Very Easy 
 
Very Difficult 
Conclusion False based on 
common knowledge 
Very Difficult Very Easy 
Conclusion is not affected 
by common knowledge 
Easy Difficult 
Table 4:  Categorization of difficulty level of syllogisms, Experiment 2 (b), Study 1 
                                                 
4
 Note that this categorization is based on the assumption that the syllogism comprises exact two premises and 
one conclusion and can be answered as false or true. Other possible syllogism reasoning problems exist; for an 
extensive review see Khemlani/Johnson-Laird (2012). 
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As the meta-analysis of Khemlani/Johnson-Laird (2012) indicates that ‘Very Easy’ syllogisms 
are mostly answered correctly, syllogism of that form were neglected and only ‘Easy’, 
‘Difficult’, and ‘Very Difficult’ syllogisms were applied in the present experiment. 
Accordingly of the four total syllogisms, two of them were ‘Very Difficult’ syllogism 
reasoning questions and were adopted from the pioneer work of Markovits/Nantel (1989). 
The other two were ‘Easy’ and ‘Difficult’ syllogisms that were subsequently created by 
slightly adjusting the pre-knowledge conflicting content of the two ‘Very Difficult’ 
syllogisms. This design was ought to disentangle the general ability to answer a syllogism 
correctly and the ability to answer it correctly even if the conclusion appears incorrect based 
on common knowledge which can be seen as proxy for Type 2 processing 
(Campitelli/Gerrans 2013; De Neys 2006). 
As for the CRT, a multiple choice version of the syllogism task had to be created, so that it 
was possible to give answers manually and ‘choose’ one answer option. To this end, the 
syllogism design of De Neys (2006) was mimicked and two answer choices ‘The conclusion 
follows logically from the premises’ and ‘The conclusion does not follow logically from the 
premises’ labeled as A or B were provided.5 More specifically, similar to the design of the 
CRT participants in the manual choice condition were instructed to ‘take’ the answer which 
they thought was correct by removing a small piece of paper featuring the letter ‘A’ or ‘B’ 
that was loosely attached to the syllogism sheet, while participants in the oral choice 
condition were instructed to say which answer they thought was correct (i.e. by saying ‘A’ or 
‘B’), which was sequentially marked by the research assistant. The syllogism reasoning tasks 
were printed on two sheets for the sake of clear arrangement. The first sheet featured the 
‘Easy’ and the ‘Difficult’ syllogisms, while the second sheet featured the two ‘Very Difficult’ 
syllogisms (the final design and the syllogism questions can be found in the General 
Appendix IV). 
3.6.3 Method 
Eighty-eight students (52.3% Males, MAge = 20.84 years, SDAge = 1.51) participated in this one 
factor between subject design experiment in return for partial course credit. Participants were 
invited to come to the lab for individual sessions that were scheduled throughout one week 
                                                 
5
 It was randomized whether A or B indicated either ‘The conclusion does not follow logically from the 
premises’ or ‘The conclusion follows logically from the premises’ to prevent any order bias. 
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and took place in the morning and afternoon (Monday to Friday, approximately from 10:00 
am to 3:00 pm). After arrival participants were guided to a small room with a bar table. The 
experimental task was paper based and comprised a total of five sheets which were placed 
upside down on the bar table. The first sheet included three lines of introduction, the 
manipulation and the multiple choice version of the CRT (i.e., Experiment 2a). As 
experimental manipulation participants were either asked to give their answers manually (i.e., 
‘manual choice condition’ by removing the little pieces of paper featuring the letters of the 
answers, N = 44) or orally (i.e. ‘oral choice condition’ by saying the letter of the answer, N = 
44). After participants answered all CRT questions, the CRT sheet was taken away and 
participants continued with a second sheet featuring two control questions (‘The questions 
were easy to answer’ on a seven-point Likert scale 1 = I strongly agree; 7 = I strongly agree; 
‘I knew at least one of the three questions before’ as binary yes/no question). 
The control sheet was then removed and participants continued with the syllogism task 
printed on two sheets (i.e., Experiment 2b). After participants answered the last question of 
the syllogism task, the sheets were taken away and participants continued with a second 
control sheet to assess the subjective performance and difficulty of the syllogism task with the 
same two control questions used in the CRT before. Subsequently, participants continued with 
an unrelated study in which course demographic information was assessed. 
Because answering the CRT questions and the syllogism task correctly requires Type 2 
processing, it was proposed that participants expressing their answer manually would choose 
significantly more answers correctly than would participants expressing their answer choice 
orally. However, because these tasks differ in their difficulty and require different levels of a 
general ability to perform Type 2 processing, it was further assumed that for the CRT there 
would not be a significant difference for choosing all answers correctly as this would be a 
rather proxy for general and not context-specific ability to engage in Type 2 processing. For 
the syllogism a somewhat counterfactual effect was predicted. Since the difficulty of the 
questions was adjusted and included an ‘Easy’ syllogism, it is proposed that there would not 
be a significant difference between conditions for choosing no or at least one correct 
syllogism answer. Note that answering no question correctly would rather indicate a general 
lack of the ability to engage in Type 2 processing (Campitelli/Gerrans 2013). However, 
because two ‘Very Difficult’ syllogisms were included, it is proposed that participants 
expressing their answer choice manually are more likely to answer three or more syllogisms 
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correctly compared to participants expressing their answer choice orally, as the correct answer 
choice of a very difficult syllogism particularly requires the engagement of Type 2 
processing. Finally, it was predicted that significantly more participants in the manual choice 
condition than in the oral choice condition would answer the ‘Very Difficult’ syllogism 
correctly. 
3.6.4 Results CRT 
CRT performance was pursuit following the recommendation of Frederick (2005). More 
precisely, correct answer choices were coded as 1 and incorrect answer choices were coded as 
0. The addition of these numbers per participant yielded a composite CRT score reaching 
from 0 to 3 (see also Alter et al. 2007 for similar approach). Higher CRT scores indicate a 
higher likelihood of making an ORC and thus Type 2 processing.
 6
 As expected, participants 
in the manual choice condition reached higher CRT scores (MManual = 1.14, SDManual = 1.0) 
than did participants in the oral choice condition (MOral = .45, SDOral = .79, F(1, 88) = 12.55, p 
= .001). Further, participants in the oral choice condition chose significantly more often the 
intuitive answer (MOral = 2.18, SDOral = .95) than did participant in the manual choice 
condition (MManual = 1.59, SDManual = .996, F(1, 88) = 8.14, p = .005). These results are 
displayed Figure 5 (black lines indicate standard errors of the means).  
 
                                                 
6
 Strictly speaking the number of correct answers is not a continuous variable. The results of a non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney test yield similar results and can be found in Table 11, General Appendix XI. 
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Figure 5:  CRT Scores and number of intuitive answer, per experimental group, Experiment 2 (a), 
Study 1 
Further, while 70.5% in the manual choice condition answered at least one question correctly, 
only 31.8% of the participants in the oral choice condition answered at least one of the three 
CRT question correctly (χ2 (1, N = 88) = 13.14, p < .0005). However, in line with the 
assumption that for the CRT the fact of answering all questions correctly is more likely a 
proxy of general ability for Type 2 processing, it was found that the number of participants 
answering all three CRT questions correctly did not significantly differ between conditions (χ2 
(1, N = 88) = 2.2, p = .14). These results are displayed in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6:  Percentage of participants answering at least one CRT and all CRT questions correctly per 
experimental group, Experiment 2 (a), Study 1 
Finally, the control variables were assessed. Although it appeared that participants in the 
manual choice condition perceived the CRT questions as being slightly easier (MManual = 4.68, 
SDManual = 1.65) than did participants in the oral choice condition (MOral = 4.02, SDOral = 1.5), 
this difference was only marginally significant (F(1, 88) = 3.83, p = .054). However, 
controlling for ‘The questions were easy to answer’ the effect of expression modality on CRT 
scores remained significant (p = .001), while the main effect of the control remains 
insignificant (p = .43). Eventually, there was no difference between conditions for knowing at 
least one CRT questions before (MManual = 34.1% vs. MOral = 25.0%, χ
2
 (1, N = 88) = .87, p = 
.35).  
3.6.5 Results Syllogism 
Similarly to the procedure applied to the CRT results, a composite syllogism score that 
reached from 0 to 4 was created. Higher syllogism scores imply higher likelihood of making 
an ORC.
7
 As expected, participants in the manual choice condition had significantly higher 
                                                 
7
 Strictly speaking the number of correct answers is not a continuous variable. The results of a non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney test yield similar results and can be found in Table 12, General Appendix XI. 
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syllogism scores (MManual = 3.55, SDManual = .70) than had participants in the oral choice 
condition (MOral = 3.00, SDOral = .92, F(1, 88) = 9.89, p = .002).
 
This result is displayed in 
Figure 7 (black lines indicate standard errors of the mean).  
 
 
Figure 7:   Syllogism score per experimental group, Experiment 2 (b), Study 1 
In line the argumentation about the level of difficulty of the applied syllogism reasoning 
questions, all eighty-eight participants answered at least one of the syllogism correctly and the 
share of participants answering at least two questions correctly was also not significantly 
different between the conditions (p = .15). However, as expected, it was found that more 
participants in the manual choice condition answered at least three syllogisms correctly 
(MManual = 88.6%) than did participants in the oral choice condition (MOral = 68.2%, χ
2
 (1, N = 
88) = 5.44, p = .02). The same pattern was true for answering all four questions correctly 
(MManual = 65.9% > MOral = 36.4%, χ
2
 (1, N = 88) = 7.69, p = .006).  
Further, as predicted the percentage of participants answering both ‘Very Difficult’ 
syllogisms correctly was higher among participants in the manual choice condition (MManual = 
70.5%) than among participants in the oral choice condition (MOral = 47.7%, χ
2
 (1, N = 88) = 
4.7, p = .03). These results are depicted in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8:  Percentage of correct answers per experimental group, Experiment 2 (b), Study 1 
Finally, assessing the control variables revealed that participants in the manual choice 
condition perceived the syllogisms as slightly easier (MManual = 5.32, SDManual = 1.65) than did 
participants in the oral choice condition (MOral = 4.70, SDOral = 1.55). However, this 
difference was only marginally significant (F(1, 88) = 3.23, p = .08). Further, the effect of 
expression modality on syllogism scores remains significant after controlling for ‘The 
questions were easy to answer’ (p = .005), while main effect of the control remains 
insignificant (p = .21). Finally, there was no difference between conditions in knowing at least 
one of the presented syllogisms before (MManual = 22.7 % vs. MOral = 22.7 %, χ
2
 (1, N = 88) = 
.000, p = 1).  
3.6.6 Discussion Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 fulfilled two main purposes. First, it provided additional evidence for the 
hypothesis that expressing a choice manually increases the likelihood of making an ORC (i.e., 
a correct answer) in a different context. In particular, Experiment 2 revealed that participants 
instructed to choose their answer option manually had higher CRT and syllogism scores than 
had participants instructed to choose their answer option orally. As higher scores indicate a 
higher likelihood of making an ORC, the results are in line with H1. 
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Moreover, because answering the CRT and syllogism correctly is seen as proxy for Type 2 
processing, the results imply that manual choice expression is an external antecedent of Type 
2 processing. Further, Experiment 2 implies that the likelihood of making an ORC was not 
significantly affected by the general ability to engage in Type 2 processing. Remember that it 
was conjectured that individuals possessing a very augmented ability to engage Type 2 
processing are likely to answer all CRT questions correctly, and that individuals possessing a 
very attenuated ability to engage Type 2 processing would probably answer only one or none 
syllogism correctly. However, Experiment 2 indicates that there is no difference between 
manual and oral choice expression for answering all CRT questions and at least one or none 
syllogism question correctly.  
Although the results of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 (a, b) indicate that manual choice 
expression is more likely to yield an ORC compared to oral choice expression in line with 
main hypothesis (H1), there are still some issues to address. For instance, social interaction or 
the effect of ‘the mere touch’ (Peck/Shu 2009) might still have an impact on the obtained 
results. Regarding social interaction, participants in the oral choice condition had to interact to 
some extend with another person (i.e., say their choice to the research assistant), while 
participants in the manual choice condition were not required to interact. The mere touch 
effect might have had an impact because other than participants in the oral choice condition, 
participants in the manual choice condition physically ‘took’ their choice. Further, although 
the obtained effects are line with the ‘default-interventionist theory’ (Evans 2007), the results 
cannot readily reject the alternative explanation that manual choice expression might not have 
increased the likelihood of making an ORC, but that rather oral choice expression might have 
attenuated the likelihood of making an ORC. Experiment 3 is intended to address these issues.  
3.7 Experiment 3 ‘RBP, Marble Choice Experiment’ 
Experiment 3 fulfilled three purposes. First, by replicating the main effect that manually 
expressed choices are more likely to yield an ORC compared to orally expressed choices in an 
again different decision context, Experiment 3 is intended to prove the robustness of the 
initial results. Second, the potential problems that participants in the manual condition took 
their choices themselves and were not obligated to interact with the research assistant, while 
participants in the oral choice condition were handed their choice and were obligated to 
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interact with the research assistant was addressed. Finally, Experiment 3 was ought to show 
explicitly that the observed difference in making an ORC is due to the fact that making an 
ORC requires Type 2 processing, which is not induced by oral choice expression. If this 
assumption were true, the likelihood of making an ORC should be equal between manual and 
oral choice expression conditions if Type 2 processing is externally induced by a choice 
modality unrelated trigger. In other words, the modality of choice expression should not have 
an impact on the likelihood of making an ORC if Type 2 processing is externally triggered 
prior choice expression. 
To test the assumption that manual choice expression is more likely to yield an ORC if 
rational processing is not already externally triggered, the ‘marble choice experiment’, similar 
to the experiment conducted by Inbar/Cone/Gilovich (2010) was executed. Thus, participants 
had to choose between one of two bowls of which one appears intuitively appealing (e.g., 
featuring more absolute winners) and the other constitutes an objectively rational choice (e.g., 
featuring a slightly higher winning chance). The rationale behind this experimental set-up is 
the RBP and it is assumed that choosing the bowl with less absolute but more relative winners 
constitutes the ORC and thus is a proxy for Type 2 processing.  
The choice expression modality (i.e., manual versus oral choice condition) was manipulated 
and it was predicted that participants in the manual choice condition are more likely to opt for 
the ORC (e.g., bowl with more relative winners) compared to participants in the oral choice 
condition. As second manipulation, it was varied whether Type 2 processing was triggered by 
another independent external factor (e.g., fraction solving) prior choice expression or not. In 
line with the assumption that Type 2 processing is the underlying cause for making an ORC, 
it was assumed that the likelihood of making an ORC would not differ between choice 
expression modalities if Type 2 processing is triggered prior the actual choice.  
3.7.1 Method 
One-hundred-forty-eight students (41.2% Males, MAge = 20.82 years, SDAge = 1.02) 
participated in this two factor between subject design experiment in return for partial course 
credit. Participants were invited to come to the lab for individual sessions that were scheduled 
throughout two weeks and took place in the morning and afternoon (Monday to Friday, 
approximately from 9:00 am to 3:00 pm).  
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Immediately after their arrival, participants received an introduction sheet and were shown 
two bowls, containing two kinds of marbles (e.g., yellow and blue) on a table. They were told 
in the introduction sheet that the blue marbles are ‘winners’, while the yellow marbles are 
‘losers’ and that the bowls would contain different amounts of marbles. Particularly, it was 
indicated that one bowl (Bowl A) would contain 100 marbles of which 91 would be yellow 
and 9 would be blue. The other bowl (Bowl B) would contain 10 marbles of which 9 would 
be yellow and 1 would be blue. The transparent bowls containing the marbles were clearly 
visible placed on a table in front of the participants and were labeled by small paper signs as 
‘A’ or ‘B’ (see picture 2, General Appendix V). 
Participants were instructed to decide from which bowl a research assistant should randomly 
draw a marble. They were informed that if he draws a blue marble they would win a prize 
(e.g., chocolate-bar), but if he draws a yellow marble they would not win anything. 
It was manipulated whether the choice from which bowl the research assistant should 
randomly draw was expressed manually (i.e., manual choice condition, N = 74) or orally (i.e., 
oral choice condition, N = 74). While in the oral choice condition participants said their 
choice (e.g., ‘please pick from bowl A’ or ‘please pick from bowl B’) very similar to previous 
experiments, participants in the manual choice condition expressed their choice by pressing a 
button next to the bowl from which the research assistant should draw a marble. The manual 
modality ‘button pressing’ was applied to show that the effect is not due a difference between 
taking and speaking but rather due to a difference between manual versus oral choice 
expression. Further, because the choice expression modality ‘button pressing’ involves some 
interaction with the research assistant (e.g., participants have to make sure that the research 
assistant observes their action) and does not involve an explicit tangency of the choice object 
(e.g., participants were not allowed to touch one of the bowls or a marble), the set-up of 
Experiment 3 kept any possible influences of social interaction or the ‘mere touch’ constant 
across conditions. 
As second manipulation half the participants were instructed to solve a small calculus task 
before choosing one of the bowls (‘high cognition’, N = 74). This calculus test was printed on 
one DIN A4 page and comprised five fractions for which participants were instructed to 
indicate the percentage value. Unknown to the participants, two fractions were actually a 
multiple of the winning odds of the two bowls. Solving fractions and indicating percentage 
values was assumed to trigger Type 2 processing (Attridge/Inglis 2015; DeWolf/Vosniadou 
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2015). To ensure that participants understood their task correctly, one example fraction (e.g., 
13/39 = 33.33%) was provided. The fractions used are displayed in table 10 in the General 
Appendix V.  
The other half of participants started immediately with the bowl choice (‘Low cognition’, N = 
74). This procedure resulted in a total sample comprising four experimental groups 
(NManual/Low cognition = 37, NOral/Low cognition = 37, NManual/High cognition = 37, NOral/High cognition = 37). 
As stated before, choosing the small bowl is the ORC in this situation. Therefore, it was 
predicted that because only participants in the Oral/Low cognition condition are not triggered 
to engage in Type 2 processing, participants in this experimental group would be significantly 
less likely to make the ORC (i.e., choose the small bowl) compared to all other experimental 
groups. Because for the remaining three experimental groups (i.e., Manual/Low cognition, 
Manual/High cognition, and Oral/High cognition) it is assumed that Type 2 processing is 
triggered, no difference for choosing the small bowl among these conditions should be 
observable. 
Eventually, as in Experiment 1 control measures for processing preference (e.g., NFC and FI) 
and intention to win (‘I tried to win’) and knowledge of the RBP (‘I am familiar with the 
Ratio-Bias-Paradigm’) assessed on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree) were included in the demographic section of the questionnaire. 
3.7.2 Results RBP 
To test the main hypothesis, the likelihood of participants choosing the small bowl (i.e., ORC) 
depending on their experimental condition was assessed first. As expected, when cognition 
was not externally triggered 54.1% of the participants expressing their choice manually chose 
the small bowl (i.e., Manual/Low cognition), but only 29.7% of the participants in the oral 
choice condition (i.e., Oral/Low cognition) choose the small bowl with fewer absolute 
winners, but relatively higher winning chances. This difference was statistically significant, χ2 
(1, N = 74) = 4.5, p = .034.  
However, if participants had to solve the five fractions before choosing a bowl (e.g., High 
cognition), participants in the oral and manual choice expression condition were equally 
likely to choose the small bowl (MManual/High cognition = 67.6% vs. MOral/High cognition = 62.2%, χ
2
 
(1, N = 74) = .24, p = .63).  
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Further, within the manual choice condition there was no difference in the percentage of 
participants choosing the small bowl, regardless whether cognition was externally triggered or 
not (MManual/Low cognition = 54.1% vs. MManual/High cognition = 67.6%, χ
2
 (1, N = 74) = 1.42, p = .23).  
However, within the oral choice condition participants were significantly less likely to choose 
the small bowl when cognition was not externally triggered (MOral/Low cognition = 29.7%) 
compared to when cognition was externally triggered (MOral/High cognition = 62.2%, χ
2
 (1, N = 
74) = 7.84, p = .005). Figure 9 and Figure 10 provide visual representations of the results. 
 
 
Figure 9:  Percentage of participants choosing the small bowl (i.e., ORC) per experimental group I, 
Experiment 3, Study 1 
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Figure 10:   Percentage of participants choosing the small bowl (i.e., ORC) per experimental group II, 
Experiment 3, Study 1 
As in the previous experiments, control variables were subsequently assessed. The NFC and 
FI were created following the same approach as outlined in Experiment 1. However, neither 
for the NFC (F(3, 144) = .27, p = .85) nor for FI (F(3, 144) = .98, p = .4) a significant 
difference between conditions could be revealed (see Figure 11 for a visual representation, 
black lines indicate standard errors of the means). 
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Figure 11:  NFC and FI scores per experimental group, Experiment 3, Study 1 
Further, the overall intention to win was fairly high among all participants (MTotal = 5.78, 
SDTotal = 1.44) but not significantly different among conditions (F(3, 144) = .3, p = .82). The 
overall RBP knowledge was considerably low among all participants (MTotal = 3.05, SDTotal = 
1.8) and also not significantly different among conditions (F(3, 144) = .49, p = .69). Thus, 
there was no difference among conditions in the preference for Type 2 processing, pre-
knowledge of the choice problem at hand (i.e., knowledge of the RBP), and the intention to 
actually win (and hence the motivation to make a good choice). These results are depicted in 
Figure 12 (black lines indicate standard errors of the means). 
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Figure 12:  Winning intention and RBP knowledge per experimental group, Experiment 3, Study 1 
Noteworthy to mention is that controlling for processing preference (i.e., NFC, FI), intention 
to win and RBP knowledge did not significantly affect the results. Detailed statistics can be 
found in the General Appendix XI.  
3.7.3 Discussion Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 adds to the previously conducted experiments in several essential ways. First, 
by replicating the main effect that manually expressed choices are more likely to yield an 
ORC compared to orally expressed choices in a different scenario (e.g., choosing a bowl with 
fewer absolute winners, but higher winning probability over a bowl with more absolute 
winners, but lower winning probability), robustness of the initial findings is provided. Second, 
Experiment 3 implies that the observed effect is unlikely caused by any artifact of the ‘mere 
touch effect’ or due to social interaction as these potentially influential factors are held 
constant in the present experiment. More precisely, in contrast to Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2 (a, b), in Experiment 3 participants did not physically touch their choice as they 
did not take it and were not handed it. Further, all participants were obligated to interact to 
some extent with the research assistant. Finally and most important, Experiment 3 provides 
more explicit evidence for the underlying mechanism of the main effect. In particular, only 
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when Type 2 processing was not externally triggered it was observed that manual choice 
expression is more likely to yield an ORC compared to oral choice expression. However, 
when Type 2 is externally triggered unrelated to the choice expression modality there was no 
difference in the likelihood of making an ORC among participants in the oral and in the 
manual choice condition. Particularly, participants instructed to express their choice manually 
and who were not instructed to solve fractions (i.e., Manual/low) were as likely to choose the 
ORC as participants who were externally triggered to engage in Type 2 processing (i.e., 
Oral/high and Manual/high). This implies that manual choice expression and fraction solving 
induces similar mental processes (i.e., Type 2 processing). 
3.8 General Discussion 
Although nowadays consumers have the opportunity to express their decisions and choices 
through many different modalities in the marketplace, research on the impact of choice 
expression modalities is still scarce. Referring to dual processing theory, this research is a first 
attempt to investigate the impact of manual and oral choice expression modalities on choice 
rationality and types of mental processing. In three controlled laboratory experiments, first 
empirical evidence for the assumption that individuals expressing their choice manually are 
more likely to make an ORC than are individuals expressing their choice orally was obtained. 
Because making an ORC can be considered as proxy to assess Type 2 processing 
(Toplak/West/Stanovich 2011), these results imply that manual choice expression is an 
external antecedent of Type 2 processing. More specifically, in Experiment 1 it was observed 
that in a situation in which switching an initial choice is considered the ORC, participants 
expressing their initial choice manually were more likely to switch than were participants 
expressing their initial choice orally. Experiment 2 revealed that performance in the CRT and 
syllogism reasoning, which can be considered as proxies for Type 2 processing, was 
significantly increased when answers were provided manually rather than orally. Eventually, 
Experiment 3 showed an important boundary condition. If Type 2 processing was externally 
activated (i.e., by fraction solving), no significant difference in the likelihood of making an 
ORC between the modalities of choice expression could be observed. However, when Type 2 
processing was not externally activated, the initial effect in line with the main hypothesis 
could be replicated. That is, participants expressing their choice manually were more likely to 
choose the ORC compared to participants expressing their choice orally. This finding is in 
Study 1: The Effect of Manual and Oral Choice Expression Modalities on Choice Rationality 63 
 
line with the assumption that choice rationality is a consequence of Type 2 processing and 
that only manual choice expression modalities constitutes an external antecedent of Type 2 
processing. The results obtained in this study are essential for both theoretical and practical 
considerations. 
3.8.1 Theoretical Implications 
Dual processing theory is one of the most intensely studied fields in social psychology (Alter 
et al. 2007). Although this theory was repeatedly challenged (Keren 2013; Osman 2004), 
there is now much agreement regarding its basic concepts and assumptions. To this date 
ample studies have investigated the underlying mechanisms and consequences of two distinct 
types of cognitive processing, one that is fast, automatic, and intuitive (Type 1) and one that is 
slow, deliberated, and analytic (Type 2). However, research on the antecedents or external 
factors that might trigger the one or the other type of cognitive processing is still limited 
(Inbar/Cone/Gilovich 2010). In this research, it was proposed that the way or modality in 
which a choice is expressed (i.e., choice expression modality) might function as external 
antecedent of Type 2 processing. The underlying rational for this proposition was based on 
findings in the field of neuroscientific research, which imply that manual choice expression 
might trigger activity in brain areas involved in higher cognition. Since research in 
neuroscience implies that oral choice expression does not trigger brain activity in brain areas 
involved in higher cognition, one can deduce that individuals expressing a choice orally retain 
Type 1 processing. This assumption is in line with the ‘default-interventionist theory’ (e.g., 
Evans 2007), which assumes that choices are made based on Type 1 processing, unless Type 
2 processing is triggered. Therefore, this study is directly related to recent attempts implying 
that Type 2 processing can be triggered by situational cues (Alter et al. 2007; 
Inbar/Cone/Gilovuch 2010). However, the present study differs from earlier studies as it 
additionally provides a first conceptual explanation of the underlying mechanism for the 
observed results (i.e., activity in different brain areas). Although it was possible to rule out 
some alternative explanations for the obtained findings (i.e., motivation or ability), the 
research design could only implicitly proof the presence of Type 2 processing. Even though 
the methods applied in this study follow the latest research recommendation, the implicit 
nature of these state of the art measures is an issue that should be considered by future studies 
and researches and should elicit the development of more direct methods to successfully 
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assess dual processing. Nevertheless, as the main purpose of the present study was to shed 
more light into the new research avenue of choice expression modalities, this research is 
theoretically as well as practically valuable as it implies that the mere fact, in which modality 
a certain choice is expressed, influences the likelihood of making an ORC. 
3.8.2 Practical Implications 
In every day’s life individuals are surrounded by various options to express our decisions and 
choices (i.e., ‘choice expression modality’). However, as there are few insights into whether 
the mere fact in which a choice is expressed might steer choices and decisions and potentially 
impact choice related variables, it seems that in reality practitioners underestimate the impact 
of the modality in which customers express their choices. It even appears that their 
consideration which choice expression modality to offer to customers is often not strategically 
grounded, but rather based on convenience or is simply randomly assigned. For example, 
many supermarkets offer two options to purchase groceries such as bread, cheese, or meat 
simultaneously. Customers can either take pre-packed items from a shelf themselves or they 
can go to a service counter and say which items they would like to have. The same is true for 
farmer’s markets that in the course of the organic movement become increasingly popular. 
While some market stalls still offer their products in the traditional way (e.g., customers have 
to say what they want) some stalls offer the opportunity for customers to choose their 
vegetables themselves and pay their basket in the end. Eventually, the internet influenced 
shopping behavior tremendously and many purchase decisions are now entirely manually 
expressed (i.e., by clicking) which formerly included a great amount of oral choice 
expression. These examples illustrate that in reality most vendors seem to assume that the 
modality in which choices are expressed is virtually unimportant for the final decision or 
choice.  
However, this study implies that the modality in which a choice is expressed has a direct 
influence on the likelihood of making an ORC. Considering that products can differ according 
to their relative vice and relative virtue features (Wertenbroch 1998), this fact might become 
interesting for practitioners. For instance, Raghunathan/Naylor/Hoyer (2006) found that 
healthy snacks trigger an intuitive and automatic perception of being not tasty, although when 
asked to think about these products thoroughly, individuals valued them for their healthy 
benefits. Other products appear intuitively appealing (e.g., salty snacks), but might lose some 
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of their subjective value if consumers deliberate about them (e.g., content of fat, calories). 
Thus, manufactures of products involving relatively more vices (i.e., indulging snacks or a 
gas guzzling sports car) might consider offering oral choice modalities to prevent thorough 
deliberation, while manufactures of products featuring relatively more virtues (i.e., healthy 
nutrition or a safe, but boring car), might consider to let their customers to express their 
choices manually, to induce deliberative thinking and overcome the intuitive perception of 
unattraction (e.g., Dhar/Wertenbroch 2000).  
Further, whether a choice is based on impulsive and intuitive Type 1 or cognitive and 
reflective Type 2 processing might also impact customer’s variety seeking. For instance, 
research implies that an impulsive decision style (i.e., Type 1 processing) is likely to enhance 
variety seeking (Baumgartner 2002; Sharma/Sivakumaran/Marshall 2010). While individuals 
processing information reflectively (i.e., Type 2 processing) often perceive a need to find 
reasons and to justify their choices (Jordan/Whitfield/Zeigler-Hill 2007; Strack/Deutsch 
2004), which is easier for a choice from a relatively smaller assortment than for a choice from 
a relatively larger assortment (Scheibehenne/Greifeneder/Todd 2010). Thus, vendors offering 
large assortments might steer their customers to express their choices orally, while vendors 
with smaller assortments might consider offering manual choice expression modalities. 
Besides this direct impact of choice expression modalities on the objective rationality of 
choice, there might be an additional, but probably more indirect effect of choice expression 
modality on choice satisfaction. For example, Hafner/White/Handley (2012) argue that 
sticking to one’s initially chosen envelope after one non-winning token is uncovered in the 
‘Monty Hall Game’ is not necessarily a proxy for irrational behavior, but might be interpreted 
as ‘revealed satisfaction’. Following this argumentation, one might alternatively interpret the 
finding of Experiment 1 that individuals expressing their envelope choice orally were less 
likely to change their initially chosen envelope, because they were more satisfied with their 
initial choice (i.e., ‘choice-satisfaction’ see Fassnacht/Schmidt/Pannek 2015; 
Heitmann/Lehmann/Herrmann 2007). This would imply that for certain choice situations an 
intuitive choice style (i.e., Type 1) might yield higher levels of choice satisfaction than a 
reflective choice style (i.e., Type 2). The examination of the impact of choice expression 
modalities on choice satisfaction will be the focus of Study 2 in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
  
66 Study 2: The Effect of Oral and Manual Choice Expression Modalities on Choice Satisfaction 
 
4 Study 2: The Effect of Oral and Manual Choice Expression Modalities 
on Choice Satisfaction 
The following Chapter 4 is presented in form of a scientific working paper. Although humans 
can use various modes to express their choices (e.g., by speaking, by physically taking, or by 
pushing a button etc.), so far no research has investigated whether the modality of choice 
expression influences subjective measures such as choice satisfaction. Study 2 investigates the 
impact of choice expression modality on choice satisfaction. In line with the assumption that 
in contrast to manual choice expression, oral choice expression does not induce Type 2 
processing and the assumption that Type 2 processing impedes choice satisfaction in choice 
situations comprising uncertainty and little information, the present study shows that oral 
choice expression results in higher levels of choice satisfaction than manual choice expression 
(Experiment 1 (a, b) and Experiment 2). Moreover, in line with the assumption that this effect 
is due to a difference in mental processing, this study shows that the effect disappears if Type 
2 processing is externally triggered prior choice expression (Experiment 3 and Experiment 4). 
Further, a moderated mediation analyses provides first evidence for the conjecture that the 
satisfaction augmenting effect of oral choice expression is mediated by intuition, but only if 
Type 2 processing is not externally triggered. 
4.1 Introduction 
We face many difficult decisions in choices in life that require detailed deliberation. Which 
job to take, which city to live in, or which car to buy constitute examples for important and 
complex decisions for which most people prefer decisions and choices based on reflective 
consideration (Dijksterhuis/Nordgren 2006; Gilblin/Morewedge/Norton 2013; 
Inbar/Cone/Gilovich 2010). However, we are frequently confronted with choice situations 
that comprise incomplete information and choice uncertainty, which impede detailed 
deliberation. Consider for instance an individual who has to choose between two seemingly 
identical assignments at work or a customer in a restaurant choosing between two exotic 
desserts, which both are new and unfamiliar to her. In these choice situations, which involve 
incomplete information and choice uncertainty, individuals simply have to follow their 
intuition and to make a decision following their ‘gut-feeling’ (e.g., Payne/Bettman/Johnson 
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1988). In fact, in these decision situations, intuition might even yield better and more 
satisfying choices compared to decisions based on reasoning. For instance, Hammond et al. 
(1987) found that in vague and uncertain situations, the performance and the decision quality 
of professionals is augmented when the decision style is intuitive. Similarly, Wilson et al. 
(1993) observed that individuals are more satisfied with a poster choice when they utter it 
immediately and spontaneously compared to when they deliberate about it.  
Given that in situations of uncertainty, intuitive decisions might yield better choices compared 
to reason and deliberation based decisions, it is important to understand what prompts 
individuals to engage in intuitive decision making rather than extensive deliberation. Previous 
studies imply that the mere fact in which modality a choice is expressed might influence a 
final decision and choice (e.g., Klesse/Levav/Goukens 2015). Particularly, based on the ‘dual 
processing theory’ it was observed in Chapter 3 of the present dissertation that individuals 
expressing their choices orally are likely to maintain an intuitive and reflexive style of 
cognitive processing (i.e., Type 1 processing). In contrast, when choices are expressed 
manually it appears that individuals engage in a reflective and deliberative style of cognitive 
processing (i.e., Type 2 processing). 
Consequently, it is stated that the mere act of expressing one’s choice orally (versus manually) 
increases choice satisfaction in choice situations with limited information, uncertainty, and in 
which the outcome of a choice is a subjective matter (e.g., Inbar/Cone/Gilovich 2010). For 
this purpose, four experiments are designed to demonstrate that oral (e.g., speaking) versus 
manual (e.g., taking and button pressing) choice expression yields higher choice satisfaction 
(Experiment 1 (a, b), Experiment 2), but only if Type 2 processing is not externally triggered 
(Experiment 3, Experiment 4). In the following section a brief overview of the underlying 
concepts and definition of the most important constructs is provided. Based on this overview 
testable hypotheses are developed.  
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4.2 Conceptual Background 
4.2.1 Dual Processing: A Brief Summary 
In this study it is conjectured that orally expressed choices result in higher levels of choice 
satisfaction than manually expressed choices based on the assumption that oral and manual 
choice expression modalities induce different types of cognitive processing. More 
specifically, it is proposed that manual choice expression triggers a rational decision style 
(i.e., Type 2 processing) and oral choice expression triggers an intuitive decision style (i.e., 
Type 1 processing). Because of the extensive discussion on the link between choice 
expression modality and mental processing styles (i.e., dual processing), in chapter 3.2 of this 
present dissertation only the main pillars of this argumentation that clarify the important 
concepts for this study are briefly discussed and explained. 
The ‘dual processing theory’ proclaims that information processing and decision elicitation is 
either based on reflexive intuition (i.e., Type 1 processing) or reflective deliberation (i.e., 
Type 2 processing) (e.g., Evans 2008). Further, the ‘default-interventionist theory’ implies 
that by default individuals decide and process according to Type 1 processing. Only if the 
decision or choice context requires further attention and cognition is externally induced, 
individuals engage in Type 2 processing (Evans 2007, 2008, 2011; Evans/Stanovich 2013; 
Wason/Evans 1975). Accordingly, in Study 2 it is assumed that Type 1 processing is the 
default mode and Type 2 processing can be triggered by external antecedents (e.g., Alter et al. 
2007; Inbar/Cone/Gilovich 2010). 
4.2.2 Choice Expression Modality and Intuitive Choices 
Nowadays, individuals can express their choices by interacting with companies using various 
different mediums. In many stores consumers select items by simply taking them from the 
shelf. In some situations consumers can express their choices by button pressing (e.g., a 
vending machine), and sometimes consumers have to talk to another person to express their 
choice. Thus, depending on devices used or situational factors, consumers might express their 
choices orally (i.e., by speaking) or manually (e.g., by button pressing or by taking an item).  
Based on the assumptions of Klesse/Levav/Goukens (2015), in chapter 3.1 of the present 
dissertation, it was conjectured that choice expression modality impacts the degree of decision 
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deliberation and eventually the degree of the objectively assessable rationality of a final 
choice (i.e., making an ORC). This proposition was based on neuroscientific findings, 
implying that manual actions trigger activity in brain areas related to higher cognition (i.e. 
dorsal/caudal part of the ACC) and that verbal utterances trigger activity in brain areas related 
to affection (i.e., rostral/ventral part of the ACC) (Bush/Luu/Posner 2000; Paus et al. 1993; 
Qiu et al. 2007).  
In a nutshell, the extensive argumentation given in Chapter 3.2 can be summarized by stating 
that oral choice expression yields an intuitive (i.e., Type 1) and manual choice expression 
yields a cognitive (i.e., Type 2) style of choosing.  
4.2.3 Intuitive Choice and Choice Satisfaction 
Although intuitive decisions and choices constitute very common forms of consumer 
behavior, intuitive decisions and choices based on the gut are often implicitly and explicitly 
considered as being inferior in comparison with rational, deliberation-based decisions and 
choices (Rook/Fisher 1995; Shafir/Simonson/Tversky 1993; Simonson 1989; 
Steenkamp/Maydeu-Olivares 2015; Strack/Werth/Deutsch 2006). This presumption is 
grounded in the assertion that individuals tend to prefer decisions that are justifiable to others 
(Slovic 1975) and the traditional economic view, which implies that rational choices are 
generally more acceptable and defensible (Simon 1955). 
However, although it is often inferred that thorough deliberation about a decision increases 
choice quality (e.g., Chaiken 1980), which in turn should increase the level of choice 
satisfaction (e.g., Fassnacht/Schmidt/Pannek 2015; Raiffa 1968; Tordesillas/Chaiken 1999), 
some studies imply that intuitive decision making might yield superior choices and result in 
greater choice satisfaction compared to reason based decision making depending on the 
choice context (Dijksterhuis et al. 2006; Novak/Hoffman 2009; Kahneman 2003).  
Particularly, research repeatedly reveals that when objective decision and choice rules are not 
readily applicable due to context specific constraints, such as limited information and choice 
uncertainty, intuitively elicited decisions can outperform decisions based on reflective and 
thoroughly deliberation. For instance, Hammond et al. (1987) found that in vague and 
uncertain work situations, the performance and the decision quality of highway-engineers was 
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significantly enhanced when they relied on their intuition compared to when they attempted to 
decide analytically. Similarly, research in the field of management indicates that particularly 
for decisions characterized by information scarcity and uncertainty, managers’ decisions often 
yield superior solutions and choices when they are based on intuitive rather than on reflective 
thinking (e.g., Dane/Pratt 2007; Hayashi 2001).  
In the area of consumer research, Wilson/Schooler (1991) found that individuals were more 
likely to express choices in line with experts’ opinions when they were instructed to decide 
spontaneously compared to when they were instructed to give reason for their decision. 
Further, Calvillo/Penaloza (2009) show that for simple choice scenarios intuitively expressed 
judgments can be better than judgments expressed after some deliberation. In their study, the 
authors provided participants with performance information about four fictional cars and 
asked them to subsequently judge the cars’ performances. Performance information was 
designed so that one car was objectively superior (i.e., dominating), two cars were middle 
options, and one car was an option dominated by all other cars. Calvillo/Penaloza (2009) 
observed that participants who were instructed to express their judgment immediately after 
the display of performance information were more likely to detect the dominating pattern 
among the cars compared to participants who were instructed to consciously deliberate about 
the performance information or compared to those participants who were distracted prior 
judgment assertion (i.e., unconscious deliberation). Although the authors did not explicitly 
assess which car participants would prefer to choose, it is reasonable to assume that a more 
objective and correct assessment of the choice relevant factor ‘car-performance’ would likely 
impact choice and might eventually augment satisfaction with one’s choice.  
The assumption that an intuitive decision style augments choice satisfaction when the choice 
situation comprises only little information and the choice outcome is a subjective matter, is 
also supported by the research of Wilson et al. (1993). The authors showed participants a set 
of five posters and asked them to choose one of them as a present for participating in an 
unrelated study. One half of the participants was merely instructed to choose one of the 
posters, while the other half was additionally instructed to write down reasons for their 
choice. Wilson et al. (1993) observed that participants who choose immediately without being 
instructed to write down reasons were more satisfied with their choice (i.e., their poster) than 
were participants who were instructed to write down reasons for their choice. Dehghan et al. 
(2011) replicated the experimental set-up of Wilson et al. (1993) and obtained similar results. 
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They found that participants who were asked to choose one of the posters spontaneously (i.e., 
intuitively) were more satisfied with their chosen poster than were participants who were 
distracted by a filler task after initial poster exposure, but before expressing their final choice. 
Dehghan et al. (2011) explain this finding by arguing that the filler task triggered participants 
to ‘unconsciously deliberate’ (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al. 2006; Dijksterhuis/Nordgren 2006) 
about their decision. Consequently, these participants did not express an entirely intuitive 
final choice. This implies that even small or unconscious bits of rational deliberation can have 
a negative impact on choice satisfaction if the choice situation comprises little information, 
features a high level of choice uncertainty or when the choice outcome is a subjective matter. 
In summary, it is conjectured that in choice situations comprising choice uncertainty and little 
information (e.g., when thoroughly deliberation is virtually impossible and an ORC is not 
traceable), an intuitive decision style (i.e., Type 1 processing) yields higher levels of choice 
satisfaction compared to a deliberation based decision style (i.e., Type 2 processing).  
4.3 Hypothesis Development 
Following the reasoning given above, it is suggested that in choice situations with little 
information and high levels of choice uncertainty, orally expressed choices result in higher 
levels of choice satisfaction than manually expressed choices. Accordingly: 
 
H1:  Oral choice expression (i.e., speaking) results in higher levels of choice satisfaction than 
manual choice expression (i.e., taking or button pressing). 
 
In chapter 4.3, it was proposed that oral choice expression yields higher levels of choice 
satisfaction, because in contrast to manual choice expression, oral choice expression does not 
trigger a rational style of decision making (e.g., individuals remain in default Type 1 
processing). Accordingly, it is assumed that if a rational style of decision making (i.e., Type 
2) is triggered by an external factor (e.g., when individuals experience unexpected sensations 
or are triggered to pay attention) levels of choice satisfaction will not be affected by different 
choice expression modalities. Following this logic, the second hypothesis is formulated: 
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H2:  Oral choice expression (i.e., speaking) only results in higher levels of choice satisfaction 
than manual choice expression (i.e., grabbing or button pressing), if Type 2 processing 
is not externally induced.  
 
The aforementioned hypotheses imply that the effect of choice expression modality on choice 
satisfaction is mediated. More specifically the following moderated mediation effect is 
assumed:  
 
H3:  The effect of oral choice expression (i.e., speaking) resulting in higher levels of choice 
satisfaction than manual choice expression (i.e., grabbing or button pressing) is 
mediated by intuition, but only if Type 2 processing is not externally triggered.  
4.4 Current Research 
These three hypotheses are tested in four experiments. Specifically, Experiment 1 (a, b) and 
Experiment 2 are devoted to test that orally expressed choices result in greater choice 
satisfaction than manually expressed choices (H1) across different contexts. Experiments 3 
and 4 are designed to test the second hypothesis as to whether orally expressed choices do not 
result in higher levels of choice satisfaction compared to manually expressed choices if Type 
2 processing is triggered by altering the auditory feedback (Experiment 3) or by information 
disfluency (Experiment 4). Additionally, Experiment 4 provides initial evidence for the 
assumption that the choice satisfaction augmenting effect of oral choice expression is 
mediated by intuition, but only when Type 2 processing is not externally trigged (H3).  
In all experiments, participants were asked to choose between two ostensibly similar options 
(e.g., drink A or drink B) while receiving only little information about the choice options 
(e.g., without knowing which option is which one). After making their choice, but before 
trying (i.e., inspecting, drinking or eating) their chosen option, participants are asked to 
indicate their satisfaction with the choice they made (i.e., choice satisfaction). Keeping all else 
constant, in each experiment it is manipulated whether participants make their choice orally 
(i.e., by speaking; ‘oral choice condition’) or manually (i.e., by taking the item of their choice 
or by pressing a button next to it; ‘manual choice condition’). The experimental set-up 
comprising a choice between ostensibly equal, but still distinct choice options, guarantees that 
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participants have to make a random choice with little information (e.g., Christenfeld 1995). 
As such, the choice situations can be considered as uncertain and choices are a subjective 
matter.  
To provide evidence for the second hypothesis (H2), two field experiments (Experiments 3 
and 4) were conducted in which, in addition to the general experimental set-up, the cognition 
and thus the type of mental processing of participants was manipulated (e.g., Type 2 
processing was externally induced prior choice or not). In Experiment 3, Type 2 processing 
was triggered by manipulating whether participants could hear themselves in an altered or 
unaltered manner by means of music volume and active noise cancellation (i.e., auditory 
feedback). It is expect that altered auditory feedback activates Type 2 processing. In 
Experiment 4, Type 2 processing was induced by means of ‘information disfluency’. 
Additionally, Experiment 4 tested the impact of the level of choice intuition on the effect of 
choice expression modalities on choice satisfaction (H3). Table 5 provides an overview of all 
experiments conducted in this Study 2. 
 
# Experiment Purpose Conditions 
 
1 (a) 
 
 
Paper Stack 
Experiment 
 
H1: Choice Satisfaction 
 
Oral (speaking) vs. Manual (taking) 
 
1 (b) 
 
Cola  
Experiment 
 
H1: Choice Satisfaction 
 
Oral (speaking) vs. Manual (taking) 
2 Nougat 
Experiment 
H1: Choice Satisfaction  Oral (speaking) vs. Manual (taking 
and button pressing) 
3 Headphone/Cola 
Experiment 
H1: Choice Satisfaction 
H2: External Cognition 
Oral (speaking) vs. Manual (taking) 
X  
Regular vs. Altered Feedback 
4 Cognition/Cola 
Experiment 
H1: Choice Satisfaction 
H2: External Cognition 
H3: Moderated Mediation 
Oral (speaking) vs. Manual (taking) 
X  
Fluent vs. Disfluent Information 
Table 5:  Overview of Experiments, Study 2 
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For all experiments, it was essential that participants followed all instructions closely and did 
not deviate to any extent. Particularly, participants who did not utilize the instructed choice 
expression modality (e.g., they grabbed their choice in the oral choice condition or were 
talking while taking their choice in the manual choice condition) or tried their chosen option 
before indicating their choice satisfaction were immediately excluded from the data set and 
never considered for any analysis. An overview of the excluded participants can be found in 
Table 6. 
 
Experiment Wrong Modality 
Immediate/no 
Consumption 
Total Exclusion 
1 (a) 12 - 12 
1 (b) 18 20 38 
2 45 6 51 
3 25 - 25 
4 11 4 15 
Table 6:  Overview excluded participants per Experiment, Study 2 
4.5 Experiment 1  
Experiment 1 is subdivided into two independent Experiments 1 (a) and 1 (b). Both are 
intended to test the main prediction that expressing one’s choice orally (e.g., by saying) 
results in higher levels of choice satisfaction than expressing one’s choice manually (e.g., by 
taking) in different settings and with different choice options. In the laboratory Experiment 1 
(a), individuals were asked to choose between two stacks of paper. In the field Experiment 1 
(b), individuals were offered two ostensibly different drinks (i.e., different kinds of Cola) and 
asked to choose one of them. Due to this set-up, it is possible to test the effect of oral choice 
expression on choice satisfaction in different settings with different choice options and thus to 
provide proof of the robustness of the initial findings (e.g., Cumming 2014). 
4.5.1 Experiment 1 (a) ‘Paper Stack Experiment’ 
Participants were presented two stacks of paper, one labeled with the letter A and the other 
stack labeled with the letter B. They were told that each stack would constitute a different 
Study 2: The Effect of Oral and Manual Choice Expression Modalities on Choice Satisfaction 75 
 
experimental task, which they would have to work on in the course of their experimental 
session. Participants were instructed to choose one of the two stacks of paper, without 
receiving any further information about the experimental tasks or to which extent they would 
differ. Unknown to the participants, the choice expression modality was manipulated: half of 
the participants indicated their choice orally (i.e., by speaking ‘oral choice condition’) and the 
other half indicated their choice manually (i.e., by taking one stack ‘manual choice 
condition’).  
 Method 4.5.1.1
Experiment 1 (a) was a single factor between subject design laboratory study. The sample 
comprised eighty-two marketing students (Male = 43.9%, MAge = 21.66, SDAge = 1.86) who 
received partial course credit for their participation. Participants were invited to come to the 
lab for individual sessions that lasted approximately 12 minutes. Sessions were scheduled 
throughout one week and took place in the morning (Tuesday, Wednesday, Friday from 9:40 
am to 1:30 pm) or in the afternoon (Monday and Friday, 12:40 pm to 4:30 pm). After arriving, 
but before entering the lab, participants were handed an introduction sheet, in which the 
procedure was explained. That is, they were informed that they would see two paper stacks 
placed next to each other on a table. The stacks were labeled with a different letter (i.e., one 
with an ‘A’, the other one with a ‘B’ (see picture 3, General Appendix VI)) and each stack 
would feature a different experimental task that participants would have to fulfill in order to 
receive the partial course credit. Participants were told that they have to choose one of the 
stacks without knowing which stack constitutes which task. No further information about the 
task was provided so that the choice situation can be characterized as uncertain and featuring 
little information. Unknown to the participants, it was manipulated whether participants were 
instructed to express their choice orally (i.e., by saying the letter of the stack (i.e., A or B) 
without touching it, N = 41) or manually (i.e., by taking the stack they want, without saying a 
word, N = 41). After reading the introduction sheet, participants were allowed to enter the lab. 
In the lab, a second research assistant was standing behind the table with the two stacks lying 
in front of her. Participants were allowed to choose as soon as they entered the lab. 
Participants who chose their stack orally said the letter (A or B) of their choice and were then 
handed their chosen stack. Participants who chose their stack manually took their preferred 
stack (A or B). Subsequently, all participants took a seat at separate table and received a one-
76 Study 2: The Effect of Oral and Manual Choice Expression Modalities on Choice Satisfaction 
 
sided, paper based questionnaire before they were allowed to remove the cover sheet of their 
chosen stack and actually check the task they chose. In the questionnaire the participant’s 
satisfaction with their choice (i.e., choice satisfaction) was assessed with three questions 
measured on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = I strongly disagree; 7 = I strongly agree): ‘I am 
happy with my choice’, ‘I am pleased with my choice’, ‘I feel satisfied with my choice’ (e.g., 
Mano/Oliver 1993; Oliver 1989). Importantly, choice satisfaction was assessed before 
participants got to know anything about the task that they had chosen. After completion of 
this first questionnaire, participants were asked to start working on their chosen task. 
Unknown to the participants and regardless of their actual choice, all participants worked on 
exactly the same task (i.e., a word puzzle), which was actually just a filler task and not 
relevant for the present study. Participants worked on the puzzle for 7 minutes and were then 
provided a second questionnaire in which demographics were assessed. After that participants 
were thanked and dismissed. 
  Results 4.5.1.2
To assess choice satisfaction, the three choice satisfaction questions were computed into a 
composite measure ‘choice satisfaction index’ (in the following CS-Index), reaching 
sufficient reliability (α = .95). In line with the first hypothesis, participants expressing their 
stack choice orally (MOral = 5.67, SDOral = 1.28) were more satisfied with their choice 
compared to participants expressing their stack choice manually (MManual = 5.07, SDManual = 
1.26, F(1, 80) = 4.6, p = .035, Cohen’s d = .47).  
4.5.2 Experiment 1 (b) ‘Cola Experiment’ 
Participants were presented two identical looking cups of Cola and it was claimed that one 
would contain national brand Cola (hereafter: NB Cola) and one would contain private label 
Cola (hereafter: PL Cola). Participants did not receive any further information about the cups 
and were only allowed to try one of them in the cause of the experiment. The choice 
expression modality was manipulated and it was examined whether oral choice expression 
modality (i.e., ‘speaking’) yields higher levels of choice satisfaction compared to a manual 
choice modality (i.e., ‘taking’). 
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 Method 4.5.2.1
Experiment 1 (b) was conducted on campus on two consecutive days (Tuesday and 
Wednesday; from 9:30 am to approximately 2:00 pm) as single factor between subject design. 
All individuals walking by were invited to participate in exchange for a free cup of Cola. The 
sample comprised one-hundred-ninety-one individuals (Male = 45.5%, MAge = 21.83 years, 
SDAge = 3.19). Individuals were handed an introduction sheet in which the study procedure 
was explained. As a cover story, participants were told that they would participate in a tasting 
study and that they would have to decide for one out of two cups of Cola. They were 
informed that one cup would contain NB Cola while the other would contain PL Cola. In 
order to create a decision situation comprising uncertainty and little information, the cups 
looked identical and contained the exact same amount of Cola (100 ml). Moreover, it was not 
revealed which cup contained which type of Cola. Unknown to the participants, it was 
manipulated whether participants were instructed to express their choice orally (i.e., by saying 
the position of the cup ‘left’ or ‘right’ without touching the cup, ‘oral choice condition’ N = 
96) or manually (i.e., by taking the cup they want, without saying a word, ‘manual choice 
condition’ N = 95). Because unknown to the participants both cups always contained the same 
NB Cola, participants always received the same Cola regardless of their actual choice. After 
reading the introduction sheet, participants were guided to a table on which the two cups of 
Cola were placed next to each other. The position of the cups was clearly marked by position 
signs indicating the position ‘left’ or ‘right’ (for experimental set-up see picture 4, General 
Appendix VII). After making their choice but before consuming the Cola (i.e., participants in 
the oral choice condition were handed their cup, while participants in the manual choice 
condition held their cup in their hand), all participants received a questionnaire.  
After receiving, but before consuming their chosen Cola, participants were asked about their 
choice satisfaction with the CS-Index (i.e., similar to Experiment 1 (a)). Subsequently, 
participants were asked to taste their Cola and then to continue answering the remaining 
questions about their demographics. After that they were thanked and dismissed. 
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 Results 4.5.2.2
As in Experiment 1 (a), choice satisfaction was assessed by computing the CS-Index, 
reaching sufficient reliability (α = .94). In line with the first hypothesis (H1), participants 
expressing their choice orally (MOral = 4.99, SDOral = 1.26) were more satisfied with their 
choice compared to participants expressing their choice manually (MManual = 4.31, SDManual = 
1.37, F(1, 189) = 12.89, p < .0005, Cohen’s d = .52).  
4.5.3 Discussion Experiment 1 
The results of Experiment 1 (a) and Experiment 1 (b) suggest that individuals expressing their 
choice orally are more satisfied with their final choice than individuals expressing their choice 
manually in choice situations comprising uncertainty and little information (H1). Noteworthy 
are the facts that this effect appears prior actual knowledge of the attributes of the option 
individuals decided for (i.e., without knowing which task or which cola one actually chose) 
and that all individuals ended up with the same option regardless of their actual choice.  
However, to provide more conclusive evidence for the argumentation that oral versus manual 
choice expression results in different levels of choice satisfaction, it is necessary to generalize 
the findings to another manual choice expression modality in the next experiment (i.e., button 
pressing). If a significant difference between speaking and both manual choice expression 
modalities (e.g., taking as well as button pressing) can be obtained, one can exclude the 
alternative explanation that the finding of Experiment 1 (a) and Experiment 1 (b) are specific 
to the comparison of speaking and taking.  
4.6 Experiment 2 ‘Nougat Experiment’ 
As indicated before, Experiment 2 compares the impact of speaking (i.e., oral choice 
expression) to taking as well as button pressing (i.e., manual choice expression modalities) on 
choice satisfaction. In addition, to further generalize the initial findings, another product (i.e., 
nougat-cream) was utilized. Besides these adjustments, the procedure and conduction of 
Experiment 2 was similar to that of Experiment 1 (b). 
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4.6.1 Method 
Experiment 2 was conducted on campus on two consecutive days (Tuesday and Wednesday, 
9:30 am to 1:30 pm). All German-speaking individuals passing by were invited to participate 
in exchange for a free sampling of nougat-cream. The experimental sample comprised one-
hundred-ninety individuals (Male = 51.9%, MAge = 21.44 years, SDAge = 2.78).
8
 
All participants were handed an introduction sheet, which outlined the experimental 
procedure. Specifically, participants were informed that they would participate in a tasting 
study and had to decide between two samples of nougat-cream. As in Experiment 1 (b), 
participants were told that one sample would be a NB product (i.e., Nutella) and the other one 
would be the corresponding PL version. To create a choice situation comprising uncertainty 
and little information both samples looked identical (for experimental set-up see picture 5 and 
picture 6, General Appendix VIII). Further, participants were uninformed about which sample 
featured which type of nougat cream and were only allowed to try one of them. However, as 
in Experiment 1 (b), all participants received the same nougat cream, because all samples 
featured NB nougat cream. As experimental manipulations, participants were either instructed 
to say which sample they wanted (‘oral choice condition’, N = 64), to take one sample 
(‘taking-manual choice condition’, N = 63) or to press a button next to the sample they 
decided for (‘button-manual choice condition’, N = 63). Once participants made their choice 
(i.e., participants in the oral and button choice condition were handed their nougat sample, 
while participants in the taking choice condition held their sample in their hand), they 
received a questionnaire in which choice satisfaction prior to consumption and demographic 
information were assessed. 
4.6.2 Results 
As in previous experiments, the CS-Index was computed which reached sufficient internal 
reliability (α = .92). Given that choice expression modality was a three-level variable, 
orthogonal contrast codes were used to compare the (1) manual choice expression condition 
(i.e., taking and button pressing) to oral choice expression, (2) button choice expression to 
oral choice expression, (3) taking choice expression to oral choice expression and eventually 
(4) the two manual choice expression conditions to each other. Note that for the first three 
                                                 
8
 Data refer to 188 participants, as one participant refused to provide any demographic information. 
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contrasts significant results are expected, but that for the fourth contrast an insignificant result 
is predicted. Contrast coefficients and expected direction of effects are displayed in Table 7. 
 
 Coefficient 
Speaking (S) 
Coefficient 
Taking (T) 
Coefficient 
Button (B) 
Expected  
Effect 
 
Contrast code 1: 
Speaking vs. 
Taking and Button  
 
1 
 
-.5 
 
-.5 
 
S > B&T 
 
Contrast code 2 
Speaking vs. Taking 
 
1 
 
-1 
 
0 
 
S > T 
Contrast code 3: 
Speaking vs. Button  
1 0 -1 S > B 
Contrast code 4:  
Taking vs. Button 
 
0 1 -1 T = B 
Table 7:  Contrast code coefficients and expected effects, Experiment 2, Study 2 
The first planned contrast (1) revealed that participants who expressed their choice orally 
were more satisfied with their choice than participants who expressed their choice manually 
(MOral = 5.38, SDOral = 1.33 vs. MManual = 4.83, SDManual = 1.16, F(1, 187) = 8.61, p = .004, 
Cohan’s d = .45). The second contrast (2) revealed a significant difference between oral 
choice expression and choice expression by taking (MOral = 5.38, SDOral = 1.33 vs. MTaking = 
4.73, SDTaking = 1.21, F(1, 187) = 9.01, p = .003, Cohan’s d = .49) and the third contrast (3) 
revealed a significant difference between oral choice expression and choice expression by 
button pressing (MOral = 5.38, SDOral = 1.33 vs MButton = 4.93, SDButton = 1.11, F(1, 187) = 4.3, 
p = .04, Cohan’s d = .37). As predicted, the fourth contrast (4), which compares the two 
manual modalities to each other, was not significant, indicating that participants’ choice 
satisfaction in these conditions did not differ (F(1, 187) = .86, p = .36, Cohan’s d = .17). Since 
the Levene’s test did not reject the hypothesis of homogeneity of variances (i.e., variance in 
the oral choice condition was significantly larger than in the button choice condition) the 
same analysis was conducted with adjusted degrees of freedom (DF) that do not assume equal 
variances. The results of this procedure do only marginally deviate from the previously 
reported results and can be found in Table 14 in the General Appendix XI.  
Study 2: The Effect of Oral and Manual Choice Expression Modalities on Choice Satisfaction 81 
 
A graphical representation of these results can be found in Figure 13 (black lines indicate 
standard errors of the means). 
 
 
Figure 13:  Choice satisfaction per experimental group, Experiment 2, Study 2 
4.6.3 Discussion Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 adds to the findings of Experiment 1 in two important ways. First, as a 
significant difference between speaking and both manual choice expression modalities (i.e., 
taking and button pressing) was revealed, it is reasonable to exclude the alternative 
explanation that the observed effect is inherent to the comparison of speaking and taking. 
Instead, the findings point toward a more fundamental difference between oral and manual 
choice expression in regard to choice satisfaction. Second, by replicating the findings of 
Experiment 1 (a) and Experiment 1 (b) utilizing an again different choice scenario (i.e., food 
rather than tasks or drinks) the robustness and potential of generalizability of the findings is 
further strengthened. 
Figure 14 provides a comprehensive overview of the results of Experiment 1 (a), Experiment 
1 (b) and Experiment 2, respectively (black lines indicate standard errors of the means). 
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Figure 14:  Choice satisfaction per experimental group, Experiment 1 (a, b), Experiment 2, Study 2 
4.7 Experiment 3 ‘Headphone/Cola Experiment’ 
Experiment 3 fulfills the purpose to test the second hypothesis (H2) and thus to explore the 
underlying mechanism of the initial findings by highlighting an important boundary 
condition.  
Recall that the reasoning for the choice satisfaction augmenting effect of oral choice 
expression is in line with the argumentation and findings of chapter 3 of the present 
dissertation. Based on findings in the field of neuroscientific research, indicating that Type 2 
processing is related to brain activity in the dorsal/caudal part of the ACC (Bush/Luu/Posner 
2000; Paus et al. 1993; Qiu et al. 2007), it was conjectured that in contrast to manual choice 
expression, oral choice expression does not function as an external antecedent of Type 2 
processing. In other words, a lack of activity in the dorsal/caudal part of the ACC seems to be 
related to intuition based decision making (i.e., Type 1), which is assumed to be the cause for 
augmented choice satisfaction in choice situations comprising uncertainty and little 
information.  
However, if this absence of Type 2 processing is indeed the underlying cause for the choice 
satisfaction augmenting effect, it is reasonable to assume that the level of choice satisfaction 
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should be equal among orally and manually expressed choices if Type 2 processing is 
externally triggered. Put differently, if brain activity in the dorsal/caudal part of the ACC was 
triggered prior choice expression, the level of choice satisfaction should be unaffected by the 
modality of choice expression. 
Ample imagining studies repeatedly show that unexpected or conflicting sensations trigger 
activity in the dorsal/caudal part of the ACC (Carter et al. 1998; Holroyd et al. 2004; Paus 
2001; Ridderinkhof et al. 2004). In particular, electroencephalography (EEG) studies further 
strengthen this link by showing that the absolute value of the event related negativity (ERN), 
a signal that likely evokes in the dorsal ACC (Holroyds/Cole 2002; Ridderinkhof et al. 2004), 
is increased by unexpected stimuli (Maidhof/Pitkäniemi/Tervaniemi 2013; Roth et al. 1976). 
This is important, because studies investigating auditory feedback induced brain activity find 
that if individuals hear their own voice in real time but in an altered manner (e.g., pitched or 
alienated), that the ERN is significantly augmented (Heinks-Maldonado et al. 2005; Heinks-
Maldonado/Nagarajan/Houde 2006). In other words, one can deduce that hearing one’s own 
voice in an unexpected and altered way triggers activity in the dorsal ACC.  
Therefore, it is conjectured that altering the auditory feedback of one’s own voice in an 
unexpected way triggers activity in the dorsal/caudal part of the ACC which in turn should 
induce Type 2 processing. As a result, the level of choice satisfaction between oral and 
manual choice expression should be equal, when the individuals hear their own voice in an 
altered and unexpected manner during choice expression. 
In Experiment 3, it was consequently manipulated whether participants could hear their own 
voice unaltered or altered (by means of music volume and active noise cancellation) and it 
was predicted that oral choice expression only results in greater choice satisfaction than 
manual choice expression in choice situations comprising uncertainty and little information, if 
participants can hear their own voice unaltered. However, if the auditory feedback of one’s 
own voice is altered, no difference in the level of choice satisfaction between conditions is 
expected.  
4.7.1 Method 
Experiment 3 utilizes a 2 by 2 between subject design in which the choice expression 
modality (i.e., oral versus manual) and auditory feedback (i.e., regular auditory feedback (RF) 
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versus altered auditory feedback (AF)) was manipulated. This flied experiment was conducted 
on three consecutive days (Monday till Wednesday from 10:00 am till 05:00 pm) on campus. 
All German-speaking individuals passing by were approached and invited to participate in a 
tasting study in exchange for a free cup of Cola. The sample comprised one-hundred-forty-
three individuals (Male = 47.6 %, MAge = 21.3 years, SDAge = 2.54).  
All participants were asked to choose one out of two cups of Cola following the same 
procedure outlined in Experiment 1 (b) (see picture 7, General Appendix IX). More precisely, 
although participants were told that one cup would contain PL and the other NB Cola and 
therefore faced a choice situation comprising uncertainty and little information, both cups 
actually contained 100ml of the same NB Cola. As manipulation, participants were either 
instructed to express their choice orally (by speaking, ‘oral choice condition’, NOral = 70) or 
manually (by taking, ‘manual choice condition’, NManual = 73). In addition to the procedure of 
Experiment 1 (b), in Experiment 3 participants were told that the effect of music on choice 
making was investigated. For this purpose, they were asked to wear active noise cancellation 
headphones
9
 and listen to music (i.e., a variation of Händel’s watermusic, which has been 
shown to be perceived as in exchange neutral in terms the mood impact (Mitterschiffthaler et 
al. 2007)) while expressing their choice. Unknown to the participants, the volume of the 
music was varied (i.e., low, ~32dB, or high, ~85dB) and the noise cancellation feature of the 
headphones was activated or disabled. More specific, for half of the participants (NRF = 71), 
the music volume was low and the noise cancellation function was disabled (RF). For the 
other half (NAF = 72), music volume was high and the noise cancellation function was 
activated (AF). This procedure yielded four experimental conditions (NOral/RF = 35, NManual/RF 
= 36, NOral/AF = 35, NManual/AF = 37).  
As in the previous experiments, choice satisfaction (i.e., ‘CS-Index’) was assessed prior 
consumption of the chosen Cola. After that, participants were asked to taste their Cola and 
then to continue answering the remaining questions related to demographics and the auditory 
feedback manipulation. That is, participants were asked to which extent they agreed with the 
questions ‘The music was very loud’ and ‘The music made it impossible to hear myself speak’ 
on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = I strongly disagree to 7 = I strongly agree). Eventually, 
participants were thanked and dismissed. 
                                                 
9
 Bose Quiet Comfort 25 Acoustic Noise Cancelling Headphones, see picture 8, General Appendix IX. 
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4.7.2 Results 
As in the previous experiments, choice satisfaction was assessed by computing the CS-Index, 
which reached sufficient reliability (α = .95). 
Next, it was assessed whether the auditory manipulation worked as intended. Indeed, 
participants in the AF condition perceived the music as being louder (MAF = 4.71, SDAF = 1.66) 
than participants in the RF condition (MRF = 2.18, SDRF = 1.27, F(1, 141) = 104.53, p < .0005, 
Cohen’s d = 1.7) and were also more likely to agree that the music made it impossible to hear 
themselves (MAF = 4.93, SDAF = 1.86) than were participants in the RF condition (MRF = 2.69, 
SDRF = 1.7, F(1, 141) = 56.5, p < .0005, Cohen’s d = 1.26). For these questions, only a main 
effect of auditory feedback, but no interaction effect with choice expression modality was 
observed (p = .85, and p = .54, respectively). This implies that the auditory feedback 
manipulation worked as intended. The results of the manipulation check are displayed in 
Figure 15 (black lines indicate standard errors of the means). 
 
Figure 15:  Manipulation check Experiment 3, Study 2 
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To access the hypothesized effect, the CS-Index was submitted to a two way ANOVA with 
choice expression modality (condition 1: ‘Oral vs. Manual’) and auditory feedback (condition 
2: ‘RF vs. AF’) as independent factors. In line with the second hypothesis (H2), a significant 
interaction effect between condition 1 (e.g., oral vs. manual) and condition 2 (RF vs. AF) on 
choice satisfaction was obtained (F(1, 139) = 3.89, p = .05,  = .027). In order to explore this 
interaction effect further, planned contrasts separately for the RF and AF condition were 
executed. As expected, within the RF condition the main effect in line with H1 was replicated. 
Participants expressing their cup choice orally (MOral/RF = 5.59, SDOral/RF = 1.04) were more 
satisfied with their choice than were participants expressing their choice manually (MManual/RF 
= 4.76, SDManual/RF = 1.34, F(1, 69) = 8.52, p = .005, Cohen’s d = .69). However, within the 
AF no significant difference between orally and manually expressed choices was revealed 
(MOral/AF = 5.00, SDOral/AF = 1.34 vs. MManual/AF = 5.01, SDManual/AF = 1.34, F(1, 70) = .001, p 
= .98, Cohen’s d = .007). This finding is in line with the second hypothesis (H2). 
A graphical representation of the findings in Experiment 3 can be found in Figure 16 (black 
lines indicate standard errors of the means). 
 
 
Figure 16:  Choice satisfaction per experimental group, Experiment 3, Study 2 
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In order to demonstrate that oral choice expression augments satisfaction rather than that 
manual choice expression attenuates it, the CS-Index for RF and AF within the oral choice 
condition was compared. As expected, participants expressing their choice orally showed 
higher levels of choice satisfaction in the RF compared to the AF condition (p = .043, 
Cohen’s d = .49). This implies that AF attenuates choice satisfaction. 
4.7.3 Discussion Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 was intended to show an important boundary condition and thus to shed light on 
the possible underlying mechanism for why oral choice expression yields higher levels of 
choice satisfaction. In line with the second hypothesis (H2), there was only a significant 
difference in the level of choice satisfaction between orally and manually expressed choices if 
participants could hear themselves in an unaltered manner and received regular auditory 
feedback (i.e., RF). However, in line with the assumption that altered auditory feedback 
triggers Type 2 processing, no significant difference in the level of choice satisfaction 
between orally and manually expressed choices was observable when participants received 
altered auditory feedback and heard their own voice altered in an unexpected manner (i.e., AF 
condition). In other words, the level of choice satisfaction was equal among conditions in 
which participants were expected to engage in Type 2 processing, but augmented when they 
were expected to remain Type 1 processing (i.e., Oral/RF condition).  
Although these results provide initial evidence for the proposed mechanism, the findings are 
still rather implicit. First, although the results imply that the induction of Type 2 processing 
by altering auditory feedback was successful, this manipulation is so far unique and therefore 
requires further application to be considered as generally reliable. Further, although the results 
match all a priori expectations, the results only implicitly support the conjecture that the effect 
on choice satisfaction is actually caused by the existence or absence of a reflective processing 
mode (i.e., Type 2 processing). Accordingly, in the following Experiment 4 a more 
established method to experimentally trigger Type 2 processing is applied (i.e., disfluency). 
Additionally, Experiment 4 intends to measure the extent to which a choice is actually based 
on intuition or reflection more explicitly. 
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4.8 Experiment 4: ‘Cognition/Cola Experiment’ 
Experiment 4 fulfills two main purposes. First, by manipulating Type 2 processing with a 
more established manipulation (e.g., information disfluency), it is intended to confirm the 
initial findings of Experiment 3 and thus, provide robustness of the results. Second, by 
explicitly measuring the extent of intuition versus reflection involved in choice expression, a 
more direct support for the underlying mechanism shall be provided. Hence, Experiment 4 is 
ought to test the hypothesis that the choice satisfaction augmenting effect of oral choice 
expression in choice situations comprising uncertainty and limited information is mediated by 
the level intuition, but only if Type processing 2 is not externally triggered (H3).  
4.8.1 Manipulating Type 2 Processing by Means of Disfluency  
Various studies have repeatedly shown that merely altering the font and therefore the fluency 
in which experimental information is provided changes the extent to which cognition and thus 
Type 2 processing is triggered (e.g., Alter/Oppenheimer 2009; Diemand-
Yauman/Oppenheimer/Vaughan 2011; Gervais/Norenzayan 2012; Song/Schwarz 2008a). For 
instance, Alter et al. (2007) found that experiencing disfluency augments performance in 
cognitive demanding tasks, such as the CRT or syllogism reasoning. Moreover, in the context 
of intuitive choice situations, there is evidence that individuals are more likely to display 
attenuated levels of choice confidence or might even defer choice if information relevant to 
decisions is provided in a disfluent manner (e.g., Novemsky et al. 2007; Simmons/Nelson 
2006). Although varying the difficulty of font is a widely accepted method to experimentally 
manipulate disfluency and eventually to induce a cognitive decision style (Alter/Oppenheimer 
2009), there is dissent about which fonts are considered to be ‘easy-’ or ‘difficult-’ to-read. 
 Pretest Easy- and Difficult-to-Read Fonts 4.8.1.1
In a first step, different sources in which font disfluency manipulation were applied and in 
which detailed information about the execution was provided (e.g., which fonts were applied) 
were compiled. In total, it was possible to identify 13 different difficult-to-read and 3 easy-to-
read fonts (see Table 8).  
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Font Authors Example 
 
Arial, 10p, 25%, 
grey, italic 
 
Alter/Oppenheimer (2008) 
 
Switzerland is famous for cuckoo clocks, banks, 
and pocket knives 
Arial, 12p 
NORMAL FONT 
Alter/Oppenheimer (2009); 
Oppenheimer/Frank (2008); 
Song/Schwarz (2008a); 
Song/Schwarz (2008b) 
Switzerland is famous for cuckoo clocks, 
banks, and pocket knives 
Blackadder ITC, 
12p, 50% grey, 
italic  
Oppenheimer/Frank (2008) Switzerland is famous for cuckoo clocks, banks, and 
pocket knives 
Bondoni, 12p, 60% 
grey, italic  
Diemand-
Yauman/Oppenheimer/Vaug
han (2011) 
Switzerland is famous for cuckoo clocks, 
banks, and pocket knives. 
Brush, 12p Song/Schwarz (2008a); 
Song/Schwarz (2008b) 
Switzerland is famous for cuckoo clocks, banks, and 
pocket knives 
Comic Sans, 12p, 
60% grey, italic  
Diemand-
Yauman/Oppenheimer/Vaug
han (2011) 
Switzerland is famous for cuckoo 
clocks, banks, and pocket knives. 
Haettenschweiler, 
12p, italic 
Alter/Oppenheimer (2008) Switzerland is famous for cuckoo clocks, banks, and pocket 
knives 
Haettenschweiler, 
12p 
Diemand-
Yauman/Oppenheimer,/ 
Vaughan (2011) 
Switzerland is famous for cuckoo clocks, banks, and pocket 
knives 
Haettenschweiler, 
10p, 25% grey  
Simmons/Nelson (2006) Switzerland is famous for cuckoo clocks, banks, and pocket knives. 
 
Mistral, 10p Oppenheimer/Frank (2008) Switzerland is famous for cuckoo clocks, banks, and pocket knives 
Mistral, 12p Song/Schwarz (2008a) Switzerland is famous for cuckoo clocks, banks, and 
pocket knives 
Monotype Corsiva, 
12p 
Diemand-
Yauman/Oppenheimer/Vaug
han (2011) 
Switzerland is famous for cuckoo clocks, banks, and 
pocket knives 
Tahoma, 9p 
NORMAL FONT 
Simmons/Nelson (2006) Switzerland is famous for cuckoo clocks, banks, and 
pocket knives 
Times New Roman, 
12p 
NORMAL FONT 
Alter/Oppenheimer (2008); 
Alter/Oppenheimer (2009); 
Oppenheimer/Frank (2008) 
Switzerland is famous for cuckoo clocks, 
banks, and pocket knives 
Table 8:  Overview fonts in alphabetic order, Pretest Experiment 4, Study 2 
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  Method 4.8.1.2
To identify the ‘easiest’ and ‘most difficult’ font, a second step comprised an online pretest in 
which participants (N = 31, MAge = 25.87 years, SDAge = 2.94, 38.7% Male; M = 8.68, SD = 
.98 on a 1-10, 10 = ‘Proficient English’ scale) were displayed the sentence ‘Switzerland is 
famous for cuckoo clocks, banks, and pocket knives’ and asked to indicate the ease with which 
they could read the sentence on a 7 point Likert scale (1 = very difficult to 7 = very easy; see 
Song/Schwarz (2008a) for a similar approach). The sequence of font appearance was 
randomized to prevent any influence of order on the results. Further, to insure that participants 
actually read the sentence in every font thoroughly, the question ‘The spelling is correct’ on a 
7 point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = I strongly agree) was included to induce the 
feeling that sentences might differ and thus to keep up the motivation to read all fonts 
carefully.  
  Results 4.8.1.3
To assess the results, a paired sample t-test was conducted. The results indicate that ‘Times 
New Roman 12p’ was rated the easiest-to-read font (M = 6.52, SD = .81) and that ‘Mistral 
10p’ was rated the most difficult-to-read font (M = 2.61, SD = 1.43, t(30) = 12.23, p < .0005). 
Interestingly, although the sentence ‘Switzerland is famous for cuckoo clocks, banks, and 
pocket knives’ was identical for all font manipulations, participants were more likely to 
indicate that the sentence might include a spelling mistakes when it was displayed in ‘Mistral 
10p’ (M = 5.00, SD = 1.39) compared to when it was displayed in ‘Times New Roman 12p’ 
(M = 5.65, SD = 1.38, t(30) = 12.23, p < .0005). 
Based on these results, ‘Times New Roman 12p’ was applied as easy-to-read font and 
‘Mistral 10p’ as difficult-to-read font. It is predicted that ‘Mistral 10p’ font induces disfluency 
and therefore Type 2 processing.
10
  
                                                 
10
 By coincidence this manipulation matches the manipulation by Oppenheimer/Frank (2008) and ‘Times new 
Roman 12p’ was applied in all previous experiments of Study 2. 
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4.8.2 Method 
Experiment 4 was conducted as a 2 by 2 between subject design, but was otherwise a 
replication of Experiment 1 (b). The experiment took place on campus on three consecutive 
days (Monday to Wednesday; from 10:00 am to approximately 3:00 pm) and all German-
speaking individuals walking by were asked to participate in exchange for a free cup of Cola. 
The sample comprised two hundred individuals (Male = 50.5%, MAge = 21.7 years, SDAge = 
2.48).
11
 The cover story and the experimental set-up was generally a replication of 
Experiment 1 (b) (e.g., choice situation comprised uncertainty and little information). Half of 
the participants was instructed to express their cup choice orally (i.e., by saying the position 
of the cup ‘left’ or ‘right’ without touching the cup, ‘oral choice condition’, NOral = 100) while 
the other half was instructed to express their cup choice manually (i.e., by taking the cup they 
want, ‘manual choice condition’, NManual = 100).  
In addition, the cognitive decision style by altering the fluency of the font of the instruction 
sheets was manipulated. As outlined before, it was expected that a difficult-to-read font 
triggers Type 2 processing (i.e., high cognition) and that an easy-to-read font does not trigger 
Type 2 processing and that thus individuals retain default Type 1 processing (i.e., low 
cognition). In particular, half the participants received the instructions in difficult-to-read 
‘Mistral 10p’ font (NHigh = 100), while the other half received an introduction sheet printed in 
easy-to-read ‘Times New Roman 12p’ font (NLow = 100). Accordingly, this procedure created 
four experimental groups (NOral/Low = 50, NManual/Low = 50, NOral/High = 50, NManual/High = 50).  
As in Experiment 1 (b), after reading the introduction sheet, participants were guided to a 
table on which the two cups of Cola were placed next to each other (i.e., the cup position was 
clearly marked by position signs ‘left’ or ‘right’ and every cup contained 100ml of the same 
NB Cola (see picture 9, General Appendix X)). After expressing their choice (i.e., participants 
in the oral condition were handed their cup, while participants in the manual condition held 
their chosen cup in their hand), but before drinking all participants received a questionnaire.  
After receiving, but before drinking their chosen Cola, choice satisfaction was assessed with 
the CS-Index (see previous experiments). Further, it was assessed whether participants made 
their cup choice based on intuition or on thoughts. More specific, before participants were 
allowed to taste their chosen cup they were asked to indicate whether their choice was based 
                                                 
11
 One participant refused to indicate information about her age. 
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on their ‘Intuition’ or their ‘Thoughts’ by crossing a 10 cm long ‘intuition-line’ (‘Intuition’ = 
left side of the line, ‘Thoughts’ = right side of the line). Figure 17 provides a visual 
representation of the intuition-line. 
 
Figure 17:  Depiction of the ‘intuition-line’, Experiment 4, Study 2 
Subsequently, participants tasted their Cola and continued answering the remaining questions 
including demographics information and questions about the ease of reading the introduction 
sheet (e.g., manipulation check). For this purpose, participants were asked to rate the ease 
with which they could read the intro-sheet on a 7 point Likert scale (1 = very difficult to 7 = 
very easy; Song/Schwarz 2008a). After completion, they were thanked and dismissed. 
4.8.3 Results 
As in the previous experiments, the CS-Index reaching sufficient reliability (α = .94) was 
computed first. 
Next, it was assessed whether the disfluency manipulation worked as intended. As expected, 
participants reading the introduction sheet in easy-to-read ‘Times New Roman 12p’ font 
perceived it as easier to read (MLow = 6.16, SDLow = 1.09) than did participants reading the 
introduction sheet in difficult-to-read ‘Mistral 10p’ (MHigh = 3.3, SDHigh = 1.8, F(1, 198) = 
183.03, p < .0005). The interaction effect between choice expression modality and disfluency 
manipulation was insignificant (p = .4). This implies that the ‘cognition’ manipulation worked 
as intended and that Type 2 processing was triggered (visual representation of the result can 
be found in Figure 18, black lines indicate standard errors of the means. For a similar 
manipulation check, see Alter et al. 2007; Novemsky et al. 2007; Song/Schwarz 2008b). 
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Figure 18:   Manipulation check, Experiment 4, Study 2 
To access the hypothesized effect, the CS-Index was submitted to a two way ANOVA with 
choice expression modality (condition 1: ‘Oral vs. Manual’) and cognition (condition 2: ‘Low 
vs. High’) as independent factors. This procedure revealed a significant interaction effect (F(1, 
196) = 5.03, p = .026,  = .025). Planned contrasts reveal a significant difference in the level 
of choice satisfaction between choice expression modalities when the font was easy-to-read 
and thus cognition was low (MOral/low = 5.1, SDOral/Low = 1.07 > MManual/Low = 4.35, SDManual/Low 
= 1.3, F(1, 98) = 9.84, p = .002, Cohan’s d = .63) in line with the first hypothesis (H1). 
However, in line with the second hypothesis (H2) there was no difference in the level of 
choice satisfaction between the modalities of choice expression, when the font was difficult-
to-read and thus cognition was high (MOral/High = 4.65, SDOral/High = 1.55 vs. MManual/High = 4.71, 
SDManual/High = 1.1, F(1, 98) = .05, p = .82, Cohan’s d = .04). A graphical representation of the 
results is provided in Figure 19 (black lines indicate standard errors of the means). 
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Figure 19:  Choice satisfaction per experimental group, Experiment 4, Study 2 
As a first step to access the third hypothesis (H3), the ‘intuition-line’ was reversed-scaled into 
an ‘intuition-score’ for which higher scores indicate higher levels intuition in choice making 
(e.g., a ten would indicate that the choice was entirely based on intuition and zero would 
indicate that the choice was entirely based on reasoning). In the next step, this ‘intuition-score’ 
was submitted to a two way ANOVA with choice expression modality (condition 1: ‘Oral vs. 
Manual’) and cognition (condition 2: ‘Low vs. High’) as independent factors. A marginally 
significant interaction effect was obtained (p = .06). As expected, within the high cognition 
condition ‘intuition-scores’ did not differ between choice expression modalities (MOral/High = 
7.88, SDOral/High = 2.57 vs. MManual/High = 8.17, SDManual/High = 2.18, F(1, 98) = .38, p = .54, 
Cohan’s d = .12). However, within the low cognition condition it was found that participants 
who expressed their choice orally indicated significantly higher scores on the intuition line 
(MOral/Low = 8.25, SDOral/Low = 2.49) than did participants who expressed their choice manually 
(MManual/Low = 7.18, SDManual/Low = 2.81, F(1, 98) = 4.06, p = . 047, Cohen’s d = .4).  
Eventually, to directly address the third hypothesis (H3) a moderated mediation analysis with 
CS-Index as dependent variable, condition 1 (Coding: Oral = 1; Manual = 0) as independent 
variable, intuition-score as mediator and condition 2 (Coding: Low = 1; High = 0) as binary 
moderator was conducted following the recommendations of Hayes (2012) and applying the 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Low cognition
(easy-to-read font, p = .002)
High cognition
(difficult-to-read font, n. s.)
C
h
o
ic
e 
S
a
ti
sf
a
ct
io
n
 
Oral
Manual
Study 2: The Effect of Oral and Manual Choice Expression Modalities on Choice Satisfaction 95 
 
SPSS Macro ‘PROCESS’. Following the recommendations of Zhao/Lynch/Chen (2010) it 
was assumed that if the 95% bootstrapped (BS), bias-corrected (BC) confidence interval (CI) 
of the indirect effect excludes zero, a significant mediation effect is apparent. By observing 
the indirect effect of highest order, it was revealed that the interaction effect of condition 1 
and condition 2 on the CS-Index is indeed mediated by the ‘intuition-score’ (a x b = .087, 95% 
BS, BC, CI = [.0015; .28]). Particularly, the assessment of the conditional indirect effects 
show that when cognition was low, the effect of oral choice modality was significantly 
mediated by the intuition score (a x b = .068, 95% BS BC CI = [.0012; .21]), but was not 
significantly mediated when cognition was high (a x b = -.019, 95% BS, BC, CI = [-.12: .03]). 
This finding supports the third hypothesis (H3). 
4.8.4 Discussion Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 fulfilled several purposes. First, within the low cognition condition, the results 
are an exact replication of the results obtained in Experiment 1 (b), because by coincident the 
font of the introduction sheets was identical (i.e., easy-to-read ‘Times New Roman 12p’ font). 
In line with the first hypothesis, it was revealed that participants expressing their choice orally 
indicated significantly higher levels of choice satisfaction than did participants expressing 
their choice manually. Second, by externally inducing Type 2 processing by means of 
information disfluency (i.e., font readability), the results provide further support for the 
second hypothesis and proof robustness of the findings of Experiment 3. In other words, 
comparable to Experiment 3, it was observed that the choice satisfaction augmenting effect of 
oral choice expression disappears if Type 2 processing is externally triggered prior choice 
expression. Finally, by conducting a moderated mediation analysis, it was possible to provide 
first explicit evidence for the assumption that the choice satisfaction augmenting effect of oral 
choice expression on the CS-Index is mediated by intuition, when cognition is not externally 
triggered. These results are in support for the third hypothesis (H3).  
4.9 General Discussion 
In Study 2, the impact of oral versus manual choice expression modalities on choice 
satisfaction in choice situations comprising uncertainty and little information was 
investigated. In line with dual processing theory (e.g., Evans/Stanovich 2013a) and evidence 
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from neuroscience (Bush/Luu/Posner 2000; Paus et al. 1993), it was conjectured that manual 
choice expression triggers Type 2 processing, while oral choice expression does not trigger 
Type 2 processing. Consequently, it was assumed that individuals expressing their choice 
orally retain default Type 1 processing (e.g., Evans 2007). Because research implies that an 
intuitive processing mode augments choice satisfaction in situations comprising uncertain and 
little information compared to a rational processing mode (Dijksterhuis et al. 2006; Wilson et 
al. 1993), it was conjectured that in these choice situations oral choice expression would yield 
higher levels of choice satisfaction compared to manual choice expression (H1). Further, 
because it was conjectured that the absence of Type 2 processing is the underlying cause for 
the choice satisfaction increasing effect, it was consequently proposed that there should be no 
difference in the level of choice satisfaction between orally and manually expressed choices if 
Type 2 processing is externally triggered (H2). Accordingly, it was further assumed that the 
choice satisfaction increasing effect is mediated by the level of intuition, when Type 1 
processing is retained (H3). 
Evidence for these conjectures was obtained in four experiments. By varying the choice 
options (i.e., paper based tasks, drinks and foods) and applying different forms of manual 
choice modalities (e.g., taking and button pressing), Study 2 provides evidence that oral 
choice expression yields higher levels of satisfaction compared to manual choice expression 
in different choice situations comprising uncertainty and little information (H1). It is therefore 
reasonable to argue that the obtained effect can be generalized to other choice situations that 
comprise uncertainty and little information. 
In line with the supposition that the choice satisfaction augmenting effect is due to the 
absence of Type 2 processing when choices are expressed orally (H2), Experiment 3 and 
Experiment 4 show, that indeed no significant difference in the level of choice satisfaction 
between oral and manual choice expression modalities can be detected when Type 2 
processing is externally triggered by means of altered auditory feedback (Experiment 3) or 
information disfluency (Experiment 4). Eventually, by applying a moderated mediation 
analyses (e.g., Hayes 2012), the results of Experiment 4 imply that the choice satisfaction 
augmenting effect of oral choice expression is mediated by the level of intuition, but only 
when cognitive Type 2 processing is not externally triggered (H3). 
These findings are relevant for both theoretical and practical considerations which are 
discussed in the subsequent section. 
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4.9.1 Theoretical Implications 
The findings of Study 2 provide several theoretical implications and contributions. To the best 
knowledge, Study 2 constitutes the first attempt to show that the mere fact in which a choice 
is expressed influences subjective choice measures (i.e., choice satisfaction). Further, by 
replicating the finding that oral choice expression augments choice satisfaction in four 
different experimental set-ups, robustness of the obtained results is provided. It is therefore 
likely that the obtained findings can be generalized to other choice contexts in which the 
choice situation provides little information and is characterized by uncertainty and subjective 
choice outcome. Moreover, by providing two studies featuring important boundary conditions 
and by executing a moderated mediation analysis this study provides first support for the 
assumption that the choice satisfaction increasing effect of oral choice expression is caused by 
the absence of a reflective style of decision making (i.e., Type 2 processing).  
As such, this study not only provides valuable new insights for the considerably new field of 
investigating choice expression modalities, but also implies valuable new insights in the field 
of dual processing theory and the experimental induction of reflective mind sets and decision 
styles (e.g., Type 2 processing). First, in line with insights from the field of neuroscience, an 
entirely new method for Type 2 processing induction was developed. That is, it was 
conjectured that altering auditory feedback of one’s own voice induces a reflective decision 
style. The results of Experiment 3 provide initial proof that this manipulation works as 
intended and that altering auditory feedback is yet another method to experimentally 
manipulate Type 2 processing (e.g., Toplak/West/Stachovich 2011). Moreover, by conflating 
existing research investigating the impact of information disfluency on cognitive processing, 
this study is to the best knowledge the first attempt to give a comprehensive overview of the 
existing procedures applied to create information disfluency by means of different font styles. 
Based on this overview and a controlled pretest, this study recommends the usage of ‘Times 
New Roman 12p’ as easy-to-read, fluent and ‘Mistral 10p’ as difficult-to-read, diffluent font 
to manipulate the type of mental processing.  
4.9.2 Practical Implications 
Expressing choices through different modalities is very common nowadays, but research 
investigating the potential impact of different choice expression modalities on decision and 
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choice is still scarce (e.g., Klesse/Levav/Goukens 2015). Study 2 was intended to provide 
more insights in the field of choice expression modalities and showed empirically that in 
choice situations comprising little information and choice uncertainty, choice satisfaction is 
enhanced when choices are expressed orally compared to when they are expressed manually. 
This finding is particularly interesting considering that many everyday choices comprise a 
certain amount of uncertainty (e.g., Kwak/Duvvuri/Russell 2015). For instance, consider an 
individual choosing between two pineapples that appear to be identical. Whether a pineapple 
is ripe or not can only be readily assessed after cutting it (e.g., Moyle et al. 2004). Thus, while 
making the choice the individual has little information about ripeness and thus the quality of 
the choice option. Further, even after cutting only one of the pineapples, one cannot say 
whether the other one might have been the better or worse choice. Thus, this choice situation 
comprises two (or more) ostensibly different, but similar options for which the objective 
quality is infeasible to assess. The results of Study 2 imply that in this ‘fruit choice situation’ 
consumers are likely to be more satisfied with their choice when they express their choice 
orally compared to when they express it manually. This argumentation might explain why 
customers at farmer’s markets (oral choice expression) appear to be more satisfied with their 
chosen vegetables than customers in supermarkets, although objectively the quality of the 
products is very similar (e.g., Wolf/Spittler/Ahern 2005). More generally, the obtained results 
imply that choice satisfaction in uncertain situations can be augmented when individuals 
express their choices orally. Marketers (for instance Coca Cola) could use this knowledge and 
launch a campaign in which for example the slogan ‘I take Coke’ is used. Consumers might 
recall the slogan and quietly repeat it while making their choice. In other words, they would 
then utter their choice orally and would thus probably perceive higher levels of choice 
satisfaction. 
4.10 Limitations  
Although the obtained results are in line with the developed hypotheses and initial findings 
were repeatedly replicated, there are still some limitations to this research that might be 
interesting avenues for future research. First, as a methodological issue one has to admit that 
the experiments featured a fairly high share of participants that had to be excluded from the 
sample. The reason for this high amount can be explained by at least three reasons: First, as 
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the experiments (except for Experiment 1 (a)) were conducted as field experiments, the 
incentive to precisely follow the guidelines and instructions was fairly low. As a result, the 
sample always included at least some ‘free-riders’ that just wanted the reward (e.g., the free 
Cola) without the intention to provide correct or any data at all. Second, because it was 
assumed that the provision of too much or too detailed information might trigger a reflective 
decision style (i.e., Type 2 processing), as few as and as simple as possible instructions were 
provided. As a result, information and guidelines were not presented in detailed and 
replicative terms and some participants might just have overseen important instructions 
unintentionally. Finally, since the experimental set-up was generally intended to assure a 
rigorous hypotheses testing, it might have appeared slightly artificial to at least some 
participants. For instance, some participants might have found it odd to answer questions 
about their choice without trying it first (e.g., choice satisfaction). Thus, if they did not read 
the instructions thoroughly enough they might have consumed immediately after they were 
handed their chosen item as this would be a most straight forward action in a ‘tasting study’.  
Although all incorrect actions of participants were noticed and noted and the exclusion 
procedure always followed the same strict guidelines and additionally all data of excluded 
participants were never considered, the fairly high number of excluded participants is a 
problem that might be addressed by further research approaches and different methods. In this 
context it is noteworthy to mention that the replication of the obtained results requests a very 
thoroughly procedure and experimental execution, as all factors that influence the fluency of 
choice expression potentially attenuate the desired effect.  
A more general limitation of this Study 2 is the fact that only choice situations comprising 
little information, choice uncertainty, and subjective outcome were under investigation. 
Although, these situations are theoretically relevant as they allow more rigorous hypothesis 
testing, and are also practically reasonable (as outlined in section 4.9.2), one might oppose 
whether the obtained results also hold for other decision or choice situations. Particularly, one 
might ask the question which decision style and thus which choice expression modality might 
augment choice satisfaction if the choice situation does involve sufficient information. 
Although some studies imply that in these situations individuals make better choices when 
they engage in Type 2 processing and deliberate about the provided information (e.g., 
Dijksterhuis et al. 2006) and are sequentially also more satisfied with their deliberation based 
choices, one could also argue that an intuitive mindset might always result in higher 
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satisfaction, because the mere fact of ‘thinking’ compared to ‘not-thinking’ might deflate 
satisfaction (e.g., Wilson/Schooler 1991). The determination whether a reflective or reflexive 
mindset and thus a manual or oral modality of choice expression augments choice satisfaction 
in situations comprising sufficient information, little choice uncertainty and an ORC is left to 
future research. 
Finally, although the variable ‘choice satisfaction’ is an important antecedent for overall 
product or service satisfaction and therefore also highly relevant for practical concerns (see 
Heitmann/Lehmann/Herrmann 2007; Zhang/Fitzsimons 1999), one might argue that the 
construct ‘choice satisfaction’ represents a rather theoretic concept and accordingly that 
insights might only possess value for theoretical considerations. Although other factors, such 
as consumption or taste satisfaction (Heitmann/Lehmann/Herrmann 2007), product liking 
(Landwehr/McGill/Herrmann 2011), or product enjoyment (Just/Sigirci/Wansink 2014) might 
admittedly be concepts that are more relevant for practical concerns, it was argued that the 
assessment of choice satisfaction allows the deduction of more rigorous conclusions from the 
obtained results (see chapter 2.1.3). In other words, in contrast to those more practically 
relevant variables, choice satisfaction can be assessed prior consumption and is independent 
from any consumption related artifacts (e.g., some like their Cola served cold, some prefer 
room temperature) (e.g. Fassnacht/Schmidt/Pannek 2015). Nonetheless, to rule out any doubts 
about the practical relevance of the findings of Study 2 a final fifth post-hoc experiment was 
conducted. 
4.11 Post-hoc Experiment 5 ‘Cola Study, Liking, Consumption Satisfaction and 
Consumption Enjoyment’ 
To address the previously raised potential problem of inappropriate practical relevance of the 
obtained results in Study 2, Post-hoc Experiment 5 was conducted as an exact replication of 
experimental set-up of Experiment 1 (b). However, instead of assessing choice satisfaction 
prior consumption, participants were instructed to taste their chosen cup immediately and 
were then asked to indicate how satisfied they are with the taste (a), how much they enjoyed 
the consumption (b), and how much they liked the cola they choose (c). It was conjectured 
that oral choice expression has an immediate positive effect on these more practically relevant 
variables.  
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Accordingly, for the Post-hoc Experiment 5 the following hypothesis is defined: 
 
H4:  Oral choice expression modality (i.e., ‘speaking’) leads to higher levels of taste 
satisfaction with (a), consumption enjoyment of (b), and liking of (c) the chosen item 
compared to a manual choice expression modality (i.e., ‘taking’). 
4.11.1 Method 
Post-hoc Experiment 5 was conducted on campus on two days (Wednesday and Friday; from 
9:30 am to approximately 2:00 pm) as single factor between subject design. All individuals 
walking by were invited to participate in exchange for a free cup of Cola. The sample 
comprised one-hundred-nineteen individuals (Male = 51.3%, MAge = 22.08 years, SDAge = 
2.44).
12
 As manipulation approximately half of the participants was instructed to express their 
cup choice orally (i.e., by saying the position of the cup, ‘oral choice condition’, N = 60), 
while the other half was instructed to express their choice manually (i.e., by taking one cup, 
‘manual choice condition’, N = 59). The experimental procedure was identical to Experiment 
1 (b) except for the fact that participants were instructed to taste their chosen Cola before 
answering any question in the questionnaire. After consumption, participants were asked to 
indicate their ‘taste-satisfaction’ with their Cola (i.e., ‘Please rate how satisfied you are with 
the taste of the Cola you choose’ on a ‘1 = very unsatisfied’ to ‘10 = very satisfied’) and how 
much they liked it (i.e., ‘I like the Cola I chose’ on a ‘1 = I strongly disagree’ to ‘7 = I 
strongly agree’ Likert scale). Further, a subscale of ‘the taste experience enjoyment scale’ by 
Just et al. (2014) to measure ‘consumption enjoyment’ (e.g., ‘The Cola tasted really great’, 
‘The Cola was very satisfying’, and ‘The Cola was very enjoyable’ all assessed on ‘1 = I 
strongly disagree’ to ‘7 = I strongly agree’ Likert scale) was included. Finally, also ‘choice 
satisfaction’ after consumption (i.e., CS-Index) and relevant demographic variables were 
measured. 
                                                 
12
 Three individuals refused to indicate any demographic information. In total 6 individuals were excluded from 
the analysis due to wrong modality of choice expression. 
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4.11.2 Results 
In line with H4a, participants expressing their choice orally were more satisfied with the taste 
of their chosen Cola (MOral = 7.12, SDOral = 2.2) than were participants expressing their choice 
manually (MManual = 6.24., SDManual = 2.4, F(1, 117) = 4.29, p = .04, Cohen’s d = .38). Further 
in line with H4b, participants expressing their choice orally also liked their chosen Cola more 
(MOral = 5.02, SDOral = 1.51) than did participants expressing their choice manually (MManual = 
4.42., SDManual = 1.58, F(1, 117) = 4.38, p = .039, Cohen’s d = .39).  
To test H4c, a ‘consumption-enjoyment’ composite scale (α = .96) was created. Participants 
expressing their choice orally enjoyed their chosen Cola significantly more (MOral = 4.89, 
SDOral = 1.39) than did participants expressing their choice manually (MManual = 4.17, SDManual 
= 1.56, F(1, 117) = 7.18, p = .008, Cohen’s d = .49). These results are displayed in Figure 20 
(black lines indicate standard errors of the means). 
 
 
Figure 20:   Results Post-hoc Experiment 5, Study 2 
Finally, also the CS-Index (α = .97) was assessed. The results indicate in line with previous 
results that participants expressing their choice orally (MOral = 5.17, SDOral = 1.28) were more 
satisfied with their choice than were participants expressing their choice manually (MManual = 
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4.27, SDManual = 1.6, F(1, 117) = 11.53, p = .001, Cohen’s d = .62). Note that in Post-hoc 
Experiment 5 choice satisfaction was assessed after consumption and that choice satisfaction 
was positively correlated with taste-satisfaction (r = .84, p < .0005), Cola-liking (r = .83, p < 
.0005), and consumption enjoyment (r = 85, p < .0005).  
4.11.3 Discussion Experiment 5 
The results of Post-hoc Experiment 5 further strengthen the practical relevance of the initial 
findings and address one potential limitation of Study 2. It was observed that participants who 
expressed their choice orally were more satisfied with the taste of their chosen cola (H4a), 
liked it more (H4b), and enjoyed its consumption more (H4c) compared to participants who 
expressed their choice manually. In addition, it was revealed that taste satisfaction, cola 
liking, and consumption enjoyment are all highly and positively correlated with choice 
satisfaction. The high correlation between these measures further supports the importance of 
choice satisfaction being a practically highly relevant measure. Importantly, the results of 
Post-hoc Experiment 5 also support the assumption, that choice satisfaction is a more rigorous 
measure independent from external and internal factors. Rephrased, in all experiments (e.g., 1 
(a) ‘Paper Stack’, 1 (b) ‘Cola’, 2 ‘Nougat’, 3 ‘Headphone/Cola’, and 4 ‘Cognition/Cola’) 
participants were additionally asked about the general liking of the offered products in the 
demographics part of the questionnaires. These results were not reported, because they were 
inconclusive and did not significantly influence the main effects. However, in the post-hoc 
Experiment 5, the dependent measures, including the assessment of choice satisfaction after 
consumption, were highly correlated with pre-existing preferences. For the other experiments 
of Study 2 no such relation could be detected (see Table 9). Thus, the results of Post-hoc 
Experiment 5 do not only support the practical relevance of Study 2, but also confirm the 
initially conjectured theoretical robustness of the assessment of choice satisfaction in 
comparison to any other satisfaction measure. 
 
 
 
 
104 Study 2: The Effect of Oral and Manual Choice Expression Modalities on Choice Satisfaction 
 
Exp.  Control DV Correlation with DV 
 
1 (a) 
 
1. ‘to me it did not matter which task (A or B) I picked’ 
2. ‘I like word puzzles in general’ 
 
CS-Index 
 
1. r = -.06, p = .6 
2. r = .11, p = .35 
 
1 (b) 
 
1. ‘I am very convinced that I picked the brand Cola’ 
2. ‘I am very convinced that I picked the private label 
Cola’ 
3. ‘Generally, I like Cola’ 
 
CS-Index 
 
1. r = .006, p = .93 
2. r = .013, p = .86 
3. r = -.08, p = .27 
 
2 
 
1. ‘I am very convinced that I picked the brand Nougat 
Cream’ 
2. ‘I am very convinced that I picked the PL Nougat 
Cream’ 
3. ‘I like Nougat Cream in general’ 
4. ‘Generally, I think that Nutella tastes better than any 
No-Name Nougat-Cream.’ 
5. ‘I have a clear preference for Nutella Nougat-Cream.’ 
 
CS-Index 
 
1. r = .12, p = .11 
2. r = -.08, p = .25 
3. r = .16, p = .03** 
4. r = .05, p = .52 
5. r = .03, p = .69 
 
3 
 
1. ‘I am very convinced that I picked the brand Cola’ 
2. ‘I am very convinced that I picked the PL Cola’ 
3. ‘I like Cola in general’ 
4. ‘Generally, I think that Coca Cola tastes better than any 
No-Name Cola.’ 
5. ‘I have a clear preference for Coca Cola.’ 
 
CS-Index 
 
1. r = .09, p = .3 
2. r = -.09, p = .26 
3. r = -.11, p = .2 
4. r = .03, p = .73 
5. r = .097, p = .25 
 
4 
 
1. ‘To me it did not matter which Cola (Pepsi Cola or Lidl 
Cola) I picked.’ 
2. ‘Generally, I think that Pepsi Cola tastes better than any 
No-Name Cola.’ 
3. Generally, to you prefer Pepsi Cola or Lidl Cola?’ 
 
CS-Index 
 
1. r = .03, p = .63 
2. r = -.02, p = .78 
3. T = -.02, p = .79 
(Kendall’s tau) 
 
 
5 
 
1. ‘I am very convinced that I picked the brand Cola’ 
2. ‘I am very convinced that I picked the No-Name Cola’ 
3. ‘Generally, I like Cola’ 
4. ‘Generally, I think that Coca Cola tastes better than any 
No-Name Cola.’ 
5. ‘To me it did not matter which Cola (Coca Cola or Lidl 
Cola) I picked.’ 
 
 
 
CS-Index (after 
consumption) 
 
 
1. r = .51, p = .000*** 
2. r = -.43, p = .000*** 
3. r = .2, p = .03** 
4. r = .06, p = .55 
5. r = .07, p = .48 
Taste 
Satisfaction 
1. r = .49, p = .000*** 
2. r = -.42, p = .000*** 
3. r = .2, p = .03** 
4. r = .13, p = .17 
5. r = .05, p = .63 
Liking of 
chosen Cola 
1. r = .5, p = .000*** 
2. r = -.41, p = .000*** 
3. r = .3, p = .001*** 
4. r = .11, p = .22 
5. r = -.002, p = .99 
Consumption 
enjoyment 
(composite) 
1. r = .52, p = .000*** 
2. r = -.39, p = .000*** 
3. r = .27, p = .003*** 
4. r = .08, p = .37 
5. r = .05, p = .62 
Note: r = correlation coefficient; *** p < .001, ** p < .05, * p < .1 
Table 9:  Correlation of DV and consumption controls, Post-hoc Experiment 5, Study 2
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5 General Conclusion 
The point of departure of the present dissertation is grounded in the observation, that although 
the marketplace offers consumers multiple different modalities to express their choice (i.e., 
choice expression modality), surprisingly little is known about the potential impact of 
different choice expression modalities on choice and choice related variables so far. 
Particularly, as most daily choices are either expressed manually (e.g., by taking an item or by 
some sort of action that involves clicking or pushing) or orally (e.g., by talking to another 
person), the focus was set on the investigation of oral and manual choice expression 
modalities. 
To close this research gap, the overarching goals of this dissertation were to obtain a better 
understanding of the presumed impact of oral versus manual choice expression modalities on 
objective and subjective choice related measures and to gain more insights into the 
conjectured underlying mechanisms for these phenomena. These research goals were 
consecutively addressed by the conduction of two empirical studies. For this purpose, the 
theoretical and conceptual foundations were compiled in Chapter 2. Upon this theoretical and 
conceptual basis and a comprehensive literature review, three more specified research 
questions were eventually derived. Because an extensive presentation and discussion of the 
results as well as the potential practical and theoretical implication of the two empirical 
studies were already provided in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, this final Chapter 5 is mainly 
intended to serve as summarizing evaluation of the research questions developed in section 
2.5 and compiles the most central findings of the present dissertation. 
The first research question addressed the potential impact of manual and oral choice 
expression modalities and the likelihood of making an ORC. More specifically it was phrased: 
First research question: What is the impact of manual and oral choice expression modalities 
on the likelihood of making an ORC as proxy for Type 2 processing? 
This research question was addressed in three laboratory experiments in the sections 3.5, 3.6, 
and 3.7 in the context of Study 1 of the present dissertation. More specifically, in these 
experiments individuals were always presented different choice options. Among these options 
one constituted an ORC and at least one other item constituted an intuitively appealing, but 
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objectively inferior choice option. As manipulation, individuals were either instructed to 
express their choice orally (i.e., by saying which option they would like to choose) or 
manually (i.e., by taking the item they would like to choose or by pressing a button next to the 
item). In line with the assumption that only a manual modality of choice expression triggers 
Type 2 processing and thus higher cognition (e.g., section 3.2.2), the empirical results imply 
that individuals are more likely to make an ORC if they express their choice manually 
compared to if they express their choice orally.  
Further, in line with the conjecture that manual choice expression induces Type 2 processing 
which is eventually the cause for the augmented likelihood of making an ORC, the results in 
section 3.7 indicate that the probability of making an ORC is equally high for orally and 
manually expressed choices if Type 2 processing is externally trigged by an antecedent 
unrelated to the modality of choice expression. In other words, the results imply that Type 2 
processing can be induced by manual choice expression modalities and oral choice expression 
modality does not affect default Type 1 processing. 
Accordingly, the theoretical implication of Study 1 is two folded. On the one hand, it implies 
that choice expression modalities have an observable impact on the objective quality of 
choice and particularly that manual choice expression augments the likelihood of making an 
ORC. On the other hand, another very important theoretical implication of Study 1 constitutes 
the insight that manual choice expression modalities likely function as an external antecedent 
of Type 2 processing. 
For practitioners the results of Study 1 imply that the consideration which modalities of 
choice expression they should offer their customers should not be made randomly, as the 
specific modalities have an impact on objective choice quality. Although traditional economic 
theory implies that choices based on rational consideration are always superior compared to 
choices based on intuition (Denno 2003; Simon 1955; Von Neumann/Morgenstern 2007), 
there are situations in which intuitive choice elicitation might yield better outcomes (e.g., 
Novak/Hoffman 2009). Accordingly, practitioners should strategically evaluate whether 
within the product category of their offered products and services a certain choice outcome is 
subjective or objective and then adjust the offered choice expression modalities accordingly.  
However, as the objective choice quality does not necessarily result in subjective perceptions 
of choice quality (Schwartz et al. 2002), the second research questions was formulated: 
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Second research question: What is the impact of manual and oral choice expression 
modalities on subjective choice satisfaction in a choice situation with subjective outcome? 
The sections 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 address this research question in the context of Study 2 of 
the present dissertation. Research implies that in choice situations in which it is impossible to 
make an ORC, because little information is available and the choice outcome is uncertain, 
individuals seem to be more satisfied with an expressed choice if it is based on intuition rather 
than on thoroughly deliberation (Dijksterhuis et al. 2006; Wilson et al. 1993). Because the 
results of Study 1 (Chapter 3) imply that oral choice expression does not induce Type 2 
processing, and thus individuals retain intuitive Type 1 processing (e.g., Evans 2007), it was 
conjectured in Study 2 that oral choice expression yields higher levels of choice satisfaction 
than manual choice expression in situations in which the choice outcome is uncertain and 
individuals receive little information. In one laboratory experiment (Experiment 1a) and four 
field experiments (Experiments 1b, 2, 3, and 4) individuals were offered two ostensibly 
different choice options and asked to choose only one of them. Unknown to the individuals, it 
was always manipulated whether they were either instructed to express their choice orally or 
manually. Because choice satisfaction constitutes the most applicable satisfaction measure for 
the purpose of rigorous hypothesis testing (see section 2.1.3 for an extensive discussion), 
individuals were asked about their satisfaction with their choice prior consuming or using it. 
The results imply that indeed oral choice expressions yield higher levels of choice satisfaction 
than manual choice expression. As important boundary condition and in line with the 
conjecture that an intuitive processing style (i.e., Type 1 processing) constitutes the 
underlying mechanism of the obtained results, Experiment 3 and Experiment 4 in section 4.7 
and 4.8 respectively, show that oral and manual choice expression yields similar levels of 
choice satisfaction if Type 2 processing is externally triggered. 
From a theoretical point of view, this result is particularly valuable as it further supports the 
initial assumption that the modality in which a choice is expressed does influence choice and 
subjective perceptions related to it. Particularly, as the choice situations comprised 
uncertainty and little information, the obtained effects are independent from any form of 
preexisting preferences and other external factors. Besides this main theoretic contribution, 
the methods applied in section 4.7 and 4.8 further add to the research in the field of dual 
processing theory. More precisely, by inducing Type 2 processing by means of altered 
auditory feedback, an entirely new method of external cognition induction was developed and 
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introduced in section 4.7. Although in section 4.8 Type 2 processing was induced by a 
common and established method of manipulating the fluency of information 
(Alter/Oppenheimer 2009; Diemand-Yauman/Oppenheimer/Vaughan 2011; 
Gervais/Norenzayan 2012; Song/Schwarz 2008a), this section comprised to the best 
knowledge the first comprehensive overview of specific and concrete font disfluency 
manipulations applied in previous studies. As such Study 2 comprises a first attempt for the 
provision of objective recommendations for the execution and application of disfluency 
manipulations for future research. 
From a practical point of view, the obtained results imply that yet again the decision which 
choice expression modalities should be offered to consumers should be a strategic and not a 
random one. Particularly, when making an ORC is not possible, as it is often the case for 
various product categories, consumers appear to be more satisfied with their choices when 
they expressed them orally instead of manually. Because customer satisfaction has a positive 
direct and indirect impact on various important measures, such as revenue and profit, the 
consideration of which choice expression modalities to offer might steer corporate success. 
Additionally, the results indicate that the external induction of Type 2 processing might 
attenuate the level of choice satisfaction in the specific choice situation when little 
information is available and an ORC is infeasible. Although this insight has already practical 
relevance itself, it also directly links to the third research question: 
Third research question: Is the impact of manual and oral choice expression modalities on 
choice satisfaction in a choice situation with subjective outcome mediated by the level of 
intuitive decision making? 
In line with the assumption that an intuitive choice mode due to Type 1 processing is 
responsible for the observed effect of augmented levels of choice satisfaction, it is reasonable 
to conjecture that this effect is mediated by the level of intuitive decision making. In other 
words, this implies for choice situations comprising choice uncertainty and little information, 
that the more a certain choice is based on intuition, the higher is the level of choice 
satisfaction. The results of a moderated mediation analyses (Hayes 2012), supports the 
conjecture that the positive effect of oral choice expression on the level of choice satisfaction 
is indeed mediated by the level of intuitive decision making. 
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These findings further support the theoretical conjecture that oral choice expression is related 
to intuitive decision making. As such, it adds to the insights on the underlying mechanisms 
for why manual and oral choice expression modalities impact choice differently. Additionally, 
it implies that intuitive decision making augments choice satisfaction in choice situations with 
little information and choice uncertainty (Wilson et al. 1993). Although previous studies 
implicitly support this connection, the focal study is one of the first that provides explicit 
support. 
Detached from the insights about choice expression modalities, this finding is very essential 
from a practical point of view as it implies that an intuitive mindset increases the subjective 
quality of choice if the outcome of a choice is subjective. Considering that the outcome of 
most consumer choices is subjective, because products within a certain product category often 
comprise very similar features and the objective performance does not significantly differ 
(Batra et al. 2000; van Rompay/Fransen/ Borgelink 2014), marketers might therefore increase 
customer satisfaction by simply impeding the induction of Type 2 processing. This implies 
that the usual practice of offering a huge amount of information and providing comparisons 
with competitive products (Kivetz/Simonson, 2000; Lee/Lee 2004) might be a 
disadvantageous for ordinary consumer products. However, whether this finding can be 
generalized and whether this finding remains robust in different choice setting is left to future 
research. 
In conclusion, the present dissertation constitutes an important step towards the investigation 
of the impact of different modalities of choice expression on the objective and subjective 
quality of choice. The empirical results imply that the manual choice expression can increase 
the likelihood of making an ORC if the choice outcome is objective and that oral choice 
expression can increase choice satisfaction if the choice situation comprises uncertainty and 
little information. According to these findings, marketers but also researchers are invited to 
strategically assess which modalities of choice expression might yield optimal outcomes for a 
given choice situation. 
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General Appendix 
I 
Experimental Material Experiment 1 (Monty Hall Game), Study 1 
 
 
Picture 1: Envelopes in the Monty Hall Game 
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III 
Experimental Material Experiment 2 (CRT), Study 1 
Please choose the correct answer to the following questions. Please read the questions 
carefully and then decide which answer is correct by taking the small piece of paper with 
the letter of the correct answer. 
 
1.) A bat and baseball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs 1 dollar more than the ball. How 
much does the ball cost? 
A 
 
B  C  D  E  F 
2 cents  5 cents  10 cents  15 cents  20 cents  50 cents 
 
 
2.) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 products how long would it take 100 machines 
to make 100 products? 
A  B  C  D  E  F 
5 min.  10 min.  20 min.  50 min.  100 min.  105 min. 
 
 
3.) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half 
of the lake? 
A  B  C  D  E  F 
12 days  17 days  22 days  24 days  36 days  47 days 
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IV 
Experimental Material Experiment 2 (Syllogism reasoning Task), Study 1 
In this task you must suppose that the two premises are true and you have to limit yourself only to the 
information contained in these two premises. This is very important.  
Please read the questions carefully and then decide which answer is correct according to the two premises by 
saying the letter of the correct answer to the Research Assistant. 
 
1.) 
Premises:  1.) All Europeans are blonde. 
  2.) Mr. X is blonde. 
Conclusion:        Mr. X is European. 
A The conclusion does not follow logically from the premises 
  
B The conclusion follows logically from the premises 
  
2.) 
Premises:  1.) All persons in group 1 are smart. 
  2.) Mr. X is in group 1. 
Conclusion:       Mr. X is smart. 
A The conclusion does not follow logically from the premises 
  
B The conclusion follows logically from the premises 
 
3.) 
Premises:  1.) All mammals walk. 
  2.) Whales are mammals. 
Conclusion:        Whales walk. 
A The conclusion follows logically from the premises 
  
B The conclusion does not follow logically from the premises 
  
4.) 
Premises:   1.) All things that have a motor need oil 
  2.) Automobiles need oil 
Conclusion:        Automobiles have motors. 
A The conclusion follows logically from the premises 
  
B The conclusion does not follow logically from the premises 
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V 
 
Experimental Material Experiment 3 (RBP ‘Marble Choice Experiment), Study 1 
 
Picture 2: Small and Large Bowls containing Marbles 
 
Fraction Correct Answer 
Share of Participants indicating 
Correct Answer 
9
27
 33.33% 59.5% 
18
200
 9% 63.5% 
4
16
 25% 73.0% 
1
30
 3.33% 52.7% 
10
100
 10% 78.4% 
Table 10: Experiment 3, Study 1, Fraction-solving (Appendix) 
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VI 
 
Experimental Material Experiment 1a (Paper Stack Experiment), Study 2  
 
Picture 3: Paper stacks placed next to each other (graphical facsimile)  
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VII 
 
Experimental Material Experiment 1b (Cola Study), Study 2  
 
Picture 4: Cola cups placed next to each other including position signs 
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VIII 
 
Experimental Material Experiment 2 (Nougat Study), Study 2  
 
Picture 5: Nougat samples placed next to each other including position signs (German) for 
decisions expressed orally or by taking 
 
 
Picture 6: Nougat samples placed next to each other including position signs (German) for 
decisions expressed by button pressing 
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IX 
 
Experimental Set-up Experiment 3 (Headphone/Cola Experiment), Study 2 
 
Picture 7: Display of the experimental set-up  
 
 
Picture 8: Headphones BOSE QuietComfort 25 
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X 
 
Experimental Material Experiment 4 (Cognition/Cola Experiment), Study 2 
 
Picture 9: Cola cups placed next to each other including position signs (German) 
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XI Additional Statistics 
 
 
 Manual 
(N = 44) 
Oral 
(N = 44) 
z-value Mann-Whitney U  
 
Correct answers 
 
Md = 1 
 
Md = 0 
 
3.64 
(p = .000) 
 
 
566 
Intuitive answers Md = 2 Md = 2 2.85 
(p = .004) 
 
642 
Table 11: Experiment 2, Study 1, CRT: Non-parametric results (Appendix) 
 
 
 Manual 
(N = 44) 
Oral 
(N = 44) 
z-value Mann-Whitney U  
 
Correct answers 
 
Md = 4 
 
Md = 3 
 
2.97 
(p = .003) 
 
642 
Table 12: Experiment 2, Study 1, Syllogism: Non-parametric results (Appendix) 
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Comparison 
(IV) 
Without 
control 
NFC FI 
Intention to 
win 
RBP 
 
ML vs. OL 
 
p = .036 
 
a: p = .02 
b: p = .06 
 
a: p = .037 
b: p = .94 
 
a: p = .034 
b: p = .35 
 
a: p = .029 
b: p = .36 
 
MH vs. OH 
 
p = .63 
 
a: p = .62 
b: p = .59 
 
a: p = .63 
b: p = .91 
 
a: p = .76 
b: p = .02 
 
a: p = .66 
b: p = .39 
 
ML vs. OH 
 
p = .48 
 
a: p = .51 
b: p = .51 
 
a: p = .49 
b: p = .87 
 
a: p = .49 
b: p = .35 
 
a: p = .53 
b: p = .48 
 
ML vs. MH 
 
p = .24 
 
a: p = .25 
b: p = .44 
 
a: p = .22 
b: p = .76 
 
a: p = .26 
b: p = .56 
 
a: p = .21 
b: p = .29 
 
OL vs. OH 
 
p = .006 
 
a: p = .005 
b: p = .12 
 
a: p = .006 
b: p = .68 
 
a: p = .005 
b: p = .013 
 
a: p = .005 
b: p = .13 
 
OL vs. MH 
 
p = .002 
 
a: p = .001 
b: p = .09 
 
a: p = .002 
b: p = .91 
 
a: p = .002 
b: p = .014 
 
a: p = .002 
b: p = .48 
Table 13: Experiment 3, Study 1: Main effect with and without controls (Appendix) 
Description Table 11: 
P-values obtained from binary regression: Effect of conditions (IV) on DV (i.e., ORC; 
choosing the small bowl), controlling for NFC, FI, ‘Intention to Win’ and ‘RBP knowledge’, 
respectively; a = effect of IV on DV with control, b = effect of control on DV. 
IV: M = Manual, O = Oral, L = Low cognition, H = High cognition 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General Appendix  145 
 
 
 
 
 Coefficient 
Speaking (S) 
Coefficient 
Button (B) 
Coefficient 
Taking (T) 
DF P-value 
 
Contrast code 1: 
Speaking vs. 
Taking and Button  
 
1 
 
-.5 
 
-.5 
 
112.63 
 
.006 
 
Contrast code 2 
Speaking vs. Button  
 
1 
 
-1 
 
0 121.91 .041 
Contrast code 3: 
Speaking vs. Taking  
1 0 -1 124.18 .005 
Contrast code 4:  
Button vs. Taking  
 
0 1 -1 123.22 .33 
Table 14: Experiment 2, Study 2: Contrast codes coefficients and results for adjusted DF (Appendix) 
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